SINGAPORE IS THE BASE ESSENTIAL IN TODAY’S ASIAN STRATEGY?

Press, Volume CIV, Issue 30826, 11 August 1965, Page 12

SINGAPORE IS THE BASE ESSENTIAL IN TODAY’S ASIAN STRATEGY?

'By

CLARE HOLLINGSWORTH.

<n thr "Guordlan.” Manchester.)

'Reprinted bv arrangement.) What is the present or future importance of Singapore to Britain’s defence commitments?

On a short view and considered only in the light of regional strategy, the Singapore base will be vital to Britain so long as President Sukarno’s “confrontation” of Malaysia continues. Under the terms of the joint defence treaty, Britain is committed to defend Malaysia against aggression, and Singapore is the main base for the Anglo-Malaysian forces.

Singapore’s long-term and indeed classic role is. however, the protection of the sea routes to the Commonwealth countries, Australia, New Zealand and. to a lesser extent India, to which has been added during theh last decade the containment of Communist China. Further, without Singapore—Britain’s only major base east of Suez. Aden having only limited facilities for the Royal Navy —it would not be possible to fulfil our obligations to the S.E.A.T.O. powers (if 5.E.A.T.0., without French or Pakistan co-operation, can still be said to exist as an effective alliance). Unfitted Vacuum The Indian Ocean is the loneliest and least patrolled sea in the world: a vacuum ready for any major power to fill. Soviet submarines and electronic fishing trawlers are already there. In view of the political uncertainties in Aden and the Persian Gulf and of the fact that Gan is a mere runway on a coral atoll, Singapore assumes a new importance. Perhaps it would be equally true to say that it reverts, in part, to the role for which it was designed a century ago—to protect India and the Indian Ocean against attack from the East. The United States regards Singapore as a useful back stop to its operations in Vietnam. It knows that if the British were at any time to withdraw this would seriously weaken American defence in South-east Asia in the eyes of the people that matter—the Asians themselves. The opening of negotiations between the United States and the Vietnamese could change the whole scene in South-east Asia for the better. The situation in Indonesia can also change. President Sukarno is known to be ir poor health and, while few Asians think he will die in the immediate future the struggle for the succession has opened. There is already some evidence that the Communists are gaining ground in the army. If Sukarno were to be succeeded by an out-and-out Communist controlled Government change could only be for the worse. Paradoxically President Sukarno’s confrontation of Malaysia is binding the Federation together at least for the moment. Were he to come to terms with the Malaysian Prime Minister. Tunku Abdul Rahman, at the expense of the Chinese population of the country, there is little doubt

I that the Federation would ■ quickly disintegrate into sep- ! arate States one of which - would be the island of Singa- , pore. For the moment the s Chinese in Singapore accept t the presence of the British ' base: it provides them, in one , way or another, with about 25 ; per cent of their gross , national revenue. But the bril-

liant, anti-Communist Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew. and his supporters do not expect it to be permanent: indeed, they suggest it will not be tenable for longer than five years after the ending of confrontation when they will insist that a gradual running down of the base should begin.

Change For The Better

There is a danger that a “British Must Go” movement might be brought into being by traditional British behaviour or misbehaviour. As they did in India and other countries in bygone days, the British community—in this case mostly service wives are gradually infuriating the friendly, beautifully mannered Chinese by their assumption of superiority English women, for example, indignantly refuse to allow their children to play with their Chinese neighbours. British women, a Chinese Cabinet Minister told me, cause far more resentment than the noisy “V” bombers.

Today, the British taxpayer is spending at the rate of over £lOO million each year on the Singapore base and the current military operation in Malaysia and Borneo. That is. far less than £BO million in foreign exchange alone (plus substantial sterling costs) which Rhine Army requires. The new Commander-in-Chief will not lack advisers. He will find a senior Foreign Office official on his staff and four beadquarters scattered about the city overburdened with “top brass,” The army, who carry the main burden of the logistic support of the Borneo operation, have a lieutenant-general and two major-generals at the Headquarters of the Far East Land Forces while in Borneo a major-general directs the operations, and a second major-general serves under him.

But it is only fair to add. indeed to stress, that tn spite of the large headquarters staffs in Singapore, the operations in Borneo are organised with an impressive efficiency and great economy of men and material.

The urgent demand of the British Minister for Defence. Mr Healey, may help the new Commander-In-Chief to make cuts In the staff and integrate the headquarters This operation was successfully accomplished three years ago in Aden where the three Service chiefs now have offices opening on the same passage.

The Singapore base is essential now because it. contains facilities which are not available elsewhere in South-east Asia. The R.A.F. station at Changi is the only one which can cope with all types of aircraft—the long distance VC-10s, Comets and Britannias bringing troops and freight from the U.K. and the short range Argosies. Hast ings and Bristol freighters carrying them on to Borneo There are also vast secure storage depots for bombs, ammunition and weapons.

Gradual Running Dow n

The naval dockyards, which with minor improvements would be capable of refitting any type of vessel, are busy but not always working to their full capacity—in spite of the dry docks and the useful pool of semi-skilled and willing labour. The longterm policy for them, disturbed by the Malaysian crisis, appears to be a very gradual running down. The land base is useful for the acclimatisation of troops and for weapon training under jungle conditions.

There will be a need for a British or Anglo-American base in the region for many years to come, and if Singapore becomes untenable, it will have to be replaced though on a far smaller scale. Various alternatives have been suggested. Diego-Garcia, an island in the Indian Ocean, has been discussed: so have the Seychelles, Perth in Australia, Brunei with its oil and Sarawak with its traditionally proßritish population. (In my view the last two suggestions are useless unless confrontation were to end.) But the building of any of these places into a base would be prohibitively costly. From a purely selfish viewpoint Britain could, of course, withdraw from South-east Asia when confrontation ends just as France has done. But this would adversely affect Western world strategy and place an intolerable burden on the United States, as well as exposing Commonwealth countries to insidious Chinese intervention.

This article, which has special relevance to the present situation in Singapore, was printed in the “Guardian," Manchester, on the occasion of a new Commander-in-chief, Far East Forces, taking up his appointment in June.