The Press FRIDAY, APRIL 26,1968. Brighter Side Of Delay

Press, Volume CVIII, Issue 31663, 26 April 1968, Page 12

The Press FRIDAY, APRIL 26,1968. Brighter Side Of Delay

From the long and disheartening wrangle over the selection of a meeting-place since President Johnson first proposed talks with North Vietnam, two things have emerged: Mr Johnson’s determination to pursue the war, failing an assurance of progress towards negotiations, remains unshaken; and, in spite of the delay, both sides now attach great importance to the Initial contact Hanoi seems ready, without some at least of the conditions on which it has previously insisted, to discuss peace once a complete end to the bombing of North Vietnam can be negotiated at the preliminary meeting. Now both sides have made concessions to reach the point of holding preliminary talks. The North Vietnamese have accepted the restriction of the bombing as sufficient to warrant their meeting an American ambassador; the United States is willing to assume that the North Vietnamese will not enlarge their war effort in the South. The aerial bombardment of the North Vietnamese troops around Khe Sanh could hardly have been the sole cause of the sudden withdrawal of the North’s forces from the perimeter of the base. The withdrawal Indeed, suggested that Hanoi was willing to facilitate the restriction, if not the end, of the bombing. Reinforcement of the troops besieging Khe Sanh would have precluded even the curtailment of the bombing; and the United States is reported to have told Communist diplomats as much. Just as the United States is not yet prepared further to restrict the bombing, the North Vietnamese have given no other sign that they are ready to restrict troop movements.

President Johnson’s failure to redeem his promise to talk “ anywhere, at any time ” has been a great disappointment, and has given his opponents a strong propaganda weapon. Various explanations have been offered for his becoming selective about a meeting-place. The “ New York Times ”, suggesting that the initial talks might grow into full-scale peace negotiations, said recently that while the United States could take care of itself in Phnom Penh or Warsaw it was reluctant to expose the South Vietnamese or the South Koreans to meetings in a hostile capital where they have no diplomatic representatives.

Although Hanoi has reaped a considerable advantage in propaganda from the delay, it is an advantage that could be turned to account only by its according the projected talks much more importance and urgency than its first guarded acceptance of the idea implied. Russia has also modified its initial attitude, which was markedly cool. Russia favours talks in New Delhi. When Mr Kosygin called on Mrs Nehru last Sunday he may have envisaged another “Tashkent”—a meeting in the success of which Russia appeared to be instrumental. Although Peking’s relations with India are bad. China and India maintain diplomatic relations, and the North Vietnamese Communist Partv’s declaration this week on maintaining its independence in the Communist world mav be interpreted as meaning that the dispute between China and Russia will not sway its decisions. New Delhi remain' m the running as a prospective meeting-place. Whatever the arguments about Warsaw, Phnom Penh, New Delhi. Paris, and other sites for a meeting, and whatever the misgivings about President Johnson’s qualification of “ any“where”, the expectations of something useful coming out of the talks have been increased rather than diminished by the delay.