The Press FRIDAY, DECEMBER 29, 1967. The E.E.C. And Britain

Press, Volume CVII, Issue 31564, 29 December 1967, Page 6

The Press FRIDAY, DECEMBER 29, 1967. The E.E.C. And Britain

A year of intensive preparation and negotiation is ending with Britain no nearer realising its hope and purpose of gaining admittance to the European Economic Community. Mr Couve de Murville’s almost brutal veto of the British application before the Ministerial Council of the Community dismayed France's partners as it angered Britain; but there is little they can do about it. The rules of the E.E.C. provide for the admission of new members only on the unanimous vote of existing members. However willing the remaining five members might be to approve Britain’s application, they cannot constitutionally overrule France’s veto.

France’s partners have each supported, in varying degree, Britain’s application. The Netherlands is perhaps the most earnest advocate of British membership of the E.E.C.; but Germany, Italy, Belgium, and Luxemburg each want Britain in increasingly, one suspects, because they are irked by France’s domination of the Common Market While the political motives of the members of the Common Market determine tactics at this stage, the commercial considerations involved in Britain’s application tend to be overlooked. There should in the long run be solid advantages both for present members of the club and for Britain in Britain’s admission. They may be summarised in the term, “ economies of scale ”.

Britain would bring another 54 million people a third of the population of the present membership of the E.E.C. into the Common Market; and its entry would inevitably be followed by the entry of Ireland, Denmark, and the other European Free Trade Area countries. Numerically, the population of this “ Greater Common Market ” would be greater than that of the United States; economically, this population would form a trading unit not far short of that of the United States in wealth. Perhaps even more important, the inclusion of Britain would enable Europe to compete with the United States and with Russia in the advanced technologies of computers, aircraft, and space travel. The longer Britain remains outside the E.E.C., the further Europe must fall behind the United States in these fields. Yet France’s objections to opening negotiations with Britain are not without validity. The devaluation of the pound has not solved Britain’s balance-of-payments troubles which, it now appears, were even more formidable than had been admitted or even, perhaps, realised —on the eve of devaluation. The October trade deficit of £lO7 million was followed by a massive £153 million deficit in November. Making allowance for the dock strike which hindered exports in those two months and for the inflation of import payments after devaluation on November 18, it is evident that Mr de Murville’s strictures on the British economy were amply justified. By admitting Britain now the E.E.C. would gain, for the time being, a passenger rather than a partner. France’s partners, however, are not asking for the admission of Britain now, but merely for the opening of negotiations with Britain. While Britain’s economy remains precarious the French will be able to resist these demands. Only a concerted and determined demand from France’s partners for an immediate start to negotiations would be of any avail; and that is an unlikely development. Britain’s next chance to open negotiations will appear only when devaluation and the necessary accompanying measures have produced a dramatic improvement in the country’s trading position. By mid-1968, all going well, Britain may be in a better position to demand the opening of “ negotiations designed to lead to full “ membership ” of the E.E.C.