BERSATU PADU-I Technical And Health Problems Examined

Press, Volume CIX, Issue 32275, 18 April 1970, Page 15

BERSATU PADU-I Technical And Health Problems Examined

/By

NAYLOR HILLARY)

An air of unreality surrounds British participation in the military exercise Bersatu Padu in South-East Asia during the next two months.

In the first part of the exercise this month a brigade group of 2000 men and their equipment, including 200 vehicles, is being flown from Britain to Singapore in two weeks.

| 'Hie brigade will then undergo six weeks of jungle training before it takes part in “operations” with New Zealand, Australian, Malaysian and Singaporean forces. The exercise is designed to demonstrate Britain’s capacity to intervene in SouthEast Asia to help her allies after all permanent British forces are withdrawn late next year.

Months of planning have gone into the exercise: so ■far it has run very smoothly; the experience should make the “real thing” easier to mount

But Bersatu Padu (which means "complete unity”) poses a dilemma for the British services. Their mettle has been stirred by the magnitude of the exercise, yet most senior officers are opposed to the withdrawal from South-East Asia, in part because they believe the

return of the troops in a real emergency will not be possible.

Britain’s forces have been so reduced that greater military involvement in Europe, if the United States continues to scale down its forces there or if Britain joins the Common Market, could leave no troops available to use outside Europe. After 1971 the only British troops anywhere in the Far East will be the small Hong Kong garrison. The Royal Navy will have its present Far East fleet of 30 ships reduced to two frigates and five minesweepers, also based on Hong Kong. Resources Strained To find troops for Bersatu Padu the army has been forced to scrape up just about all its available forces in Britain, and to adjust its

commitment to keeping the peace in Ulster. In effect, this means that Britain would find it difficult to maintain her commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and still send a significant force to any crisis outside Europe. Two crises at once—and in this sense keeping the garrison in Ulster amounts to a “permanent crisis”—is just about more than the army can handle. For this exercise the question of whether Britain's brigade strength mobile force could be further reinforced if the situation required has been ignored. All the attention has centred on the capacity to move a fixed number of troops quickly about the globe. But a crisis big enough to require 2000 troops at a few days notice could well be one that requires a much more sustained effort British politicians appear to have stopped thinking once the problem of the physical movement of the elite mobile strategic reserve has been overcome.

The exercise also appears to avoid significant technical difficulties which could occur in war. Singapore now offers a secured landing ■field, a friendly environment, ! adequate resources for supply, and there are locallyconditioned British troops on the spot with expert knowledge to pass on to the new j arrivals. The troops and their commanders are being given ‘ ample time to adjust to the 'climate, to recover from the of the trip, and to ! learn the exacting health and ■ hygiene procedures which i tropical warfare requires. None of these things might be available on any future occasion. More generally, doubts m ■ the British Army about the effectiveness of the concept ,of an airborne strategic i reserve centre on four issues I—training, flying rights, supporting equipment and medical factors. Britain itself offers few facilities for training troops. The area is so limited that even major tank exercises have to be held in West Germany.

Training Plans In the past British troops have enjoyed unrivalled training facilities in the wide spaces of the old Empire. In the future the Government has said it will rotate troops through jungle training facilities in the Caribbean and the Far East (as long as these are available) so that three battalions will always be fully trained, for jungle fighting. In practice, other demands on the army may make this impossible. The strategic reserve must also be trained to fight on the flanks of N.A.T.O.—in the desert or the Arctic—and in the “normal” conditions of Central Europe. Flying rights permission to fly over countries or to land in them to refuel with military aircraft—may be less of a problem. Britain has rights to fly to the Pacific through the Middle East or across parts of Africa. Alternatively, troops could be flown across North America, though this would nearly double the distance from Britain to Singapore. As aircraft performance improves refuelling stops will be less frequent. Some countries which could well withdraw the permissioii to fly over them have little capacity to enforce their ban if a real emergency made a violation Of air space worth the diplomatic crisis it would provoke. Difficulties with equipment are also not insurmountable. Troops required for peacekeeping or counter-insur-gency operations would probably not need their heaviest equipment and the remainder could be flown, with them. Air transport limitations have been an important factor in the design of recent new equipment in Britain and only the heaviest tanks and vehicles must now be moved by sea.

Medical Aspects The medical aspects of the rapid movement of troops, especially to a tropical climate, pose the greatest problems and the worst of these will be disguised by the present exercise. In Vietnam, for example, two-thirds of American servicemen in hospitals have

been put there by disease, not by the Communists. The prostitutes of Saigon are said to be one of General Giap’s most effective weapons. Heat fatigue, tropical diseases, and contaminated food and water also take a toll.

The British Army’s record of tropical health and hygiene is perhaps the best in the world. Its medical service has been a leader in research in tropical medicine. But when troops are moved suddenly to remote areas of operations then problems are compounded. It may simply not be possible to make sure that unseasoned troops carry out the regulations which have been designed to protect their health.

The Indian Army found in its operations in the Himalayas in 1962 against the Chinese that it was not enough to issue suitable clothing—it was virtually impossible to make sure it was used when troops sent from the plains went straight into action at high altitudes. British Army recruiting posters have used the attractions of service overseas as a positive inducement. The movement of the troops is relatively simple, but whether they would be fit to fight on arrival, or even lead a simple domestic existence is seldom considered or questioned.

In the heyday of the Indian Empire troops went out by sea from Britain: they had six weeks to adjust to changes of time and climate; they were seldom sent to the most debilitating areas (such as the North-West Frontier) before they had been in India for a year. Even during the Second World War there was usually some time for adjustments after arrival in a new theatre of war. British troops almost always found themselves reinforcing troops which had been in the new environment for some time. They had easy ■ access to expert advice on health and hygiene. Where troops were used suddenly in a new environment without experienced local support, and with no time to adjust, then the price paid was high. The failure of the British expeditionary force sent to Norway in 1940 was caused by the climate as much as by the Germans.

Serious Problem Dr H. L’Etang, writing in “Brassey’s Annual” for 1968, the British Armed Services’ Yearbook, states that the problem of adjustment to changes in time zones is also a serious matter for troops moved rapidly by air. Significant changes in mental alertness and abilities have been found in chess champions and racehorses, as well as in businessmen and diplomats, after prolonged flights round the world. These changes affect older men more than young ones: the effects may well pass unnoticed but they can impair judgment for up to five days while the body’s metabolism adjusts to the new time zone. The risks for an army commander confronted with critical decisions on arrival in a new sphere of operations must be considerable.

Good discipline and high morale can overcome many health problems, but there is no real substitute for a tradition of local knowledge and for a breathing space after rapid movement by air for the new arrivals. In Bersatu Padu all these problems can be ignored or dealt with relatively easily. In a real emergency'there would simply not be time. Even if Bersatu Padu shows that Britain retains the capacity to intervene in South-East Asia —in somewhat artificial conditions—it takes no account of the British Government’s will to intervene in any conflict, there after 1971. For New Zealand and Australia, as well as Singapore and Malaysia, this is the most important question of all. The British attitude towards involvement in South-East Asia will be considered in a later article.