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War-time Ally Mistrusted

(N.Z.P.A.-Reuter—Copyright) Nriw YORK, January 6. The United States decided not to give nuclear information to the Soviet Union in 1945 partly because it did not want to encourage the Russians to join the war against Japan, Government officials of that time said on a television programme last night.

Mr James Byrnes, formerly Secretary of State, said “it was ever present in my mind that it was important that we should have an end to the (Pacific) war before the Russians came in.” President Truman received news of the first successful testing of the atomic bomb while he was attending the Potsdam conference with Stalin and Sir Winston Churchill. “In view of the fact that neither the President nor I were anxious to have them (the Russians) enter the war after we had learned of this successful test, we were in doubt about what attitude we should take,” Mr Byrnes said.

After a decision was made, Mr Byrnes said: “President Truman walked around to Stalin . . . and told him substantially this: that we want you to know, Generalissimo, that we have now developed what we call a secret weapon of tremendous power and which, in a few days, we hope to use in the war against Japan.’’ Mr J. J. McCloy, then a Government adviser, continued: “He pretty much said, ‘Well, that’s fine. Well, use it. And what’s the next item

on the agenda?’ It let everybody down terribly because we were so worked up emotionally over this thing.” Mr Byrnes added that he had “always been of the opinion that Stalin did not grasp the importance of the statement.” The Russians entered the war in its final phase. Mr Byrnes was at that time considering “whether we should try at an early stage to bring about collaboration with them or whether we should try to outdistance them in the race,” according to Mr Gordon Ameson, recording secretary of the committee which handled the topsecret bomb decisions. Mr Byrnes decided against collaboration.

re-emphasise the organisation’s current inadequacies in the peace-keeping field. This ineffectiveness, in part, has resulted from the failure of many members, including Russia and France, to pay their share of peace-keeping costs. Indonesia’s announced decision to withdraw from the United Nations still has not been submitted in writing.

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/CHP19650107.2.75

Bibliographic details

Press, Volume CIV, Issue 30642, 7 January 1965, Page 7

Word Count
381

War-time Ally Mistrusted Press, Volume CIV, Issue 30642, 7 January 1965, Page 7

War-time Ally Mistrusted Press, Volume CIV, Issue 30642, 7 January 1965, Page 7

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