EDEN MEMOIRS: VII PEARL HARBOUR ATTACK ENDS COMMONWEALTHS LONELY YEAR

Press, Volume CIV, Issue 30711, 29 March 1965, Page 10

EDEN MEMOIRS: VII PEARL HARBOUR ATTACK ENDS COMMONWEALTHS LONELY YEAR

IBy ANTHONY EDEN, now the Earl of Avon!

Japan’s leaders were lured on by imperial ambition, however much they nug ht ] pietext economic needs to excuse their policy. The attempt to subdue China, which by 1940 had las e< four years, tested the country’s military strength and drained its material resources. Three non-Asian Powers were in the way of the further spread of Japanese conquests. France, the Netherlands and Great Britain, each with substantial colonial territories. Behind these, but detached, stood the United States, whose threatened interests were mainly strategic and commercial.

The fall of France had the same consequences on the Far East as on the Middle East, leaving the British Commonwealth much exposed, although the hostile force which it now faced alone was not, as yet, actively aggressive.

On August 1. 1940, Prince Fumimaro Konoye formed a Government to exploit the opportunity created by France's weakness. Mr Yosuke Matsusoka became the Foreign Minister and defined Japan’s mission as the “imperial way” to a Greater East Asia CoProsperity Sphere. Its area was not modest. The trials of the Japanese war criminals later revealed that it was to include, after two more wars, not only South-east Asia but Ceylon, parts of Canada and of the United States, Central America, the West Indies, Australia and New Zealand. Dutch Territories [An urgent problem was that] of the Netherlands East Indies, where our Dutch allies were showing themselves characteristically resolute. I wished to make a declaration with them on the defence of our territories in the Far East. To the Defence Committee I wrote in a memorandum on May 15 [1941]: “We are already allied to the Netherlands Goverment against Germany. Thus, if the Netherlands East Indies were attacked by Germany’s ally, our moral obligation, as well as our vital need to secure our communications with Australia and New Zealand and our obligations in this respect to the two Dominions, would make it impossible to stand by and see the Netherlands East Indies overrun.” It seemed to me that if the United States were to remove part of their Pacific Fleet into the Atlantic, it would be more than ever necessary that we and the Netherlands should, by a firm declaration, try to convince Japan that we would protect our joint interests in the South Seas. The Defence Committee agreed, though I eventually preferred to give this warning privately through our ambassador in Tokyo to the Japanese Foreign Minister, which was done.

A few days later [after June 13] the German invasion of Soviet Russia created Japan's opportunity. Resisting the Nazi temptation to join in the attack, the Japanese prepared to concentrate on expanding their Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, regardless of the risk of war with Britain and the United States.

I soon had reports of their intention to occupy bases in

southern Indo-China and these led me to hold urgent consultations with the Dominions. the Netherlands and the United States. The Americans, it seemed, intended to freeze Japanese assets and to impose a complete embargo, at least on the export of certain key commodities.

U.S.-Commonwealth Ties

On balance, I advised against attempting to put any brake upon the American purpose whatever that might prove to be. I wrote: “The risk ... of seriously weakening the ties between us and America is real.”

My own view, as I said boldly, but not perhaps unwisely, was that “the risk of the United States not intervening in a war between ourselves and Japan is small.” I did, however, advise that if called upon to go to lengths which involved a risk of war, we ought to ask for an assurance of armed support from the United States, should the Japanese attack either ourselves or the Netherlands East Indies, as a result of action jointly agreed upon. The War Cabinet accepted this counsel. On the same day, July 21, the Vichy Government yielded to the Japanese demand for bases in southern IndoChina; by the end of the month Japanese troops had occupied Saigon and Camranh Bay. The United States, the Netherlands and ourselves then carried out the freezing measures. There remained the question of whether I could tell the Netherlands Government that Britain would give them military support if their territories in South-east Asia were attacked. Both the New Zealand and Australian Governments wanted me to do this, irrespective of the attitude of the United States, which was inhibited by its Constitution. On July 30 I wrote to the Prime Minister: “All that is suggested is that we should let the Dutch know that we will help them, in the event of a Japanese attack, to the best of our ability.” Mr Churchill agreed to my proposal. A fresh turn was given to events when the Japanese asked for the renewal of negotiations in Washington, The informal and somewhat dilatory discussion which followed . . . grated upon the Japanese military. At their demand the Imperial Confer-

ence on September 6 in Tokyo secretly agreed that, if in a !month's time Japan's minimum demands had not been accepted in Washington, the decision for war would be taken.

