EAST OF SUEZ SOME UNKNOWN QUANTITIES IN U.K.’s STRATEGIC PLANS

Press, Volume CVI, Issue 31076, 3 June 1966, Page 8

EAST OF SUEZ SOME UNKNOWN QUANTITIES IN U.K.’s STRATEGIC PLANS

(By the Defence Correspondent of “The Times > (Reprinted from “The Times. > A natural inability to predict events has forced to leave much of their future East of Suez policy to t future as the case may be. There has to be so much sdxjut future threats that the Government tend to be less than spec methods which will be employed to meet them. Pe p uncharted area of all, in the East of Suez policy, is that the chain of islands in the Indian Ocean..

Which are these islands? What will be their purpose? Will the} physically be able to provide adequate facilities for the miliary °P considered likely in the area? Will they politically b« * bl « J? f uarantee Britain and her allies that absolute security of tenure which is now acknowledged to be the prerequisite for a military base.

There is a marked reluctance to provide answers to these questions in London. It is a reluctance shared in Canberra and Washington, the two Governments which have collaborated with Britain in surveying the area for military purposes. Some of this vagueness can be attributed to a genuine desire to avoid hostility to any plan before it is fully developed. Rumours of defence plans in the Indian Ocean have already attracted unfriendly noises from the United Nations General Assembly, and from the Government of India. Gift To The Critics An unfortunate side effect of British defence policy is that it can normally be relied upon to go to the relief of anti-colonialists who might otherwise find themselves running out of causes. The scheme for the Indian Ocean threatens to have the same effect in anti-colonial quarters. It will be expensive and subject to political criticism. It is important, therefore, to weigh the military advantages against the likely political and economic consequences. Last November the Government announced that a new colony was to be established called the British Indian Ocean Territory—8.1.0. T. The islands are Farquhar, Aldabra and Desroches in the west Indian Ocean, and the Chagos Archipelago, which includes Diego Garcia. “It is intended that the islands will be available for the construction of defence facilities by the British and United States Governments," said Mr Greenwood, then Colonial Secretary. He did not mention Cocos because it has been administered by Australia since 1955. However, the owner of Cocos Island, Mr John Clunies Ross, a direct descendant of the original Clunies Ross who landed at the Cocos in 1827, has repeatedly been refused information by the Australian Government, who have denied to him that any defence functions are contemplated for the island.

The populations in the islands vary from 100 in Farquhar to about 1000 in the Chagos Archipelago. They are mainly migrants from Mauritius and the Seychelles. In Cocos there are about 400 permanent coconut growers of

Malay stock. They used to number 1700, but a forced migration to Borneo and the introduction of the birth pill in 1964 have helped to keep the population within limits. An additional control of population growth lies in a rule that any native who leaves Cocos can never be allowed to return. Depopulation in spite of 8.1.0.T.’s colonial status, it will have no colonial administration since the Government intend to depopulate the 8.1.0. T. islands as much as possible. They hope then to obviate the expected criticisms that native populations are once more being subjugated to the wishes of Britain’s Chiefs of Staff. Moreover the purely military aspect of the scheme has already been underlined by the outright payment of £3 million to Mauritius for taking over Diego Garcia. The nature of Britain’s defence needs for the islands, however, has never been spelt out. The scheme has been justified because, in Mr Mayhew’s words, “there are a number of military uses to which the islands could be put in due course, as and when specific requirements arise.” What are these requirements likely to be? The most obvious requirement is for a series of dispersal points for the FIIIA aircraft. Its 3000-mile ferry range will not help it to operate in the Indian Ocean without some alternative bases between Bahrain and Singapore or Australia. Without an aircraft carrier, land-based air power will need a variety of airfields if it is to be brought to bear in every corner of the Indian Ocean. Africa could only be covered from Aldabra. If Singapore were to go, Indonesia and Malaysia could not be covered without the Cocos. Gan, though politically sensitive, would be necessary if British air power were to be deployed over India. These situations may sound hypothetical, but because of the comprehensive nature of Britain’s East of Suez policy, they automatically become contingencies. Forward Base Needs What would a forward base for the Fl 11A require? The FIIIA operations envisage a main base in North-West Australia which is not yet built. While Britain remains in Singapore it will be the main station for the aircraft. In theory the forward island strips would require a runway, and skeleton facilities for fuel dumps and ammunition storage. The radar installations, air defence missiles, the testing and maintenance equipment would all be brought in by transport aircraft each time the FIIIA detachments were sent on to the islands. Supplies for 30 day’s operations would be available by air, it is claimed. At Gan and the Cocos there are already good runways and fuel installations. An R.A.F. transit station exists at Gan,

but at Cocos there is little room for expansion, unless the Australian Government sought to buy more land from Mr Clunies Ross. At Aldabra and Diego Garcia there is nothing so far but a migrant population collecting copra and birds* eggs, and a few families of giant tortoises watching the centuries pass. Construction of military facilities at Aldabra and Diego Garcia would be possible, but will cost several millions of pounds. All the men and construction materials would have to be brought by sea. Landing craft or possibly Hovercraft would be needed to handle them as no harbour facilities exist. Considering the emphatic statements about FlllA's superior cost effectiveness over the aircraft carrier, it is surprising that the cost projections for the 1970 s included no mention of the island chain.

It is unlikely that the establishment of these minimum facilities will eventually be all that is required by the military. Operational ideas of this nature look attractive in their infancy, but have a disconcerting habit of putting on weight. For a start, British deployment in the Indian Ocean cannot be restricted to a squadron or two of bombers. What can the bombers do io deal with internal security situations in Africa or Malaysia? Can they cordon a riot or quell a mutiny? Many Inconsistencies There will be pressure to establish facilities on the islands for the Army and Navy too. The temporary coni plexion of the bases will assume a more permanent hue when the aircraft carriers fade out, and the responsibility for maritime patrolling falls on to the Royal Air Force. The scheme at present appears to be a patchwork of inconsistencies, mitigated by the Government’s repeated assurances that no firm decisions have yet been taken The Americans are to share the cost, but that is no guarantee that even half the cost of these island bases may not turn out to be much greater than the figure first thought of. If the Americans are to share the cost, it is reasonable to assume that they will have been reassured of the usefulness of the military facilities which they will receive. There are many unknown quantities in the Government’s proposed defence policy in the Indian Ocean Politics in the area tend to be developing at a rate which outpaces the essentially limited “scenario” projections on which our future position is being based. The establishment of 8.1.0. T., the military survey of the islands, the long-term posture in the Indian Ocean amount to little more than a series of hunches by the Government which defy analysis. There is always a danger that without close scrutiny they may, almost by default, become accepted policy.