Questions About Vietnam

Press, Volume CIX, Issue 32048, 24 July 1969, Page 13

Questions About Vietnam

(From DAVID EXEL, N.Z.P.A. staff correspondent) SINGAPORE, July 23.

A n examination of battlefield progress in Vietnam today, almost precisely five years after American aircraft first hit patrol craft and oil tanks in North Vietnam, can achieve little more than the same basic questions that have been asked for the last 250 weeks.

Official optimism is high, as it has been throughout the long, various war. But unofficial cynicism swirls round the streets of Saigon, through diplomatic ranks and at least the lower echelons of the Vietnamese Armed Forces, is given strong voice by foreign civilian residents, and reaches even into mess-hall conversations among “free world” soldiers.

Between plans and actualities the gap is still large. Between pacification statistics and the reality of murdered and kidnapped villagers, between land reform schemes and their implementation, between Army training programmes and performance in the field, between the ideal of political stability and the sort of manoeuvring aimed at ousting the Prime Minister (Mr Tran Van Huong), between the thousands of “chieu hoi” surrenders and the tiny proportion of genuine Communists rallying to the Government, between kill ratios and the continued

capability of Hanoi to infiltrate men and weapons—the gap between them, there’s the rub.

American Intentions

And over all the doubts hangs the giant question mark of American intentions. President Nixon, probably within the next few days, will announce further United States troop withdrawals. President Nguyen Van Thieu mentioned the possibility of withdrawing “all American infantry troops” by the end of next year. “Given the equipment, and the aid, we could replace them,” said the President.

“If he withdraws that many,” said a foreign diplomat, “I will be leaving at the same time.”

North Vietnam, officials continue to say, is “really hurting” under the impact of huge casualties suffered since the Tet offensive last year. But, adds an official American source, at least 80 per cent of the bomb damage in the North—after the North had received the greatest weight of bombs of any nation in history—has been repaired. And North Vietnamese units have been practising economy-of-forces tactics for the last several months. Rocket and mortar attacks cost little in manpower. Training Intensified

The training of Vietnamese Army units has taken on new impetus under the pressure of American withdrawals. In Phuoc Tuy province, Anzac units are detaching companies to work with the A.R.V.N. (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) batI taiions for a month or six

weeks. In the Northern Corps zone, American marines continue their “combined action platoon” programme with “popular force” platoons being stiffened by five-man fire teams.

The Anzacs are working with the 18th A.R.V.N. Division, a unit whose battlefield performance through years of war has been nothing short of appalling. One recentlyretrained battalion killed two Viet Cong the other day—there were cheers from Australian task force officers.

Two Viet Cong killed? Cheers? Progress?

Progress, certainly—but how long before this battalion can take the place of an American unit? Two years? Four? Decline In Usefulness

In the North, the marine “combined action platoon” programme has actually declined in usefulness. A year ago, marine fire teams were able to live with the platoons in the villages. Today, harried by Viet Cong, the marines move like shadows from village to village, never staying longer than one night so that the Viet Cong will not be-able deliberately to "take out” a marine-reinforced unit. In Saigon, President Thieu and his senior aides have recently announced a land reform programme which matches the Viet Cong’s own generosity to villagers with land belonging to absentee landlords. Close observers give the scheme a “hopeful” rating. Diem Idea

The doubts still nag: land reform was first proposed by President Ngo Dinh Diem more than a- decade ago. Ac-

complishments have been meagre. The new programme seems much improved, but... The “chieu hoi” (open arms) programme is much touted as bringing thousands of lower-ranking Viet Cong to the Government side. Its value is undoubted. But the numbers, large as they are, do not match the desertion rate from the South Vietnamese Armed Forces. Statistical Measure

Pacification progress, measured by statistics, is impressive. But in “relatively secure” hamlets, headmen are still murdered. Such a negative exercise as simply listing doubts about progress in Vietnam can be criticised on many fronts. It is “unhelpful to the war effort,” “destructive,” “bad for morale.” But no honest reporter can avoid the questions. And no honest official can pretend he has all the answers.

Is there time for the Government? Is there will among the people? Is there genuine weakness in Hanoi? Were this 1965, I for one, would be optimistic about the outcome of the Vietnam war. The programmes being started now—re-equipment of Vietnamese forces, land reform, the increase in advisory teams, operational training—these programmes, over a period of years, might easily prove sound. But this is 1969, and years of struggle lie behind, leaving their toll of American weariness.

Is there time left to shape stability? Or does further compromise at Paris, no matter how disguised, represent .the realistic'avenue to peace?