The Press THURSDAY, APRIL 28, 1966. Singapore’s Future As Defence Base

Press, Volume CV, Issue 31045, 28 April 1966, Page 16

The Press THURSDAY, APRIL 28, 1966. Singapore’s Future As Defence Base

The agreement between the Prime Ministers of Singapore and the United Kingdom for the continued British occupation of the defence base at Singapore “ until the 1970’s ” will be as welcome in Canberra as in Singapore. The determination of Mr Wilson’s colleagues to prune the defence bill has concentrated attention on Britain's commitments east of Suez, and, in particular, on the huge cost of the naval base at Singapore. Although the British Defence Minister, Mr Healey, won the reluctant consent of the Australian Government to the principle of an Australian base instead of the Singapore base, the swift changes in South-east Asia since Mr Healey left Canberra in February have altered many strategic concepts. The renewed political agitation in South Vietnam, the demotion of Dr. Sukarno, and the complicated posturing of Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia must all bear on the question whether Singapore is now more or less suitable as a site for a naval base. The Australian Prime Minister, Mr Holt, who has never been happy at the prospect of a British withdrawal from Singapore, will have lost no opportunity to impress on Mr Healey the new advantages of the British presence in Singapore—or the disadvantages of a withdrawal. Singapore’s Prime Minister, Mr Lee Kuan Yew, has said he did not want the British to leave Singapore until he could be sure the island republic would be secure when they did leave. The republic’s Chinese—the majority of the population—are well aware of the trading opportunities the base brings: an estimated £5O million a year is spent in Singapore by British and other visiting servicemen.

The retention of the base, however, raises delicate diplomatic questions. Singapore’s willingness to open trade and exchange diplomatic courtesies with Indonesia has widened the breach between Singapore and Malaysia. As long as Indonesia’s policy towards Malaysia remains one of “ confronta- “ tionthe Malaysians regard Singapore’s recognition of Indonesia not merely as an unfriend!} act but as a potential threat to Malaysia’s security Mr Lee, however, is anxious to capture the trade with Indonesia, which was suspended at an early stage- of the confrontation policy, and has evidently decided that border skirmishes in Borneo should not delay the resumption of this trade. To assure the Indonesian Government that he Will not permit a Singaporebased attack on Indonesia, Mr Lee has written into the new lease a condition that Singapore must not be used by the British for aggressive purposes “ either “ on their own behalf or on behalf of the South-east “ Asia Treaty Organisation ”. This would appear to limit severely British freedom of action in the area; but it is scarcely credible that the British would accept a virtual veto by their landlords as a condition of their tenancy. The clause may be no more than a placatory gesture towards suspicious neighbours.

Whatever the restrictions, in principle or in practice, on the future uses of the naval base. Britain has now a reasonable security of tenure “ until the “ 1970’s ”. The Australian Government, relieved of the huge cost of building a base as an alternative to Singapore, will, no doubt, be called on to meet a share of Britain’s continuing bill at Singapore; New Zealand, too, must expect to contribute more men and money to Singapore.