Mr Smith’s Dilemma

Press, Volume CVIII, Issue 31786, 17 September 1968, Page 12

Mr Smith’s Dilemma

Mr lan Smith does not conceal his anxiety for a political settlement with Britain, even while he insists that it would have to legalise Rhodesia’s existing status, and that the invitation to talk again would have to come from London. But he has given no indication that he is willing to return to the Tiger formula. On the contrary, he has re-emphasised that separate development for Africans “ always has been “and always will be Rhodesia’s policy”. Fresh discussions with Mr Wilson would not get far on that basis, in view of Mr Smith’s refusal to abandon the requirement of “ no independence before majority “ rule ”. Mr Smith no doubt feels he would have a better chance of reaching agreement with a Conservative government. But time is running out; and, with spreading revolt within the ruling Rhodesia Front, he may have to act quickly, even to the extent of seeking a new mandate from the people, if he hopes to hold off a challenge from the extreme Right, under the probable direction of Lord Graham, now openly opposing Mr Smith’s leadership. Mr Smith’s position becomes increasingly more difficult. He can stand firm on his own proposals, which at least make racial equality an eventual possibility, and accept the heavy burden of sanctions. Alternatively, he could return to a Tiger type of constitution and legalise independence, with the expectation of early relief from sanctions. When the Appeal Court judges a few days ago ruled that the Smith regime was legal, the Chief Justice, Sir Hugh Beadle, declared that sanctions would not bring the government down. Yet their increasing pressure on the economy and the growing list of countries within the United Nations which are applying them, must be causing grave concern in Salisbury.

Mr Smith obviously still has the backing of a majority of his cabinet for proposals which would give Africans some representation in Parliament, while at the same time providing for a further period of five years during which an understanding with Britain might be reached. The Right-wingers would openly deny Africans any say in government, on grounds of incompetence—their “ inability to “ participate fully in a sophisticated and civilised “ form of government at this stage ”. The likelihood of irreparable harm to the economy through sanctions is, moreover, only one aspect of the danger of delaying a settlement. Another aspect, not publicised from Salisbury, is that a “ terrorist ” war is slowly but surely building up. Some sources say that 2500 guerrißas, well trained and armed, are ready to enter Rhodesia from Zambia. Others put the guerrilla army ready for action as high as 6000, and insist that the Africans have succeeded in establishing bases, for training as well as recruiting, inside Rhodesia. Mr Smith, who made a surrentitious visit to Pretoria, for talks with Mr Vorster, on July 26-27, is believed to have sought South African aid, in troops and equipment, to counter guerrilla operations. Mr Vorster would welcome a settlement of the Rhodesian dispute with Britain, and may well have urged Mr Smith to make another approach to London. It is possible that Mr Smith was discreetly sounding out this prospect when he said in Salisbury that he was ready for talks but, presumably as a matter of domestic prestige, London must issue the invitation.