Attitudes To U.S. Middle East Peace Proposals Examined

Press, Volume CX, Issue 32361, 29 July 1970, Page 6

Attitudes To U.S. Middle East Peace Proposals Examined

(By DR RONALD R. MACINTYRE, lecturer in political science, Vnicersity of Canterbury)

Whatever President Nasser says and does today, political commentators will read significance into it. Wise or unwise as this may seem, President Nasser, leader of the small, relatively poor and backward State of Egypt, has acquired world importance through the crucial part which he is playing in the Arab-Israeli war—a war fraught with the awesome consequences of Great Power involvement.

President NaAser’s present willingness to consider the American peace plan calling for a 90-day cease-fire, joint Arab-Israeli acceptance of the 1967 Security Council resolution, and the re-establishment of the mediating mission of the Swedish diplomat, Gunnar Jarring, at least on the surface augurs well for a new phase of moderation in the 23-year-old Arab-Israeli conflict.

are united on one thing—that an unfavourable peace settlement between the Israelis and the Arab States would nullify the Palestinian revolution. Thus any settlement with Israel which deals only with territories acquired since the Six Day War and falls short of the interests and “rights” of the “exiled" Palestinians will be opposed by the guerrillas. Difficult Path In short the simple path to peace in the Middle East is as fraught with obstacles as ever it was. While some Arab States are prepared to give tacit consent, others, such as Syria and Iraq, completely reject the American peace proposals if for no other reason than out of ideological reflex

:to suggested “imperialist” schemes for resolving the Arab-Israeli question. The 1 Super Powers are likewise . each watching and waiting, i viewing each others' actions i with grave suspicion, while - seeking political gains at the : other’s expense. The Palesti- ' nians meanwhile, the ones ; who are most concerned, are - at sixes and sevens with each other as they are with the participating Arab States in the conflict But as each interested party manoeuvres for • position, often at the expense i of the other, the shooting ’ goes on, more refugees die in i horrible circumstances, while i the world watches and waits i with bated breath lest Super • Power involvement . with - client States in the Middle i East escalates into total i world war. ’■

But perhaps there is some danger in reading too much into Nasser’s statement since it was made shortly after a long stay in the Soviet Union. Indeed it is tempting to ask: are the Russians really behind the Arabs in endeavours to reach a peaceful settlement of the conflict, or is this but another Russo-Egypt-ian ruse to gain maximum advantage out of American peace initiatives? As yet the reaction of the Israeli government to the peace plan is unknown, but prominent Israeli leaders have nonetheless jumped the gun in making observations. The Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, who represents the more moderate wing of the Israeli government, saw in the Egyptians* willingness to accept the peace plan as a convenient means of using the 80-day cease fire in order to emplace Russian SAM 3 missiles along the west bank of the Canal. Second, he well realised that any withdrawal of Israeli pressure from the guerillas would lead to stepped up violations of Israel’s frontiers. While so far Israel has not categorically rejected American peace initiatives, it is clear that acceptance of the proposals will not be made without qualification. Israel’s Reaction Israel’s lukewarm reaction to the present, as of previous, American peace initiatives in the Middle East stems from the fact that she insists on direct negotiations with the Arab states; - Big power involvement on the other hand is seen in Israel to complicate the issue, giving the Arab states the opportunity of avoiding the “real issue.” Fears are also mounting in Israel that the Americans might be trying to improve their global l relations with the Russians, as of their local Interests with the Arabs, at the expense of Israel. American unwillingness to supply Israel with all her arms requirements is given as evidence of her detachment from Israel. Meanwhile, the Israelis argue that the Egyptians are acquiring unlimited arms requirements from the Russians. Friction over arm sales has thus imbued the Israelis with some distrust of American peace initiatives in the region. But if suspician and mounting irritability with the United States have grown in Israel since the Six Day War, this has been tempered to some extent by Israeli fears of growing Soviet involvement in Egypt and the wider Middle East Since the Six Day War Soviet military and technical assistance has been increasing, particularly in Egypt and to a lesser extent in Syria, Iraq, Sudan and of late, Libya. Bases have been acquired in Alexandria and Lattakia, while the Suez Canal has been hurdled as the Soviet Union consolidates its position in the Sudan. Recent shipments of heavy military equipment to Libya also suggest that the Soviet Union is entering in the wake

of the American and British , departure. Soviet Middle Eastern policy seems designed to extend lines of effective communication between the Black Sea . and the Indian Ocean. This has been partly achieved and { the Soviet Union now has ' several reliable bases in the . Mediterranean. However, the ' closure of the Suez Canal J limits effective Russian naval ■ expansion to the south and, in particular, in the region 1 of the Persian Gulf which Britain is expected to vacate next year. Thus it would dearly be to the Russians’ advantage to get a speedy settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict if for no other reason than to permit further scope for extending their influence south of the Middle East But in Moscow there exists the realisation that to retain an effective hold on their Arab allies they must ensure a favourable peace settlement Ironically the Soviets are being bottled up at the Suez while seeking for that far reaching solution acceptable to the Arabs but anathema to the Israelis:—unilateral withdrawal from occupied territories as a prior condition for negotiations on a peace settlement

It remains clear, however, that Israel will not accept anything short of direct nego-i tiations with the Arab States, nor will she accept unilateral withdrawal as a prior condi-’ tion to any peace settlement. For to withdraw unilaterally Israel would be playing her trump card. Two decades and more of distrust for the Arabs, compounded by Arab identification with the Soviet Union, drives Israeli leaders away from surrendering their gains as a price for “trust” Guerrillas’ Belief But if stalemate exists between the major belligerent States, the various guerrilla movements believe that they have the answer: "Complete liberation of Palestine from the Zionists.” What in fact they mean by such a statement is by no means clear. There are some like the Popular Front for the. Liberation of Palestine who conceive of the total annihilation of Israel and the return to the situation existing before the United Nations partition resolution of November, 1947. Yasir Arafat, leader of the largest and most influential guerrilla movement, Al Fatah, does not however subscribe to this view. For him the essential thing is that Israel must be de-Zionised and a democratic State of Palestine created where Arabs and Jews share equal rights. Idealistic as this may be, it also includes substantial reparations to Palestinian refugees who lost their property and possessions in the fighting between the Arabs and Israel since 1947, However, it would be wrong to believe that any unity of sentiment exists between the major and splinter Palestinian guerrilla movements which have proliferated since the Six Day War. But if they differ over principles, they