BRITISH POLICY IN S.-E. ASIA Future Of Terendak Among Problems For New Zealand

Press, Volume CVII, Issue 31500, 14 October 1967, Page 23

BRITISH POLICY IN S.-E. ASIA Future Of Terendak Among Problems For New Zealand

“Don’t write off Terendak,” pleaded a New Zealand officer, and : those who know it could well understand his feelings. Home of the 28th • Commonwealth Brigade, about 14 miles from Malacca in Malaysia, it • hardly qualifies for the description, army camp.

A self-contained town for about 13,000 people, it enables British, Australian and New Zealand servicemen and their families to live graciously away from home, enjoying such facili- . ties as an Olympic swimming pool, beach clubs, golf clubs, saddle club, social clubs, three fine churches, supermarket, Naafi shop and an English inn.

This is the seventh to a series st articles by A. M. Menzies, a member of the staff of “Hie Press" who recently visited South-East Asia OB a tour sponsored to part by the New Zealand Ministry of Defence.

But what will become of Terendak? Costing $15,000,000 to build in 1957, it was contributed to in the proportion of Britain 54.1 per cent, Australia 27.7, and New Zealand 18.2. Maintenance costs are also shared on this basis except for various projects undertaken by the individual governments.

The area was formerly a rubber estate. Now, of the 5000 acres held on a 30-year lease from the Malaysian. Government, about 500 acres are built on, 1000 acres are developed land, parks, grass to be cut, etc., and 3500 acres are in their original and used for training and ranges. >lts own sewerage system, 35 miles of sealed roads, a 6000 ft airstrip and a helicopter port, a secondary school for 300, primary schools for 900, kindergartens, a 110-bed hospital aU help Terendak to be nearly seifcontained. AH it obtains from kutaide are its water—about Mse million gsUona a day—ted Ma electricity. ; ■’ This is certainly one of the finest garrison camps in the world; no wonder the plea: *Don*t write it off.” But it easts some phenomenal amount to run. No-one seems io be able to, or will, give a figure. Structural maintenance alone amounts to About 3500,000 a year. j Prohibitive Cost £ And Australia and New .Zealand have been getting itt lightly because, according the brigade commander, tiieir proportions have always teen subsidised by Britain paying a tot of the bidden dosts. So what happens when Britain withdraws in the 19705? The eoat to -Austraito and New Zealand of maintaining thi*, superb camp as it is at present would be prohibitive and impossible. The problem of Terendak V a good example of those created by the announcement of British withdrawal which 3uw facing New Zealand military planners, defence chiefs and the Government now. >bat is decided must set the ■pattern for New Zealand’s jiefonce for some time but seldom ean such a dedsioa have been influenced so X*uch by economic and ■political factors ae weti as militaryConsider the units the ■Dominion has. to South-East 'Asia at present. As part of the 28th ComlXMwealth Brigade a conventional three.■battaiton brigade with various supporting units ds the Ist AlsttteMi Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment Vietnam Commitment Ba responsibility has been Ao -maintain an effective battalion of three rifle companies -as part of New Zealand’s contribution to the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve. At first it was largely a garrison Jone but during Indonesia’s -Confrontation it conducted operations to West Malaysia , and Jn Borneo. Now it has the task -Of maintatoing one of its eoinpaniei as V Company in Bottth Vietnam. *.. For the Vietnam commitment toe battalion had to be Reorganised and the demands •fin it are considered to have "reduced its usefulness. More than 180 of its ceiling of ■about 700 are in Vietnam so "that-souse supporting units have disappeared altogether.

its previously ordered training programme must now prepare a company for Vietnam each six months, and the system of half-battalion relief from New Zealand each year sets everything back. The impact of all this on efficiency is held to be apparent The rest of New Zealand’s contribution to the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve is one frigate on rotation —at present the Taranaki—based at Singapore, and a mediumrange transport squadron, the four Bristol Fighters of No. 41

