The Press WEDNESDAY, JULY 15, 1970. New Moves In Paris Talks

Press, Volume CX, Issue 32349, 15 July 1970, Page 16

The Press WEDNESDAY, JULY 15, 1970. New Moves In Paris Talks

Suggestions that the United States Government is about to attempt to revive the Paris peace talks on the Vietnam war are, at the moment, no more than suggestions; but there are reasons to think that the Communists would not be entirely unresponsive. The day after American servicemen were withdrawn from Cambodia President Nixon broke the six months lull in the talks by appointing a new chief negotiator, Mr David Bruce, to replace Mr Cabot Lodge, who resigned in December, 1969. Mr Bruce is being sent to Saigon to see the situation for himself; he has also been asked to attend a meeting in Washington of the National Security Council, the chief source of defence policy, before he goes to Paris.

Mr Bruce, a Democrat who has served five Presidents, has been ambassador in Paris, Bonn, and London. His most recent post was as ambassador to Britain from 1961 to 1969, a record term. At the age of 72 he was thought to be in permanent retirement; his appointment, and his acceptance of the post, are signs that the United States believes that the deadlock in Paris can be broken. His appointment as the head of the negotiating team, a position which he will take up next month, has disturbed the South Vietnamese Government. Mr Bruce has not served in South-East Asia; he is said to be something of a “ dove ” in his private views about the war. He is likely to be more flexible than his predecessor; he might even be prepared to talk privately with the Communists, particularly with the North Vietnamese, without the presence of representatives from Saigon.

However distasteful this may be to the South Vietnamese it has become clear, during the two years in which the talks have lumbered through 73 sessions without any real progress, that the United States may have to act by itself if it is not prepared to underwrite the policy aims of members of the Saigon Government who still believe in a total military victory. This might be a good time for the United States to act Troop withdrawals from Cambodia and South Vietnam have demonstrated President Nixon’s desire to scale down the war. The Communists in South Vietnam appear to be on the defensive, partly because of the destruction of their Cambodian sanctuaries, but much more because of the less spectacular success of pacification

programmes in the Vietnamese countryside. There is also the prospect of a more effective antiCommunist alliance between Asian States if the fighting drags on.

North Vietnam may be as eager as the United States to withdraw from the war if a way can be found to get out without appearing to desert the Viet Cong or admit military defeat Since Ho Chi Minh died nearly a year ago North Vietnam’s “ collective “ leadership ” has split into two factions, one committed to military victory in the South, whatever the cost to North Vietnam, the other more concerned to get on with “ socialist construction ” in the North. Those who want to rebuild in the North appear to be coming out on top. They might well prefer to see a greater share of North Vietnam’s limited resources, heavily drained by the war, applied to their development policies. So far there have been only ritual denunciations of the United States and its new chief negotiator from the Communists: that does not rule out the possibility of some progress behind the scenes. An understanding between the United States and North Vietnam would not end the war; it could lead to a gradual “ withering away ” of the fighting. At the present time this looks like the best outcome anyone can hope for.