The Press THURSDAY, DECEMBER 30, 1965. Cambodia’s Strange Neutrality

Press, Volume CIV, Issue 30946, 30 December 1965, Page 8

The Press THURSDAY, DECEMBER 30, 1965. Cambodia’s Strange Neutrality

Prince Sihanouk’s latest outburst against suspected American threats of invasion might be taken more seriously if Cambodia had been less eager in the past to raise an international alarm about threats, real or imaginary, to its rather shaky security. The United States may be over-estimating the extent to which the Viet Cong use Cambodia as a sanctuary and supply route for operations in South Vietnam. No evidence suggests that the Cambodian Government is actively fostering the cause of the Viet Cong. The fear of reprisals by the Vietnamese, Cambodia’s traditional enemies, is too great to risk overt support for the Viet Cong. Suggestions of the clandestine use of Cambodian roads and bases have frequently been shown to be unfounded. Still, the frontier is illdefined, the jungle doubtless conceals much Viet Cong activity, and Cambodia is becoming increasingly sensitive to incursions, deliberate or accidental, by American and South Vietnamese forces. Prince Sihanouk severed diplomatic relations with the United States last May after a South Vietnamese Air Force raid across the border. He had stopped United States economic and military aid early in 1964. He protests neutrality with admirable regularity and vehemence while speaking of Peking as his “ number one ” friend and while supporting many of the main lines of Chinese policy. This brings Cambodia little more than assurances of Chinese support in the event—an unlikely event—of an invasion of Cambodia: and Prince Sihanouk has noted the absence of direct Chinese support for North Vietnam. But his vocal support for China is also an insurance against Communist subversion in Cambodia; and Prince Sihanouk has managed to discredit local Communists. China has cultivated the friendship more vigorously since its relations with Indonesia went astray. Cambodia also accepts aid from Russia and Jugoslavia, China’s ideological opponents. Prince Sihanouk is said to have no illusions about what might happen to him and his nation if the United States withdrew from Indo-China.

Cambodia’s chief complaint against the United States is its alliance with Vietnam and with Cambodia’s other traditionally ill-disposed neighbour, Thailand. Whenever he hears talk of Viet Cong activity in Cambodia and of action by the Americans or Vietnamese to subdue it, Prince Sihanouk affects to believe that it is all a pretext for invasion. Innocent Cambodians have suffered in incursions over the border in the past; and in spite of American orders to their forces to take the utmost care, they may suffer in the future. Cambodia’s army could not, however well-intentioned, deny the use of Cambodian territory to the Viet Cong; the task would be beyond its means. So it is easier to “warn off” the Viet Cong’s pursuers. The United States cannot guarantee that the Viet Cong will not use Cambodian trails any more than it can prevent the Viet Cong from buying supplies in the shops of Saigon. This is just another frustrating aspect of a frustrating war; but it will effectively thwart any hopes of an early restorations of relations between Cambodia and the United States*