Japan, Rich And Powerful, Pauses At The Crossroads

Press, Volume CX, Issue 32391, 2 September 1970, Page 6

Japan, Rich And Powerful, Pauses At The Crossroads

(From DAVID BARBER, NiiP.A.' Staff Corretpnnaent)

TOKYO. Twenty-five years after the end of the war and in the dying days of Expo 70—the guttering symbol of a quarter century’s progress—the rich and powerful industrial giant that is Japan stands poised at the crossroads, dithering about which route to take into the future. >

. Japan, a schizophrenic combination of the old and the new, the East and the West, is in a dilemma. What is it going to do with its burgeoning wealth? What sort of a role is it going to play in international politics? How is it to develop its defence policy, and is it ever to get the nuclear weapons from which it alone has suffered? Japan’s uncertainty is being watched anxiously by the whole world and particularly by the countries of Asia and the Pacific, whose destinies are already closely shadowed by the Rising Sun and who have good reason to remember the dark days of Japanese power in the 19405.

Since those days Japan has lain low in the international political and military fields, while it regathered its national strength with such success that it now has the third-biggest gross national product in the world. But today it realises that it can no longer hide its might under a bustle of economic activity. And the world watches and wonders as Japan pauses to decide which way to jump. Aid, Defence

The twin horns of the Japanese dilemma are her future political role in Asia—which is closely allied with

economic and aid policies in the region—and defence. The means and methods of building up their industries and exports from the end-of-war devastation have earned the Japanese the tags “yellow Yankees” and “economic animals” throughout South-East Asia. The build-up of their “self-defence” forces now 249,000 strong, although the post-war constitution specifically forbids the maintenance of land, sea and air forces—has sparked fears of a revived, imperial-style militarism.

Tokyo officials smart under these charges and deny them but recognise that they must be taken into account in formulating new policies. Their problems are compounded by the indecision of Asian leaders who want and expect Japanese economic aid, while at the same time fear its consequences and believe Japan must, by reason of her wealth, play a greater role in the region, but are alarmed at her potential political and military power. Diplomatic Surge Japan has already begun to feel her way, with a recent surge of diplomatic activity, its highlight her attendance at the Djakarta conference on Cambodia in May. She regards Aspac as an important political sounding-board and recognises that she must “come clean” on her future intentions in the region and make it clear where she stands.

Foreign Ministry officials insist that Japan's main role will be the supply of

economic aid to developing countries. Last year, she dished out SUSI26Om, 60 per cent of it to South-East Asia. She has vowed to provide aid amounting to 1 per cent of her gross national product by 1975 and on current forecasts this will be a staggering SUS4OOm. But to many Asian countries basic principles of Japanese aid so far have been to give away with one hand, take back some with the other, and keep the rest on tight strings. This has produced economic colonialism of disturbing proportions.

Tuuku Upset The Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tunku Abdul Rahman, recently rattled the peace and harmony of Expo 70 by rapping his hosts for their high-interest-rate loans, self-interest scale joint ventures, and insistence on placing “buy Japan” tags on all foreign aid development projects. A recent significant pointer to the future was japan’s promise of SUSIS9m aid to South Korea, made at a time when the United States was announcing plans to reduce the number of troops in that country. It is clear that aid to that extent, and the promise of banding out SUS4OOm a year by the mid-70s, will give Japan proportionate political influence and responsibility. The questions are: how will she use this influence, and will the responsibility have to be backed by military power. The defence debate is

gathering pace in Japan, and observers detect a fastchanging attitude to the nation’s military forces. There is open talk of the necessity to protect trade routes and overseas investments, and opinion polls indicate a softening in opposition to the possession of nuclear weapons. U.S. Treaty The official attitude is that Japan will become more selfreliant in conventional defence while continuing to shelter under the American nuclear umbrella through the 10 - year • old Japan - United States Security Treaty, renewed last June, but now allowing either party to withdraw on a year’s notice. But Japanese leaders are for the first time talking publicly in terms of the treaty being not permanent Japan is about to take joint control of some of the hitherto fully United States-run 123 military bases throughout the country. The Finance Minister, Mr Takeo Fukuda, widely tipped to succeed Mr Eisaku Sato as Prime Minister, has said: “It is a disgrace that Japan has to depend upon the United States for her defence." And Mr Yasuhiro Nakasone, a Cabinet Minister and head of the Defence Agency who is also regarded as a future Prime Minister, believes that defence is the sole responsibility of any sovereign country. In this context, there is something totally unreal about continued official protestations that while Japan will become “self-reliant” she will not defend herself to the ultimate degree by acquiring the ultimate deterrent

Final Move The return of Okinawa in 1972 will remove the final stigma of 25 years “occupation,” and clear the way for a more realistic—if more disturbing to the outside world —defence policy. It seems inevitable in the long run that one of the world’s big three economic powers cannot remain satisfied to be an “also started” in the political and military stakes. Japan’s hesitance today in charting its future role in the outside world is aggravated by the domestic scene. The Japanese people have not shared in tiie riches and benefits of the miracle recovery from Hiroshima 1945 to Osaka 1970. Their per capita income does not measure up to their nation's wealth, and they struggle against a rising cost of living and a deteriorating social environment. They know this and they are demanding a better deal. Mr Sato’s Liberal Democratic Party will ignore their demands, especially those from the young, at its peril. Still Uncertain

With this in mind, the Tokyo Government is in no hurry to make the decisions being pressed upon it by America, Asia, the rest of the world, and the changing circumstances of the seventies. It recognises that Asian security is a major problem. It does not want the United States to make an abrupt withdrawal into isolationism. At the same time it does not want an America frustrated by continuing unreasonable demands on its Treasury and man-power. It wants to play a role suited to its pride and prosperity. But it does not want to wear out its welcome in Asia or put on a military policeman’s cap. “In fact,” says a high-rank-ing Foreign Ministry official, with a great deal of wistful thinking, “for Japan, the status quo is no bad thing.” But Japan is not only at the crossroads, it is at the point of no return. These decisions will have to be made—and soon.