A Policy For Vietnam PRINCIPLES FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT SUGGESTED

Press, Volume CIV, Issue 30839, 26 August 1965, Page 12

A Policy For Vietnam PRINCIPLES FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT SUGGESTED

IBy

MARK D. SADLER.

B .4., B Sc.. member of the executive of the Christchurch branch of the Neto Zealand United Nations Association I

Those who try to decide whether the United States, the Communists, or the South Vietnamese regime of the former President Diem are mainly responsible for the renewal of war in Vietnam seldom look critically at the Geneva Agreement itself. That agreement, it can be argued, was as unfortunate in some of its provisions, or lack of them, as the Charter of the United Nations. Like the Charter, the Geneva Agreement provided for international co-operation in preventing a renewal of war. but the “International Commission for Supervision and Control" was not given enough power to exert continuing control over events relevant to the Agreement.

Article 14 (c), for example, i states: “Each party under-! takes to refrain from any reprisals or discrimination against persons or organisations on account of their activities during the hostilities and to guarantee their democratic liberties." Both sides, according to the evidence, violated this obligation. During the first year the International Commission listed 319 political executions by the South Vietnamese Government and none in the North, but North Vietnamese violations of this article later increased. By 1956. political arrests in both South and North Vietnam ran into thousands, a policy which led to suppression of dissidence in the North but to increasing disorder in the South.

Stronger Powers The International Commission was powerless to halt this deterioration. What was needed was a right of appeal to the Commission against sentences of death or long imprisonment on political charges and Appeal Court powers, including power to force the release of those not guilty of criminal offences. Such rights and powers, written into the Geneva Agreement. might have prevented the infraction of “democratic liberties” in both parts of Vietnam, might have preserved moderate influences in the North and greater stability in the South. All this is in the past but other criticisms of the Agreement may be more relevant to a future solution.

After several pages of details providing for a temporary political and military separation of Vietnam into two parts, the “Final Declaration” of the 1954 Geneva Conference states: “The military demarcation line . . . should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary.” In other words this seems to say: The political and military separation we have arranged for shall not in any way be interpreted as being a separation.

From' this failure to face facts, many larger failures have followed. Since, in fact, there was a separation, the agreement should have called for country-wide elections only after an internationally supervised referendum to ensure that a majority of people in each half wanted reunification. President Diem, who understandably rejected the Geneva provisions for elections in 1956 for the' whole of Vietnam, might have been i much more willing to accept (a referendum in South Viet-

nam to discover whether or not a majority of South Vietnamese wanted reunification. Under pressure, and if a cease-fire could be arranged, the present South Vietnamese Government could probably also be persuaded to submit to such a referendum.

Legitimacy Uncertain Conversely, unless and until the South Vietnamese people are allowed to decide whether or not they want a separate South Vietnam, then the legitimacy of the present division of the country must remain uncertain. Unless the West offers to support a supervised plebiscite, then its "defence” of South Vietnam will continue to have doubtful foundations. If, on the other hand, the United States and the allies could be persuaded to offer the South Vietnamese a fully democratic choice, and if North Vietnam rejected such a solution, there would then be a good chance that a majority in the Security Council would vote for collective defence of South Vietnam, provided such defence ceased to include counter-agression against North Vietnam.

The New Zealand Government, in recent months, has become expert in Treaty juggling. It has thrown up some clauses of some treaties for public view while keeping other clauses of the same or different treaties as much out of the argument as possible. In the Address-in-Reply Debate in early .lune, Mr Donald. National Party Member of Parliament for Wairarapa, quoted several clauses of the S.E.A.T.O. Treaty which seemed relevant. It was left to Sir Eruera Tirikatene, the last Labour speaker in the debate. to supply "Article 1" which reads: “The parties undertake. . . to settle any international disputes ... in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."

The Manila treaty thus does' not give any support to total violation of Articles 53 and 103 of the United Nations Charter which state: “No enforcement. action shall he taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorisation of the Security Council:” and “In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail."

Justifiable Violation? I The unsatisfactory veto system, and Russian lack of co-operation in United Nations | peacekeeping may sometimes | justify a partial violation of | Article 53. In the case of the (Malaysia-Indonesia dispute, ■the New Zealand Government ■ was urged not to commit troops until a Security Council majority decided against I Indonesia. In the event, the Security Council voted nine Ito two against Indonesian [attacks, and the New Zealand Government then took action in accordance with the majority vote, but in defiance of the Russian veto. Such a

procedure was admirable in the circumstances, and should have set a precedent for New Zealand policy elsewhere. Having ignored such a quasi-lawful procedure in the case of Vietnam, it is still possible for the New Zealand Government to insist on some attempt to make Vietnam intervention more lawful and international. This would quire:(a) A demonstration of respect for the principle of democratic self-determination in the form of an offer of a referendum in South Vietnam on reunification. (b) Asking the Security Council to find against the National Liberation Front if it rejects such an offer as one basis of a settlement.

(c) Calling for international command of a defence of South Vietnam if such a Security Council majority is achieved.

There is good reason to dis- ■ trust purely American com(mand of such defence. The (recent call of Mr Mendal I Rivers, the United States I House of Representatives’ i Armed Services Committee (chairman, for preparations to "use our atomic power to wipe out China’s atomic capability" is an example of lawless and dangerous aggressive thinking by highly-placed Americans President Johnson, with his habits of compromise. may not entirely resist such advice.

Alternative Policies Mr Shand, in his speech on behalf of the Government at the University “Teach-In” said it was easy to criticise, but that critics had not put forward practical alternative policies. Mr Shand may not have been aware of some submissions to the Prime Minister which the Government ignored. My main contention has been that New Zealand should use what influence it has, however small, to help ■ bring about a moderation and modification of American ( policy. Present American policy in Vietnam seems to consist, not of a carefully calculated attempt at a military "stalemate." as a recent American speaker in Christchurch claimed, but of an attempt to meet Communist violence by the use of greater force. In his recent interview with a “Newsweek” editor. President Johnson said that the Asian Communists would only be “convinced" by “Power. Power on land, power in the air, power wherever it’s necessary. We’ve got to commit it. and this will convince them we mean it."

But it seems to me that our killing in Vietnam can only be justified if the violence of i the under-privileged is met with law or principle com(bined with a minimum use of ■ mainly defensive power. Only ! if the world emerges from the | Vietnam crisis a little closer to a spirit of compromise and (a rule of principle and law. can what is happening there jbe historically justified. An undue reliance on present 'military might, divorced from j the principles and procedures (suggested above, could easily have an opposite effect, anil could project us into a future (where our present actions [will serve as a precedent for I more numerous nations when I they have a similar advantage lin power.