THE NIGERIAN WAR LAGOS ATTEMPTS TO CRACK THE HARDEST NIT OF ALL

Press, Volume CVII, Issue 31561, 26 December 1967, Page 8

THE NIGERIAN WAR LAGOS ATTEMPTS TO CRACK THE HARDEST NIT OF ALL

[By

CHARLES SMITH,

in the "Financial Times," London ]

[Reprinted by arrangement.)

After a long period of quiescence, the Nigerian civil war has shown signs of hotting up again. While there has been little news from the north of Biafra where the battles of September and October were fought out heivy fighting is reported to be going on in Bonny Island in the extreme south of Biafra, and Nigerian aircraft have been bombing the big refinery at Port Harcourt, a few miles behind the Biafran lines.

The campaigning season was due to begin anyway at about this time since the rains are now over and it is becoming easier to move large forces around in Nigeria’s tropical south. But the Bonny operations could be the sign of something more than the start of the dry season.' Prelude To Attack

Bonny itself has been disputed between Nigeria and Biafra since an early stage of the war. It was first captured by Federal troops in July,*a month or so after fighting broke out, and with it the Nigerians gained control of the big oil terminal which formerly served the main oilfield of Biafra and the Mid-West

At some point last month the Biafrans appear to have launched a counter-attack—-regaining, according to their own account at least a part of the island; but the present Federal attack does not seem to be designed simply to push them off it again. A number of Nigerian spokesmen, including the Federal Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, Dr Okoi Arikpo, have been predicting in the last few weeks that an attack on Port Harcourt itself was imminent and there is every sign that the Bonny fighting is a prelude to such a move.

If the Federal Army does move forward to attack Port Harcourt it may find itself in the toughest battle since the beginning of the war. With its population of rather more than 100,000 the city Is by far the biggest in what remains of Biafra. It also has the only major airport left within the secessionist State and, unless last week’s bombing has destroyed them, the main Biafran oil reserves. Ibo City In addition to all this, Port Harcourt is a predominantly Ibo city (unlike Calabar, the south-eastern port which was captured in October) and therefore a symbol of Ibo nationalism at least as powerful as Enugu, the former Biafran capital. When Federal troops moved into Enugu two months ago there was comparatively little fighting in the city itself and their task is believed to have been made easier by the mutiny of a section of the Biafran defending forces. In the campaign for Port Harcourt no such easy victory is to be expected. The Lagos Government’s decision to crack the hardest nut of all is to some extent a reflection of its fail ire on other fronts during tie last

couple of months of the war. After the fall of Enugu, Federal troops made two costly and unsuccessful attempts to capture Onltsha, the Biafran city at the eastern approach to the Niger Bridge, and as recently as two weeks ago the Federal Commander on the spot was said to be considering a third. With the Niger Bridge partly destroyed, and the crossing of the river itself being made increasingly difficult as the water level falls and sand banks appear at the start of the dry season, it is no surprise that the attempt has been abandoned. A Softer Option What the Federal Army could most probably have done, as a softer option to the direct attack on Port Harcourt, was consolidate its bold on Enugu and perhaps to advance further south from there into the “heartland” of Biafra where the Ibo

population is concentrated. At the moment, although Enugu itself is in Federal hands the Biafrans seem still to be on its fringes. According to a report from a recent British visitor to the area, Biafran snipers are still preventing the Federal side from carrying out essential repairs to the airport and it has not been possible even to restore water and electricity supplies in the city. But the strategists in Lagos seem to have decided that Enugu and points south represent a less urgent priority than the far more difficult target of Port Harcourt. Their reason for taking this view may well be the extreme urgency for the Federation of dealing a decisive blow in the war against Biafra.

This urgency is mainly a matter of money. Since the fighting began in June, Nigeria has had to spend at least £3sm on arms imports (a large proportion of it paid in cash to the Russians); its Army has been expanded from about 20,000 men at the start of the war to perhaps 50,000, with a corresponding inflation of the military payroll; and the economy has been badly hit by the war. Big Revenue Lost The loss of the Biafran oil revenue has deprived Nigeria of an income of over £lm a month, leaving it only with the much smaller revenue from Gulf Oil’s Midwest production (Gulf Is still enjoying its initial tax holiday, and thus only paying royalties to Lagos). Exports of Nigeria’s tropical crops have been disrupted by the fighting, and as a final blow

the country has become involved in the devaluation o. sterling and Nigeria’s own decision not to devalue its pound.

The Nigerian pound may be able to “look the dollar in the face” as one patriotic official in Lagos boasted in the week after devaluation. But there is no disguising the fears of the Finance Ministry in Lagos that the London market for Nigerian produce might be thrown badly out of balance by the non-devalua-tion decision. London dealers stand to lose about £Bm on contracts signed before devaluation which now have to be settled in Nigerian pounds and will only with difficulty be able to meet their obligations. Reserves Reduced The net effect of all these factors has been to reduce Nigeria’s formerly ample foreign exchange reserves to a level of about £4om, of which £2sm is required for currency backing while the remainder corresponds to about one month’s imports—that is to say imports not swollen by expensive arms purchases. In order to strengthen their fragile financial position, the Nigerian authorities have for some time been debating the advisability of applying to the International Monetary Fund for an increase in drawing rights. The Central Bank, which originally advocated this step, was at first opposed by other branches of the Government, but a week or so ago it was revealed that the International Monetary Fund had been asked to approve an enlargement of Nigeria’s quota from its present level of about s63m to between sloom and slsom. Heavy Blow Preferred Whatever the I.M.F. decides, Nigeria will still be hard put to it to pay for the continuation of the war over any very long period. It is scarcely surprising therefore that General Gowon has decided on a knock out blow against Biafra in preference to more cautious tactics. But even if the blow is successfully dealt the struggle may still be some way from its end.

At the moment, there is good reason to believe that the Biafrans really mean what they say when they claim they are “fighting for their lives”: they are apparently convinced that defeat might be followed by wholesale massacre and it is hard to imagine that General Gowon could offer any safeguards strong enough to banish this fear completely. Another obstacle to a settlement which might more easily be dealt with is the system of states laid down by the Federal Government which has the effect of dividing Biafra’s main Ibo areas and cutting off Port Harcourt from the Ibo “heartland.”

If Lagos were to indicate that the boundaries of these states were open to negotiation it might be one step nearer to bringing Biafra back into the fold. But it is just as likely that guerrilla warfare may be the next phase of the Nigerian struggle.