The Press WEDNESDAY, JUNE 28, 1967. What Sort Of Peace?

Press, Volume CVII, Issue 31407, 28 June 1967, Page 16

The Press WEDNESDAY, JUNE 28, 1967. What Sort Of Peace?

One of the things to be remembered in any consideration of peace terms in the Middle East is that on the first day of the war the Israeli Prime Minister, Mr Eshkol, said that Israel did not want any Arab territory. Before the fighting began Israel would perhaps have settled for freedom of navigation, under international law, in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal. Now there is tough talk of keeping all the territory gained by conquest, and of forcing a settlement —not an armistice —that would include permanent recognition of Israel s sovereign status. In the long view, unqualified acceptance of Israeli sovereignty by the Arab States must be the chief aim of Mr Eshkol's Government. It is easy to sympathise with Israel's determination to dictate terms. The war was forced on her, not sought. In any case it is sound politics to start bargaining by bidding high.

But a settlement in the Middle East is urgent; the longer an agreed settlement is delayed the more desperate must become the plight of the uncounted stateless Palestine refugees. A tenth of Israel’s population—2so,ooo—is already Arab. Now, by virtue of occupation, some 400,000 on the west bank of the Jordan and up to 300,000 in the Gaza strip may have to be added. If these occupied areas were to become Israeli territory the Government would have a truly daunting population problem on its hands. Could it risk, in the long term, the outnumbering of the Jewish population by the Arabs? Could it hope to turn Arabs into Israelis? Could it face the economic cost of Arab rehabilitation? These questions at least justify Israeli insistence on the direct negotiation of a peace settlement with the Arab States. Such a settlement would no doubt provide for a shared responsibility in the resettlement of refugees. But the Arabs have refused direct negotiation; and Israel has said that it will not tolerate United Nations involvement in the redrawing of Middle East frontiers.

This is where the Powers most concerned — Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union — have a responsibility and an opportunity for just intervention. Although the harsh anti-Israel line taken by Mr Kosygin in the General Assembly seemingly offered little hope of Russian co-operation in an attempt at mediation, his speech might have been meant for public consumption in the Arab countries. Realities would be better faced in private talks such as in the meeting between Mr Kosygin and President Johnson. Mr Johnson had already urged an Israeli withdrawal, and had insisted that pledges of territorial integrity must apply not to Israel alone but to all the Middle East States. In Israel, as the elation of victory gives way to clearer thinking on the problems of conquest, the Government may be able to steer public opinion towards realism and magnanimity.

Israel may justly ask for some rectification of her frontier with Syria to ensure that settlements in Galilee are no longer harassed by Syrian raiders. Sovereignty over Jerusalem must inevitably be a more difficult matter. Israel’s retention of the Old City, sacred in Jewish tradition, will be demanded so passionately and unanimously by the whole nation that no Israeli Government could afford to abate its claim. Some form of international control still seems a fair solution. The best hope for an enduring settlement must rest on Israel’s willingness to forgo some of the fruits of military success in the interests of political stability. At the moment the Government, understandably, is in no mood to submit to Arab efforts to win the peace in New York. Until the Arabs themselves are ready to recognise the permanence of the State of Israel, there can be little hope of negotiation either directly or through the mediation of others. That recognition should be the starting point for any formula propounded by the United Nations.