AIMS QUESTIONED

Press, Volume CX, Issue 32385, 26 August 1970, Page 13

AIMS QUESTIONED

(By FRANK FROSCH, of United Press Internationa!, through N.Z.P.A.) PHNOM PENH (Cambodia), Aug. 25.

The Communists were thrown back after fierce fighting when they attacked the outer defences of Phnom Penh, but the question remains whether they were really trying to take the capital or rather laying the grounds for a final, later assault.

"We have stopped the attack on Phnom Penh,” the weary Cambodian battalion commander said before boarding a boat that would take his battalion out of the line after two days of fighting last week. “Phnom Penh will never be attacked,” said Major Am Rong, the official Cambodian military spokesman, violating the cardinal rule of military briefers—“Never say never.”

He was delighted about the outcome of the fighting which had blunted a major Communist attack on the city’s outermost defences. If the Communist thrust was directed at Phnom Penh itself, however, the North Vietnamese violated every rule in the military manifesto they have authored on the battlefields of Vietnam. After occupying the town of Prek Tameak, the Communists swept southward. They intentionally smashed head-on into the understrength 52nd Cambodian Battalion seven miles north of the capital city. The 52nd Battalion had tried to construct hasty de-

fensive positions, and voluntarily put its back to the wall. It dug in against the muddy bank of the Mekong River. If overwhelmed, the soldiers would have had only two choices—die or drown. But the . Cambodian soldiers did hold against an estimated three reinforced North Vietnamese battalions. The Cambodians took almost 150 casualties before being reinforced with troops from the 65th Cambodian Battalion, ferried in on World War II landing craft The Cambodians claimed that they killed 500 North Vietnamese troops in the battle and forced the Communists to relinquish whatever plans they originally had. ‘Highly Unlikely’ It remains highly unlikely however, that the Communists were trying to reach Phnom Penh. Had the Communists committed themselves to the mission of attacking the city centre of Phnom Penh, they would not have bogged themselves down in a needless, expensive attack on the 52nd Battalion, seven miles north of Phnom Penh’s central district, in the opinion of some military observers in Phnom Penh. Morever, Communist resupply is slow. It often takes days to supply a battalion with enough ammunition for a single short assault The Communists are not allowed the frivolity of expending their vital ammunition on minor targets. And then there is the problem of the Mekong River —400 yards wide at Prek Tameak and swollen, muddy-brown as its flooding time nears.

Mekong’s Significance

“Let me put this in perspective,” Major Am Rong said after Cambodian victory was certain. “The Communists were driving down the east side of the Mekong River. Phnom

Penh is on the west side of the river.

“It is not possible for the enemy to attack Phnom Penh by crossing the river. Nature helps us to defend our city.” At no time during the Communist push were any North Vietnamese boats or rafts uncovered by Cambodian troops. As the Mekong winds into Phnom Penh, it stretches • a mile wide. At flood stage it is estimated to have an 11 mile an hour current. For a North Vietnamese soldier carrying full battle gear, the swim would be nothing short of miraculous. However, the real meaning of the Communist offensive so near Phnom Penh may be lost in all the discussion about the possible doom of the capital. ‘Nothing New’ Journalists trying to get to the battle area were told by minor political officials in the Prek Tameak area that Communist presence was nothing new.

“The Communists have been round Prek Tameak for almost two months,” a Cambodian district chief said. “They have been propagandising the people and recruiting Khmers to fight with them. They have been attempting to set up a base.” In terms of Communist strategy, as dictated first by Mao Tse-tung and restated by Vo Nguyen Giap, the establishment of a base area laying hard against Phnom Penh is a logical progression. The Communists might use such a base to hide the enormous volume of ammunition needed for a final coup de mort against the capital. They could use the dense marshes and swamps to hide large numbers of troops from Cambodian and American aerial reconnaissance. Additionally, they might use the base area north of Phnom Penh as an excellent launching pad for rocket and mortar attacks against Phnom Penh. Thus far, not a single rocket or mortar has fallen on the city.

Attack Route

If the Mekong River provides a natural defence for Phnom Penh—as Major Am Rong suggested—it also provides a high-speed attack route as well.

In the swamps and marshes north of the city, the Communists might prepare the boats, sampans and rafts that would carry their troops to the heart of Phnom Penh under the cover of a heavy mortar and rocket barrage “When the attack on Phnom Penh comes, it will not begin at an outpost seven miles away guarding our distant city defence,” one Cambodian officer said. “It will begin in the middle of Phnom Penh. “And make no mistake about it, you will know it when it happens.”