Prisoners as pawns

Press, Volume CXI, Issue 32634, 16 June 1971, Page 16

Prisoners as pawns

The unexplained refusal of the North Vietnamese Government to accept 13 disabled prisoners of war last week has dashed hopes of an early repatriation of South Vietnamese and United States prisoners held by North Vietnam. About 8500 North Vietnamese servicemen are held in prisoner-of-war camps in South Vietnam, compared with some 3500 men of the Army of the Republic of South Vietnam and perhaps 400 United States servicemen held in North Vietnam. The negotiations for an exchange of prisoners culminated in the dispatch last week of 13 disabled North Vietnamese by ship from South Vietnam to a rendezvous off the coast of North Vietnam. While the ship was on its way to the rendezvous, however, the Hanoi Government notified Saigon that it would not accept the prisoners.

The 13 prisoners so belatedly refused repatriation were the only North Vietnamese, among 660 disabled prisoners held in the South, who had said they wanted to go home. The others evidently preferred to stay in South Vietnam—perhaps because they were afraid of reprisals in the event of their returning home. But had Hanoi accepted even 13 repatriates, the North Vietnamese Government would have come under strong pressure to repatriate some of its A.R.V.N. and United States prisoners. Hanoi’s refusal is further evidence of Communist intentions to use the exchange of prisoners for political ends. In both South Vietnam and the United States, but especially the latter, the exchange of prisoners has become a political issue. If President Nixon were able to secure the release of all United States prisoners this would greatly strengthen his hand in dealing with the anti-war groups in his electorate. The reduction of United States troops in Vietnam has so far been accomplished without weakening the allied military position in South Vietnam; it has also taken some of the wind out of the sails of those who oppose American intervention. But the release of American prisoners remains a hot political issue. If he were able to secure the release of these prisoners, the President might not be nearly so concerned to withdraw the remaining United States troops from Vietnam.

By playing on the hopes and fears of the American electorate, North Vietnam may yet extract significant military advantages from the Americans in return for the repatriation of a few hundred American servicemen. Hanoi’s chief negotiator in Paris, Mr Thuy Xuan, said last month that once Mr Nixon had set a firm date for a full American withdrawal, other questions—“ including the question of “ captured military personnel ” —could be rapidly settled. But by setting a firm date, the United States would have given away its strongest bargaining argument, and would be in no position to resist further demands from Hanoi, such as Communist participation in a coalition government in Saigon and the cessation of all United States aid, economic as well as military, to South Vietnam.

The tactics of the North Vietnamese are encouraged by America’s dissenters; the more active and vocal the dissent, the more difficult the task of negotiating the release of A.R.V.N. and United States prisoners. In such situations a democracy faces its totalitarian adversary with one hand tied behind its back. All Mr Nixon can do now is to refrain from public expressions of regret over the failure of this attempt to begin an exchange of prisoners—and wait for the next opportunity to negotiate. The protests of the anti-war groups notwithstanding, the release of all prisoners is likely to be negotiated only when North Vietnam accepts that prisoners cannot be used as pawns in a game to secure strategic or political advantage. < 5