Our ambassador in Tokyo warned us that there was little hope of the Japanese Cabinet surviving, if the discussions with the United States broke down or were unduly prolonged. I thought this a Japanese manoeuvre to put pressure on Britain to exert an influence in Washington favourable to Tokyo, and on October 1 I minuted that we should not do so. To jo Succeeds A fortnight later Prince Konoye resigned, rather than fulfil the decision of the Imperial Conference for war if the discussions broke down. The menacing General Hideki Tojo succeeded him. At last, on December 5, Lord Halifax (British Ambassador in Washington) telegraphed that he had seen the President, who agreed to warn Japan against any attack on Thailand, Malaya or the Netherlands East Indies. Roosevelt considered that the warning should be given independently by the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands, his own Government issuing it first, so that it should not appear that he was following our lead. “December 4: A good message from Roosevelt about the Far East. To my intense relief was able to induce Winston to agree to full assurance to Dutch on the strength of it.” But the President’s decision was too late, for the hour was long past when deterrent words could influence Japanese plans. On December 7, all Japanese naval and military commanders were told that the war would begin on December 8, Japanese time. The decision had been ratified by the Emperor in council a week before. In the early morning of what was, by American time, Sunday, December 7, Jap inese planes, based on aircraft carriers 300 miles away, destroyed the greater part of the United States Pacific Fleet, then lying at anchor in Pearl Harbour.

This action, grievous as it was at the time for American naval power, doomed the signatories of the Tripartite Pact. They could not, in the end, withstand the combined resources of the United States, the Soviet Union and the British Empire. The hawk’s dive upon the American fleet was followed by a political decision which was to determine how the Allied victory was to be won. Hitler and Mussolini declared war on the United States on December 11. This was a gratuitous act, for neither the German nor the Italian Governments had advance knowledge of the Japanese intention.

Had the Nazi and Fascist Powers held their hand, the total American effort must have been directed to the Pacific, leaving Russia in Europe and the British forces in North Africa to bear alone for some years at least, the military might which Hitler and his satellites could have hurled against them. Hitler’s Fate Sealed The consequences of such a shaping of events can be conjectured: they would have been costly; they could have been fatal Loyalty is not a word commonly associated with Hitler and Mussolini. This unique occasion, on which they displayed it together toward a third nation, sealed their fate. With the growing weight of American power beside us we knew that Hitler could not

triumph. Our lonely year >as over.

In spite of which, many blows fell, during the early months of 1942, on the three countries which had now to fight together. In the Far East, a succession of disasters overwhelmed Malaya, the Philippines. Singapore, the Dutch East Indies and Burma, exposing the whole Pacific and Indian Oceans to the enemy.

In the Middle East we once again lost the ground gained by Auchinleck’s winter offensive and at midsummer Rommel stood near the gates of Alexandria and the Nile Delta. In Russia the German summer offensive penetrated farther than in the previous year, deep into the Caucasus and to the Volga at Stalingrad. Not until the autumn did the tide of battle begin to flow in our favour. Politically, Britain's relations with her great allies were now my chief concern until the end of the war. I accepted the fact that the United States must in time become the dominant partner in Anglo-American councils. In 1942 this was not so. Her wealth and productive capacity were not yet at full stretch and her armed forces were only beginning their training and deployment. Our effort, on the other hand, after more than two years of war, was nearing its peak. The balance of power between us brought its problem. How to handle our relations with Soviet Russia, the policy to be followed toward de Gaulle, and the future of the British Commonwealth presented varying facets almost daily. I had to judge how far in meeting them 1 could at the Foreign Office, insist on my point of view, how far be unreservedly with Mr Churchill in his sentiment for his transatlantic allies. “Spent Without Stint” These were conundrums which rose up scores of times, in different shapes and sizes. If we did not always get the right answers, our country still spent itself without stint and beyond the recovery of the wealth and authority we ha I known. There were also the strategic tugs-of-war among the United States Chiefs of Staff, and between them and our own, about the demands of the Pacific theatre and those of Europe. Though these appeared from time to time to be resolved in conference, they were apt to break out again and they had a significant influence on the course of the war.

With our other major ally the path was rougher. Though Soviet Russia's immediate interests in the war were the same as ours, in the peace they might conflict with what we and much of the world thought right. It was this contingency that I wished to guard against, if I could. I was given to saying at this time that the failure of the British Empire and Russia to agree their policies in advance had made possible three great conflicts, the Napoleonic War and the two World Wars.

We had to fight in unison, which was the only way to shorten the war. Consequently, our relations with Soviet Russia seemed to be a swaying contest between what common sense declared we ought to do and what experience proved practicable. Perhaps it must always be so when dealing with a Power which is confident that its faith must dominate the world, to the exclusion of all others.

(To be continued) Copyright 1865 The Times Publishing Company. Ltd. All rights reserved by Opera Mundt Paris In all countries except Great Britain. Reproduction in whole or in part atrictly prohibited.