“No Resignations In This Hour Of Crisis”

Press, Volume CVI, Issue 31121, 26 July 1966, Page 11

“No Resignations In This Hour Of Crisis”

(By

KENNETH YOUNG)

QN June 30,1940, six weeks after taking over the Ministry of Aircraft Production, Beaverbrook could claim with justifiable pride that his methods had worked.

Today, he wrote, there are 1040 operational aircraft ready for service; six weeks before, there had been only 45. He had also in hand a programme for developing new types of aircraft and engines.

But the letter was not written merely to put these figures on record. Sensationally, it announced Beaverbrook’s desire to resign:—

"Dear Prime Minister,

"It is now Imperative that the Ministry of Aircraft Production should pass into the keeping of a man in touch and sympathy with the Air Ministry and the air marshals. “I should be relieved of my duties after my successor has been Informed of all our projects. In particular, the new Minister should be informed of my plans for carrying out a vigorous programme of development of new types of aircraft and engines. “My decision to retire is based on my firm conviction that I am not suited to working with the Air Ministry, or the air marshals. “I am convinced that my work Is finished and my task is over. I am certain that another man could take up the responsibilities with hope and expectation of that measure of support and sympathy which has been denied to me. “In handing you this resignation I wish to thank all my colleagues for the assistance I have received and the courtesy that has been given me. “In particular I wish to give you a grateful acknowledgement of the Inspiring experience of working under your leadership in war. “I am in complete agreement with your policy and the execution of it. “Yours sincerely, Beaverbrook.”

There is no written description of the Churchillian explosion brought on by this letter. But he immediately dictated a

istry, and also to assuage the unfortunate differences which have arisen. “Yours ever sincerely, Winston S. Churchill.”

In reply to this stern exhortation Beaverbrook wrote: “Dear Prime Minister, “I have received your letter of July 1. “I will certainly not neglect my duties here in the face of invasion. But it is imperative—and all the more so because of this threat of armed attack upon our shores—that the process of turning over this Ministry should take place as soon as possible. “I cannot get information which I require about supplies or equipment. I cannot get permission to carry out operations essential to strengthening our reserves to the uttermost in readiness for the day of invasion. “It is not possible for me to go on because a breach has taken place in the last five weeks through the pressure I have been compelled to put upon reluctant officers. "In my rush and hurry to achieve substantial results in a period of crisis, I have thought only of our needs in aircraft and of equipping myself with the means and the knowledge to supply these needs. "The breach which has thus been made between the Air Ministry and myself cannot be healed, although I have made many efforts. “It is obvious that another man must be called upon who can work with

grained immobility of the Civil Service at large and the Air Ministry in particular.

But that is not the whole picture. Beaverbrook, later recalling this phase of his dealing with Churchill, indicated that he did not intend his resignations to be taken too literally, and that they were his method of stressing the urgency of his complaints and requests. He told Churchill: “I was always under the impression that in your Support for my methods you wished me to stay on in office, to storm, to threaten resignation, and to withdraw again.” Hard Decision {JHURCHILL sought Beaverbrook’s counsel on matters outside departmental duties. One windy night—it was July 2—Beaverbrook was asked to go to the Cabinet room. It was gone midnight. In the room were Churchill. A. V. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty, and Sir Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord. The atmosphere was tense and emotional.

The French Fleet, which had escaped from France and taken refuge at Oran in North Africa, had refused all invitations to make for a British port. What should be done about it? Almost intact, it would make a fine prize for the Germans—and might even make a present of itself to them. Pound was for firing on the French Fleet —he had been saying so all day long. But Churchill, always devotedly pro-French, was horrified by the idea of bombarding her Fleet. Alexander was doubtful at first but finally agreed with Pound.

Churchill explained the situation to Beaverbrook: what should he do? Beaverbrook was emphatic: the French must be attacked. He said:—

“The Germans will force the French Fleet to join the Italians, thus taking command of the Mediterranean. The Germans will force this by threatening to burn Bordeaux the first day the French refuse, the next day Marseilles, and the third day Paris.” Beaverbrook’s advice—the unsentimental voice of common sense—turned the scales. Resolutely, Churchill gave the orders for attack, though still leaving a loophole for further parley. No one, however, believed that such parley would do more than delay the attack, and so it turned out. Walk In Garden Then Churchill’s emotions took charge of him. As soon as he had given the order he seized Beaverbrook's arm and rushed him into the garden of 10 Downing Street. It was nearly 2 a.m., and Beaverbrook later recorded: —

“There was a high wind blowing. He raced along. I had trouble keeping up with him. And I had an attack of asthma. Churchill declared that there was no

other decision possible. Then he wept.” (AFTEN Churchill took his friend into his deepest confidence and told him his innermost thoughts on the war situation. “I do not,” he write on July 8, “see a way

through” unless Britain could obtain air mastery:— “When I look round to see how we can win the war I see that there is only one sure path. We have no Continental Army which can defeat the German military power. The blockade is broken and Hitler has Asia and probably Africa to draw from. Should he be repulsed here, or not

try invasion, he will recoil • eastward and we have nothing to stop him. “But there is one thing that will bring him back and bring him down, and that is an absolutely devastating, exterminating attack by very heavy bombers from this country upon the Nazi homeland. “We must be able to overwhelm them by this means, without which I do not see a way through. We cannot accept any lower aim than air mastery. When can it be obtained?”

The production figures for July were excellent, and Churchill Wired “Results magnificent especially operational. Winston.” Beaverbrook was now working harder than ever and with a sort of desperation. 11l Walk Cabinet Churchill gave him backing on many issues. He also recognised the tonic quality of his “personal buoyancy and vigour.” He therefore determined to bring him into the War Cabinet itself, that group of five men—Attlee, Greenwood, Halifax, Chamberlain, and Churchill himself—who were ultimately and totally responsible for the conduct of all Britain’s affairs. But Churchill thought that this might mean that he would have to give up direct control of the Ministry of Aircraft Production for an overlord role.

Now, paradoxically,? -averbrook took up the opposite position to that he had put so strongly in his letter of resignation only a month previously. He could not give up the Ministry at a time when invasion threatened—a somewhat saucy playback of Churchill’s own argument earlier—but he was,willing to join the War Cabinet so long as he could keep the Ministry too!

He wrote to Churchill:— “Dear Prime Minister, “Having reflected on it, I am convinced that no change should take place at this Ministry. Here is the most important production centre, and here we should concentrate our plans for a limited production during the invasion by land or by air. “In one sense, no doubt, my job is done. So far as meeting the immediate requirements of the Royal Air Force is concerned, the task is at an end. “But there remains the continuing responsibility for production during the invasion. I am completely committed to it. “I cannot lay the job down without doing real damage to the project. “I am only too willing to serve in the War Cabinet if required to do so, but not at the expense of abandoning my plans here. “We should be asked to attend when specially required by you to do so, and not expected to sit in on routine subjects. “I am fully conscious of the honour which yc” do me in giving me the invitation. And I wish you to understand that my objections are the result of a deep consideration and a careful view of my present responsibilities.” “Yours sincerely, Beaverbrook.” To this Churchill agreed, and the Xing approved. Beaverbrook joined the War Cabinet on August 2. i In September. 1940 Beaverbrook submitted a new list of 'aircraft production figures. They showed splendid progress, but his letter ended wryly: “Nobody knows the trouble I’ve seen.” “I do,” Churchill minuted in the I margin. y