The Press WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 1968. Prague Solved Nothing For The Russians

Press, Volume CVIII, Issue 31781, 11 September 1968, Page 16

The Press WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 1968. Prague Solved Nothing For The Russians

It is unlikely that there will be early summit talks in Communist Europe, useful though they might be in providing a forum for Moscow’s puppets. But it is already apparent that the brutal suppression of liberalism in Prague has done nothing to stifle the spirit of independence that has appeared in other East European countries not far below the apparently placid surface of the rigidly-controlled Communist State. It is a spirit that might at any time explode into protest against the tyranny of Marxist-style communism. Most of the satellite troops sent in with Russian divisions to occupy Czechoslovakia must have been puzzled and unwilling participants. Will the people of Poland, Hungary—with their memory of Russian ruthlessness only a decade old—Bulgaria, and East Germany continue to submit to the dictates of an ageing Stalinist leadership, in the belief that no other course is open to them?

There were angry protests against the rape of Czechoslovakia even in East Germany. The unrest throughout Eastern Europe will not have been eased by the means employed to- bring to heel the Dubcek regime in Prague, in spite of Russian assurances, Rumanians must be wondering if their ordeal is yet to come. Despite its remoteness from Russia—physically and in terms of political association — Jugoslavia has been moved to declare its determination to resist any attempt by Russia to interfere in its internal affairs; and this defiance in the face of Russian armed might must have impressed East Europeans almost as much as did the solidarity of the Czechoslovaks. Even in Russia itself there have been stirrings. Too much importance should not be attached to the protest staged in Red Square by a small group of Russian intellectuals: what must be of real concern to Mr Brezhnev and Mr Kosygin is that opinion on what should be done about Mr Dubcek was obviously divided in the Kremlin itself. The moderates were prepared to trust Mr Dubcek to keep liberalism under control and to prevent Czechoslovakia’s fundamental obligations under the Warsaw Pact from being impaired. The hard-liners were not prepared to take any risks. The decision to invade, indeed, suggested an almost panic reaction not only to divisions within the presidium, but also to fears that if Czechoslovakia were allowed to follow Jugoslavia and Rumania into a looser alliance with Russia, the resulting ferment might undermine Russian-imposed stability throughout the whole of Eastern Europe.

Can this ferment be kept under control by tanks, machine guns, and secret police? And if it can, for how long? President Johnson’s cold warning that “there will be no condoning of aggressors and no “ appeasement of those who prowl across national “ boundaries, by this or any other American “ Administration ”, will find its echoes in Eastern Europe. All the evidence suggests that the Czech crisis has created new’ problems, and possibly new dangers, for the Russians. Even Mao Tse-tung, stolidly observing the trend of events in a rival Communist empire, may be looking again at the possibilities of harassment along Russia’s vast and vulnerable eastern frontiers.