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Undisciplined Use Of Backs Was South Africa's Basic Weakness

This is the first O f four articles on the 1955 Rugbu *.°“n °J s P r ‘nsb°lcs by L ‘■The ?res. “ 9b ’' TepOrter of

'J’HE first and last major matches played by the Springboks in New Zealand —against Wellington and the fourth test—both ended in disastrous defeats and both matches underlined heavily the basic weaknesses in the South African team.

There was a similar pattern in these matches. They were played on firm grounds and in sunny weather, conditions which should have suited the Springboks, yet both matches were lost decisively. Why?

The answer is simple. Wellington and New Zealand used the same tactics. A tight, driving pack was used to break through in the line-outs, the half-back and the first five-eighths kicked regularly and errors were reduced to a minimum by the backs refusing to pass unless they were in a good position. The tackling was fierce and effective.

To combat these tactics the Springboks tried to use their strength—their brilliant and fast backs. But it was never a disciplined use: too many mistakes were made and basically it was these errors which cost the Springboks those games. Immediately after the Wellington game the experienced J. L. Gainsford said bitterly, “We won’t pass in our own half again.” This attitude obviously was taken up by the team, for it was

not until very late in the tour that the Springboks again began to use their backs adventurously. That was a mistake and one which had a major influence on the team’s play. What the Springboks should have realised was that they did not lose because they passed in their own half; they lost because they made so many mistakes and did many incredibly stupid things under pressure.

It was this traumatic effect caused by Wellington that brought the Springboks so many problems in their next few matches. Muddy grounds, perhaps, were another factor, but the Springboks, in Saturday matches at

least, tried to keep the game in the forwards, rarely using their backs—their main strength.

For example, Otago and Canterbury, neither particularly strong provincial sides, severely tested South Africa because the Springboks insisted on playing a forward game.

It was most noticeable for the greater part of the tour that matches fell into a set pattern. The Wednesday matches were won easily because the disparity in weight gave the Springboks a major advantage in the forwards and the speed of the backs meant that games were won decisively.

In Saturday matches, against better opposition and stronger forwards, the Springboks were only an average team. The odd situation was reached before the second test where in the seven Saturday matches the Springboks had scored 12 tries to 11, whereas in the Wednesday matches the total was 45 tries to eight. However, the second half of the third test was the turning point of the tour. For the first time in a major game the backs were quickly brought into play and the Springboks scored a magnificent victory.

With this new-found confidence, drier grounds and warm weather, the Springboks played some great Rugby against Hawke’s Bay and the combined team at Rotorua.

Those good wins probably were their undoing in the fourth test. Suddenly they believed they could run and pass the ball from anywhere. They tried that in the fourth test; reverted back to haphazard passing, made mistakes and thus lost the series.

The result of the fourth test, however, should not cloud the fact that the Springboks did demonstrate that, when used intelligently, backs can be a vital force even in modern Rugby. Some of the brightest moments of the tour came when de Villiers, Barnard. Gainsford and Roux played together. The virtues of these four players in particular could be used as a model by many New Zealand backs. Running half-backs are rare in New Zealand but de

Villiers showed that this type of player can be a potent attacking weapon, particularly against hesitant tackling. Barnard’s speed and elusiveness was a delight and he also showed that it is not axiomatic that a break cannot be made from set play. In pure attacking ability Barnard was not matched by any New Zealand first five-eighths. Roux and Gainsford gave a salutory lesson to New Zealand backs in the art of

crash tackling—another facet of Rugby which has been missing from the New Zealand scene for some years. Also, when they were used properly, they showed that gaps can be found by such old fashioned methods as side-stepping and swerving. It was significant that they, and some of the other Springbok backs, tried to force gaps by using these skills, not merely waiting for a gap to be presented to them because a defender was out of position. To many New Zealanders it was surprising to see how much South African Rugby had changed from what formerly had been its greatest asset —strong, tight forwards. This can be explained by the attitude of South African

officials who have demanded more attractive Rugby, which meant that the forwards, as well as the backs, had to be able to run and pass.

The Rhodesian prop, A. Macdonald, explained that he had to wait until this tour to gain a cap because before that he was not considered fast enough, or, out in the loose enough to be regarded as an international prop.

However, after the Wellington game there was a perceptible change in the forward play. Slowly but surely the play became tighter, particularly in the line-outs. In the first two tests the Springbok forwards were overwhelmed by the welldrilled All Blacks, but by the third and fourth tests there was not a great deal of difference in the two packs. In the forwards South Africa’s greatest strength was the ability of players to link quickly with the backs. Nel, Ellis and Hopwood were devastating when fed by de Villiers or Smith. On dry grounds these three players in particular were probably more dangerous than the backs, for allied with great speed they had other skills such as side-steps, the ability to sell dummies and a quick appreciation of when to change the direction of an attack. Perhaps the major weakness of the forwards was that they never really attempted the massed drive from the line-outs. With their weight advantage and their strength this could have made them a formidable proposition. But too often these assets were used in the loose only and not in tight play. Rucking was not the forte of the forwards. They preferred to smother in the rucks, something they did well in the third test, so that play could be re-started with a set scrum. It was obvious that when the ball was on the ground they were trained to try and pick it up, to start another passing rush. This sometimes led to spectacular play but also it provided some anxious moments for the backs when New Zealand forwards were hovering near by and not committed to the ruck. Another bad feature of the forwards—the backs were also guilty—was that they would not fall on the ball. This was the main reason why the second test became such a humiliating affair for the Springboks. Ellis, who has only been playing Rugby for four years, developed amazingly on tour. Macdonald, Van Zyl, Marais and Parker were solid scrummagers of the type that is expected from South African Rugby although most of them are approaching the veteran stage. But the Springboks can feel quite happy with the tour. Barnard and de Villiers must have established themselves as regular internationals. Brynard was a very good wing and Nomis, Mans and Olivier showed sufficient promise to suggest that they will play in many tests in the future. Du Preez, perhaps the outstanding Springbok forward, would be welcomed by the All Black selectors for his skill as a jumper in the line-outs. Botha and Naude were two powerful, if occasionally too placid, locks.

The final point about the team is separate from the Rugby field. By their conduct and sportsmanship they helped bring tests between New Zealand and South Africa back to a more realistic plane where they became tests of Rugby skills, not of national pride. If only for that reason they can be regarded as a successful side.

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/CHP19650922.2.117

Bibliographic details

Press, Volume CIV, Issue 30862, 22 September 1965, Page 15

Word Count
1,389

Undisciplined Use Of Backs Was South Africa's Basic Weakness Press, Volume CIV, Issue 30862, 22 September 1965, Page 15

Undisciplined Use Of Backs Was South Africa's Basic Weakness Press, Volume CIV, Issue 30862, 22 September 1965, Page 15

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