The Press FRIDAY, JANUARY 27, 1967. Communist Leadership

Press, Volume CVI, Issue 31279, 27 January 1967, Page 10

The Press FRIDAY, JANUARY 27, 1967. Communist Leadership

There can now be little doubt that the Russians are preparing for some form of confrontation with China. The exact form of this confrontation should become apparent at the international Communist conference in Moscow, if the Soviet party leaders are successful in convening such a conference with reasonable representation of the Communist countries. This qualification is important. It is almost certain, for instance, that the Jugoslavs would not attend. Early this month the chairman of the Jugoslav Parliament’s foreign affairs commission, Mr Popovic, said times had changed so much that the Communist movement could no longer be directed from one centre, nor should everyone be required to agree with “ any formally adopted common general “ document ”. Rumania and Poland, also, have shown no enthusiasm for a demonstration of Communist unity.

The Russians may well feel, nevertheless, that the risk of splitting the European parties, or at any rate of exposing a lack of unanimity, by calling a meeting, is worth taking, in view of the open conflict that has developed between pro-Mao and anti-Mao factions in China. The Russians have not sought, hitherto, to force an open breach between themselves and the Chinese. But they have known that the breach must come; and their concern would be, at that time, so to unite the Communist world as to leave China in isolation. Mr Brezhnev recently described Mao’s recourse to violent purge tactics as “ a “ major tragedy for all the authentic Communists in “ China ” —with Russia, needless to say, identified as the champion of ideological purity. The Soviet line now is to keep impressing the hope that in due time the Chinese will re-embrace Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy, to which end, it will be argued, present heresies must be universally condemned. Thus Russia hopes to restore her position as leader of the world Communist movement.

Another fundamental reason for a Russian bid to exploit the Chinese schism could be the obvious desire in Moscow for better commercial relations with the West, particularly the United States. There have been signs of a more flexible Russian attitude on Vietnam, with backing from some other European Communist parties. A break between Moscow and Peking, with increasing Russian pressure on Hanoi to approach the conference table, could lead to a Vietnam settlement. Moscow has long charged that, in spite of Peking’s show of support for the Viet Cong, all the Chinese have done has been to hold up Russian aid. With the Vietnam war ended, there would be good reason to hope for a comprehensive adjustment of American-Russian relations. The stronger Russian influence, with its moderating trends, becomes in the Communist world, the better do the chances appear for a strengthening of the principle of peaceful co-existence. As the “ Financial “ Times ” pointed out not long ago, the new economic orientation of the Communist bloc, the move towards a market economy and the admission of the profit motive as a prime force, even in Marxist economics, “ only make sense in the long run if the Russians are “ prepared to further the development of closer “ trading links with the West ”.