Indonesian Attitudes

Press, Volume CIV, Issue 30941, 23 December 1965, Page 12

Indonesian Attitudes

The dismissal of Dr. Subandrio and the promotion of General Nasution show that the right wing in Indonesia is still gaining ground at the expense of the left. General Nasution succeeds Dr. Subandrio as deputy supreme commander, a position which ranks second only to that of president. Dr. Subandrio, who was named in the short-lived “ provis- “ ional council ” on October 1, is expected to be offered some minor post, or to be sent on an overseas assignment.

To appreciate the significance of the latest changes, it is necessary to study the sequence of events in Indonesia since the abortive October 1 revolution. President Sukarno appealed to farm workers at a recent conference not to “ allow our “ leftist stance to shift to the right. If it shifts to the “ right our revolution will be crushed and will sink ”. In the same week, the Minister of Defence (General Nasution) told soldiers at a parade, in a broadcast speech, that Indonesians must marshal all their forces to crush elements of the Communist “ September 30 “ movement ”. “ Their leader has openly said that a “ war with the imperialists should be followed by an “internal war”. There was no doubt, he said, that the P.K.I. (Communist Party) was the culprit in the coup.

A study of these two speeches suggests that Dr. Sukarno still clings to his “ nasakom ” dogma, which is being steadily eroded by the army faction. “ Nasakom ” was invented by Dr. Sukarno 10 years ago. A contraction of the Indonesian words meaning nationalist, religious, and Communist, it sums up the three main unifying factors in Indonesian society as Dr. Sukarno sees them. Unless these three forces are represented in his “ guided democracy ” he fears that one or more of the scattered islands of the Indonesian archipelago might break away from Djakarta. “ You cannot ignore a party that polls six million “ votes ”, he once said, referring to the 1955 election, the last held in Indonesia. “ I am not attempting to “ bring Indonesia to the far left, but to achieve “ stability in this country ”. Indonesia had been moving steadily to the far left in recent years, to the alarm of moderate and right-wing elements in the country. The abortive September 30 coup provided these elements with the excuse they had been seeking to purge the administration of Communists. Politically, Dr. Sukarno can survive without the Communists. It now appears that he overrated their influence, much of which they derived from his support. Certainly the Communists can no longer be regarded as a significant force in Indonesian politics. The chairman of the party, Mr D. Aidit, unofficially reported to have been a prisoner of the Army since the September 30 rising, is now believed to be dead, the party organisation has been destroyed, and most of the influential Communists have lost their positions. Why does Dr. Sukarno persist in his support of a waning faction? Does he fear that, without a strong left wing in the country, the generals will prevail? Is he so committed to his cherished “ nasakom ” -that he is incapable of disavowing it? Or is he concerned to maintain friendly relations with China? The answers to these questions might all be in the affirmative, or at least a qualified affirmative. Whatever his motives, Dr. Sukarno is stubbornly fighting the cause of the leftists: but his fight begins to look like a rearguard action.