Lord Tedder’s War

Press, Volume CVI, Issue 31304, 25 February 1967, Page 4

Lord Tedder’s War

With Prejudice. By Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder. Cassell, London. Maps, Illustrations, list of operation code names, bibliography. 692 pp. Plus 26 unnumbered pages of index.

In clubs and other places where the retired higher echelons of Second World War commanders foregather this book and its contents are no doubt being hotly debated. Who was right and who was wrong? Was Montgomery a great success? Was he a meddlesome general? Was Eisenhower the man for the job? Should he have pursued other courses?

This is the story of the war as the forthright Lord Tedder saw it personally in the Mediterranean from the time of the Greece evacuation to the invasion of Sicily and Italy. Then, as deputy Supreme Commander to Eisenhower, Tedder moves to England, France and (an official trip to Russia in between) finally to a defeated Germany. Tedder, who pulls no punches, was a loyal deputy to Eisenhower in difficult times.

There can be no question but that this man who writes so clearly without emotion is a man of high ability and integrity, a man with an analytical mind who can see the strengths and weaknesses of strategies, current and proposed, and is not afraid to argue out his opinions. The gospel of this book Is air power, the building of it, and its most effective use strategically and tactically on its own account and as an ally of the navy and army. The measure of Tedder’s success with air power is that he was never deposed, either in North Africa (where he saw generals superseded) or in England (where he survived a suggestion towards the end of the war that he should be replaced as deputy Supreme Commander). After being deputy Air Officer Commander-in-Chief Middle East, Tedder took over from his predecessor, became Air C.4n-C. Mediterranean. Co-operating with Eisenhower he managed the tricky businesses of welding the American and British Air Forces. He used them outstandingly in the defeat of Rommel’s forces in North Africa and in the invasions of Sicily and Italy. Then he went to London as deputy to Eisenhower, with whom he seems to have got on well, though not slavishly. In London Tedder was in the midst of it, preparing for the invasion of France, fuming at the practice of trying to run a war by committees, and wondering whether the plan would be ready in time. The Supreme Commander and his deputy were, it seems, like puppets on strings, or would have been if they had not watched out. They were under the eyes of the British Chiefs of Staffs, the American Chiefs of Staffs and the Combined Chiefs of Staffs, and there were the unmilitary influences of politicians, not the least interfering of whom was one, Winston Churchill. And if this was not headache enough, there were personal incompatibilities to be smoothed out. Spaatz, of the United States Tactical Air Force, and Harris, of Bomber Command, let it be known that they would not accept orders from Leigh-Mallory.

Then there was Montgomery! Montgomery seems to have been more than a little difficult—a thorn indeed. After the landing in France there was disappointment with the progress of Montgomery’s army as part of a pattern of advance on objectives. The Chief of the Air

Staff, Air Chief Marshal Portal. Eisenhower and Tedder were among those dissatisfied. There were letters, telegrams and visits. There is a lot about Montgomery in this book.

There were arguments among the airmen about bombing priorities oil plants, arms factories or am-

munition dumps? Tedder’s raids on transportation achieved phenomenal chaos for the Germans. Then the devastating flying bombs and rockets began to fall in Britain. Churchill toyed with the idea of publicly announcing retaliation in the form of annihilating named German cities. Eisenhower, Portal and Tedder were opposed to action of that kind.

The British Chiefs of Staff apparently felt Eisenhower had lost his grip on the battle. Montgomery started writing letters to Alan Brooke; he urged one command of the ground forces and he wanted Bradley’s army included in his—but General Marshall stamped on that proposal. Von Rundstedt counter-attacked, and the British Chiefs of Staff wrote critically to their American vis-a-vis. In the meantime Eisenhower had offended the British political higher-ups, including Churchill, by telegraphing direct to Stalin for his military intentions. This was “not done” according to the British, and “was done” according to the Americans. What a fuss! However, in spite of everything, the war in Europe ended with the defeat of the Germans in May, 1945. But after reading this enlightening book this reviewer is left with the impression that among the higher echelons of command war is not at all like one game of chess—as is commonly claimed—but very like two games of chess in which the moves on the visible board are ever subject to the invisible moves on an invisible second board, such moves being not necessarily made by the enemy. “With Prejudice” is remarkably well documented and indexed. The months and years under consideration are noted at the top of each page, and other great assistances to the reader are chronologies of wartime events. Among the illustrations are some talented sketches by the author.