' Squadron based, at R.A.F. Changi, Singapore. ‘ Like the battalion, the Navy ' has its difficulties. The number of ships available for the [ circuit, including duties in home waters and exercises ‘ with the Americans at Pearl Harbour, is held to be one 1 short, thus putting strain on ’ ships and crews and meaning t that a great deal of training - has to be done during opera- ’ tions. Problems are intensified ■ when one of the frigates, at ■ present the Otago, has to have 1 an extensive refit. 1 The lovable, reliable but 1 noisy old Bristols—Americans ' always gaze upon them with ill-suppressed amusement—probably have the fewest problems of all. As part of the Far East Air Force they undertake various transport tasks which include helping with supplies for New Zealanders in Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam. About 1300 Men The rest of the contribution in Vietnam is the six-gun 161st Battery, Royal New Zealand Artillery, like the infantry company attached to the Australian Task Force, and the joint services medical team of 16, making about 380 ■ men in all. A team of 17 Royal New 1 Zealand Engineers construct- ' mg a feeder road under the Colombo Plan in Thailand, ' staff officers at SEA.T.O M liaison officers and officers and 1 nxoji seconded to the Malaysian Forces, complete New Zealand military presence in South-East Asia—about 1300 men. New Zealand's great difficulties arise from her size, from her small population, from her limited resources and therefore from her considerable dependence on others. Her reliance on Britain logistically in Malaysia and Singapore makes the withdrawal a heavy blow. New decisions have to be made on where Now Zealand

should have her forces and what they should be. There are those who say that New Zealand need not be in the area at all. In recent " years New Zealand’s policy with thoughts for helping her own security has been to have some sort of forward position and also take part in a number of defence arrangements such as 5.E.A.T.0., A.N.Z.U.S., and A.N.Z.A.M. A strong section of public opinion and even some formerly prominent military men hold on moral and other

grounds that New Zealand should not be in Vietnam. Events in the last fortnight —the Prime Minister’s visit to Australia and forecasts from it, and his request for a report on which units could be sent—indicate that the Vietnam contribution will be increased. What is done in Vietnam is the key to what is done in Malaysia.

Recruiting Troubles

At one time it was suggested that the ground forces from Malaysia should be sent to Thailand but this has not been favoured. There are doubts about the magnitude of the threat to Thailand, at least while the Vietnam war is on, and the cost of sending a force there and supplying it would be burdensome. So at the same time that she makes her decision on Vietnam, New Zealand has also to decide whether it is possible and desirable for her to remain in Malaysia and Singapore. If the whole battalion was to be sent to Vietnam—and some military men desire this—it would be difficult to put another battalion into Malaysia and also provide replacements for both. New Zealand’s recruiting troubles are severe and the use of territorials or . conscription brings quick political problems for any government. If Terendak’s great value as a training ground for the type of operation likely to occur to the area is still wanted, it has been suggested that Australia and New Zealand could, continue with reduced facilities. Hospitals, schools, dubs and the like would have to go and, therefore, so would dependants. Another suggestion is that Malaysia might consider taking a part but, with a number of her own camps to run already, she has shown little interest A shift to one at the ready-made eamps In Singapore which the British

will vacate or the provision of a new one in Malaysia have been mentioned but again considerations of logistics and costs arise. The Australians already have an Air Force base at Butterworth, near. Penang; any wish for another is doubtful. Which Arm? Obstacles confronting the continued stationing of ground forces in the area after British withdrawal are huge and they may make air or maritime roles more attractive. This may be enhanced by the fact that British reductions will be quicker and greater on land so that support for air and maritime forces will last longer, at least into the vague second phase of. the withdrawal in the mid-19705. Singapore hopes that she may be able to maintain the naval dockyard commercially and there are three British airfields on the island. Britain holds that there is now no need to have large

'■ ground forces in the area 1 ready to react quickly because ’ the type of threat is from subversion, dangers to internal ’ security and activities like confrontation. In the event of 1 «n, appeal for help against ■ aggression she says she could deploy a force from home very quickly. This idea is treated with

cynicism to' South-East Asia where it is said it takes fully a month to acclimatise. The same would apply to forces from New Zealand and Australia. These are some of the considerations facing the Government in its unenviable task. Having pointed out the implications, Britain is awaiting

an indication of Australian and New Zealand thinking. What New Zealand decides must also be influenced by its dependence on Australia and in some ways the United States: compatability of equipment is important here if the Dominion is going tb associate more with both. Economic necessities also are

a factor; we have cut defence spending in spite of the recommendations in the 1966 White Paper and yet almost anything we do now will cost more. Finally, it is hoped, public opinion, a reliable expression of which can only be gained if the public is taken into confidence, will play a part.