The Press THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 1968. The Future Of N.A.T.O.

Press, Volume CVIII, Issue 31836, 14 November 1968, Page 12

The Press THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 1968. The Future Of N.A.T.O.

Since the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact Powers the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in Western Europe has been anxiously reappraised in Europe and in the United States. The first reaction was that the massive accretion of Soviet military strength in Central Europe must compel a comparable build-up of N.A.T.O. strength; West Germany now had on its border with Czechoslovakia powerful Soviet mechanised divisions instead of the weaker Czechoslovak divisions which formed part of the Warsaw Pact alliance. Then Dr Kiesinger sought to arouse the N.A.T.O. command to the realities of a drastically changed situation when he said that 20 highly mobile Russian divisions in Czechoslovakia, opposite a weakly defended part of Germany, clearly made a conventional attack by a potential enemy no longer impossible. This possibility the N.A.T.O. Foreign and Defence Ministers must take into account at their semi-annual meeting, which opens in Brussels today. Last May, comparative studies of N.A.T.O. and Warsaw Pact military capabilities were put in hand by the Western Defence Ministers. No doubt steps have already been taken to speed them up, to determine the extent to which the balance of power in Central Europe has been changed by Russian action, and to suggest measures that might be needed to restore it. According to British sources, analysis of the new situation may not show any need for an increase in active N.A.T.O. strength, even taking into account the unpredictability of Russian policies. The Ministers are certain to conclude, however, that further reductions in the Allied forces are out of the question. The most urgent task, if extra divisions are not to be sent into Europe by the N.A.T.O. Powers, will be to test the readiness and the efficiency of those alreadv there. In the British view, it is also essential that all the N.A.T.O. force countries pay attention to improving the effectiveness of their armed forces as non-aligned Jugoslavia, for instance, is doing. Russia’s actions since the subjugation of Czechoslovakia—provocations against the West Germans, including the organised rioting in Berlin, propaganda attacks on the Jugoslav regime, and allegations of Israeli “ aggression ” in the Middle Easthave aroused alarm and distrust in Western capitals. One outcome of the Brussels meeting will probably be a firm warning to the Soviet Government that any further act of force must have serious consequences The treaty explicitly guarantees the security of all N.A.T.O. members, so that the Russians are fully aware that any act of aggression against one of them will inevitably involve all.

Another consequence of the invasion of Czechoslovakia wiU be an examination by the N.A.T.p. Ministers of the duration of the treaty. It will become possible next year for member States to give a year’s notice of intention to withdraw. None has so far indicated the wish to do so—not even France, despite President de Gaulle’s condemnation of “ power blocs ”. The British view of the treaty is that it binds members indefinitely. In any case it has been indicated that the Brussels meeting will consider the question of duration, and include in the final communique a positive assurance of the permanence of the alliance.