THE MULBERRY HARBOURS

Press, Volume CV, Issue 31053, 7 May 1966, Page 4

THE MULBERRY HARBOURS

Mulberry. Bv Michael Harrison. W. 11. Allen. 286 pp.

The raid on Dieppe (1942) showed how very difficult it would be to capture a port without blasting facilities out of existence: Consequently it was concluded, in the face of incredulous opposition, that the invasion army returning to Europe would just have to take a port with them. This, also in face of knowledge that the sea could be expected, even in June, to be calm enough only for four days on end, to enable a large force to be put ashore and maintained against the recoil buildup of the enemy recovering from initial surprise. But in the end, through the efforts of thousands of workers and servicemen, there did indeed appear off the coast of France —“Mulberry A (Americans for the use of . . .” at St. Laurent) and “Mulberry B (British, for the use of . . .” at Arromanches). Both were entirely British constructed. Incidentally, the origin of the code name will be revealed to those who will take trouble to read St. Luke’s Gospel, Chapter 17, verse 6, though why “mulberry” has replaced “sycamore” of the original is not clear.

Each consisted basically of an outer screen, code-word, “Gooseberries” (approximately 100 sacrificed blockships), a floating outer breakwater (“Bombardons”—the least successful units), a sunken inner break-water (“Phoenix”) of concrete and steel caissons—about 200 of these were constructed at 26 different sites in Britain, the largest displacing 6000 tons; and finally, piers of anchored pontoons bearing ingeniously constructed supports and decking. It was an amazing construction, although the author quotes comment that most of the units were not original in concept. The items made in countless places, assembled, taken across 100 miles of sea, by about 100 tugs—the whole in close co-ordination with the thousands of vessels carrying the invading soldiers, sailors and their armament. Pluto, the oil-line, was also an integral part of the exercise, though, initially, reliance was placed on 20 million Jerricans for petrol. Michael Harrison, wellknown and appreciated within his range of more than 40 books has succeeded, commendably in explaining how the problems of landing and supplying the invading armies were solved. He has reconstructed the concepts, countless staff meetings, the ultimate events, by reporting his conversations and communication with four of the principals who were evidently willing to talk freely (with him —Mountbatten, HughesHallett, Wernher, and _ SteerWebster. He has also drawn on the contents of some 60 relevent papers and books. The structures and edifice of Mulberry are little discussed but the excellent photographs and cover drawings suffice to reveal what it was all about. Rather, the book is the human story of the enterprise and within the ingredients there are some startling revelations, the veracity of which at this stage has to be accepted. There was deplorable pettiness and jealousy of prominent people who appeared to be more intent on defeating each other than the common enemy. Some dominant elements of human interest in the book include the analysis of the defensive attitude of the Chiefs of Staff in 1941, spurned by Churchill in his appointment of that extraordinary, extrovert and pro-

bably unique man Mountbatten—as director of Combined Operations. Charged with the concept of “attack,” their goal was to devise a means of invading France.

There was the resentment of the regulars to the group of unusual civilians and servicemen assembled so shrewdly by Mountbatten — men like Professor Bernal and Solly Zuckerman, who. with the leaders named earlier, dared to plan the invasion, on lines outside the orthodox Service thinking. Discontent of the Americans was a constant obstacle, noone being more difficult than the American Admiral King. In truth there appears to have been negligible American participation in the actual work that the Mulberrys entailed, at least until Eisenhower arrived as a clean new broom, but only a few months before D-Day.

One can only be amazed how successful the outcome was in face of delays in construction, misfortune, and personal animosity that are revealed. Two instances among many of this problem of personalities among tin gods in high places can be noted here. Firstly, the abortive attempt to ask Mountbatten to resign the honorary army and air-force ranks he had been given, after he had left Combined Operations to go to the Pacific, and worse, the fact that through the attitude of a named

individual, Sir Harold Wemher was not awarded even a minimum decoration; yet he was the outstandingly sucably an architect of the successful co-ordinator between Government departments and Services facilities—undeniably an architect of success of cess of Mulberry. Evidently the Germans knew all about it—up to one crucial, unknown —where did the Allies propose to land and take their harbour? The deception plan was followed right through to D-Day and encouraged the German belief that the front to be defended in great strength was in the Pas de Calais.

According to the author's listed bibliography there have been at least eight officiallysupported publications dealing with aspects of the Mulberrys. There is also a forthcoming book “Mulberry Harbour” by the redoubtable Admiral Hickling, who was in the Mountbatten team of key men in Combined Operations right from the start. Judgment of Mr Harrison's account of the whole business, constructional and personal—he not having been a direct participant—will have to await the exposition of Admiral Hickling. “Mulberry,” written in the style of a novel, and according to Harrison, is well presented and is of gripping interest, in spite of some difficulties of reading that will be encountered through an unusual application of the functions of punctuation.