The Press WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 11, 1967. Vietnam Talks And The Bombing Pause Test

Press, Volume CVII, Issue 31497, 11 October 1967, Page 16

The Press WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 11, 1967. Vietnam Talks And The Bombing Pause Test

Although bombing hinders Hanoi’s war eSort, an end to it would not greatly improve the prospects of ultimate success for the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese; troops in South Vietnam. Bombing or no bombing, China and Russia can supply North Vietnam with war materials. Only the trouble and the cost of helping Hanoi are in the long run affected by the bombing. This is as much a reason against extending the bombing attacks as it is a reason for Hanoi's insisting that a cessation of bombing is an insufficient prerequisite for talks with its enemies. Hanoi also demands that South Vietnam’s allies withdraw their troops and that South Vietnam recognise the National Liberation Front. The fourth condition set by Hanoi is that the Vietnamese should be allowed to decide their own affairs. Most people would agree with the last condition if it excluded the tactics the Viet Cong use to settle the affairs of Vietnam. Hanoi is virtually setting conditions so one-sided that negotiations would hardly be needed at all. South Vietnam’s elections have considerably changed the scene inside and outside the country. South Vietnam is now among the very few countries in Asia and Africa—indeed, in the world—in which the people have had a reasonable choice in electing their rulers. However sceptical some people may be about the ability of Asians to adopt and work some form of democratic government, the voters of South Vietnam made their assessment of themselves pretty plain when they went to the polls in large numbers last month. If there was any coercion to ensure a large vote nothing since September 3 suggests that non-voters have suffered. The elections also meant that the Government must take more heed of political opinions. One of the strongest lines expressed in the voting was the desire of many Vietnamese for negotiations to end a generation of war on their land. This was the platform of Mr Thuong Dinh Dzu, the most successful civilian candidate for the presidency. Mr Dzu’s subsequent imprisonment was an unfortunate sign that the military leaders are not going to give much weight to the voices of his supporters. Now that the Government has settled down, and Mr Dzu’s imprisonment has been amended to house arrest, President Thieu may be satisfied that pressure for peace at a price not to his liking has been sufficiently staved off. The United States certainly cannot discount the appeal of the Dzu platform. President Johnson knows that many Americans want an end to the United States* part in the war, now he knows that many South Vietnamese want an end to the fighting.

President Johnson is as eager as anyone to stop the war. His object is to ensure that the South Vietnamese and other Asians can determine their own affairs without facing the fact or the threat of Communist arms. To deny Mao’s phrase, political power should not come out of the barrel of a gun. The president expects to withdraw United States troops from South Vietnam when his object has been achieved, with or without military victory. He -is steering a militarily-expensive course between avoiding defeat for the South Vietnamese on the one hand and provoking China or Russia to war on the other. The costly diversion of troops to the demilitarised zone—a strategy at first thought necessary to prevent an invasion of the northern provinces of South Vietnam—has proved yet another costly effort that has strengthened many Americans’ impression that they are hopelessly bogged down in the whole war. This impression, coupled with the effect of intimate reporting of the war to the American public, probably accounts for much of the present mood of despondency in the United States. The President’s advisers may rely too heavily on the disarray created by the “ cultural revolution ” keeping China out of the war. It may well be that American opinion against the war is also moulded by confidence that China cannot, at present, pose a serious threat to the rest of Asia, especially India, or to the West.

Hanoi must expect President Johnson to stick to his policy. Hanoi may also hope that if it can keep the war going a few more months American voters will elect a new President who will pull the United States out of Vietnam. This thought must temper hopes that negotiations will be held in the coming year. What, then, are the choices open to the United States? Bombing of the North has reached the apparent limit of its effectiveness, and the risk of Chinese retaliation would be increased if the attacks were extended. Intensified bombing concurrently with renewed United States offers of negotiations appears to be calculated to impress Hanoi that the offers do not signal any flagging of American purpose. A blockade of Haiphong harbour would not seal off North Vietnam’s ocean supply routes; at worst, a blockade would raise the risk of naval warfare with Russia and, at best, it would compel North Vietnam to rely more heavily on China. Invasion of the North would widen the only semblance of a front and enlarge the area of guerrilla warfare. Unqualified withdrawal of American troops would expose Laos, Thailand, and, perhaps, Cambodia to the imposition by force of Communist rule—a threat not derived from the so-called dominoes theory but from the declared or implied intentions of China and North Vietnam. An unrestrained military effort to end the war and to satisfy American impatience with the long involvement could only be made at painful cost to the South Vietnamese. President Johnson seems to have little choice but to maintain the present pressure and to try to get negotiations started. The question, then, is whether a cessation of the bombing would open the way to talks. Recent reports from Hanoi suggest that the end of bombing will not be sufficient. The United States already has direct and indirect transactions with Hanoi. Diplomats from both sides met earlier this year in Moscow. President Johnson has previously weighed military cost against the diplomatic hopes: and Washington is speculating that he may do so again, ordering an indefinite pause in the bombing next month. This would be the beginning of the season in Vietnam most favourable to the American military—hardly the best time to test the belief of some Americans and others that if the bombing stopped the talks would start. Whether or not talks were held the pause would appeal to many Americans. The President, however, has said that he Is not seeking political popularity. This must lead one to believe that as long as the chances of Hanoi’s negotiating remain as slim as they are today the prospect of an end to the bombing is also slight.