SECRET REVEALED AFTER 18 YEARS

Press, Volume CII, Issue 30212, 17 August 1963, Page 10

SECRET REVEALED AFTER 18 YEARS

Fight In United States Over The A-Bomb

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FLETCHER KNEBEL and CHARLES W. BAILEY

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"Look” Magazine)

lIIDDEN in “top secret” files since World War 11, here is the dramatic story of the attempt by many nuclear scientists to convince President Truman that the A-bomb should not be used to destroy Japanese cities without warning. This is the record—uncoloured by hindsight—of what men said and did during the great moral debate.

When President Harry S Truman ordered the dropping of the atomic bomb on Japan, in an effort to end World War II with one awift atroke, he touched off a debate that ■will endure as long as men survive to write hiatory. No serious student can question the motives Or the Integrity of the men who made that fateful decision. Behind them lay more than three years of bloody, bitter fighting. Yet one question has troubled those who study the issue: were the men who actually unlocked the power of the atom—the nuclear scientists themselves—given a full hearing? Now, from behind the security curtain surrounding the atomic project, comes an answer. President Truman, faced with one of the great moral decisions of human hiatory, was denied access to the petitions of many American nuclear scientists who opposed the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima without warning. This startling fact emerges from the official files of the Manhattan Project, the two-billlon-dollar complex that built the bomb. Policy papers from these files, classified

“Top Secret” for 18 years, were obtained by “Look” after a two-year security clearance process that involved the Defence Department, the State Department, and the Atomic Energy Commission. The secret files—until now open only to official Government researchers—provide a blow-by-blow account of the futile efforts of scientists at the great atomic laboratories in Chicago and Oak Ridge to dissuade President Truman from releasing th* frightful power of the atom on the Japanese The dispute took place in an atmosphere that presentday critics find it convenient to overlook. Uppermost in the minds of President Truman and his chief advisers was the probable high cost in American lives if this country had to subdue Japan by frontal assault

At a White House war council on June 18, 1949, General George C. Marshall, Army chief of staff, estimated that in the first month alone of the invasion of Japan, there would be 31,000 casualties Other* were gloomier. Admiral Ernest J King chief

of naval operations, thought a “realistic” figure tor the conquest ot Kyushu— the first of two planned assaults on Japan—would be between 81.000 and 42.000 casualties Admiral William D. Leahy, the President's chief of staff, thought the casualty rate might be as high as 35 per cent of the 766.000-man invasion force. And Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson foresaw as many as one million American casualties—three times the cost of the entire Pacific war up to that time —if Japan fought to the bitter end.

Avoiding “An Okinawa”

With Washington and the nation sick of bloodletting, winning quickly and at minimum human cost became the prime objective Ha“ Truman told hi. military Chiefs he would write his orders ••with the purpose of economising to the maxi-

mum extent possible in the loss of American lives.” He hoped, he said, to avoid “an Okinawa from one end of Japan to the other.”

Thus dissenters to the use Of the bomb found most officials indisposed to approve any course that could prolong the war. Nevertheless,

the dispute raged behind Manhattan’s wall of secrecy. Although 18 years old, the story is as fresh as tomorrow morning’s newspaper—for the struggle behind the tight Manhattan security curtain provide* a backdrop for the debate that has swept the world since Russia resumed testing the giant megaton warheads that could erase whole cities from the earth.

The long-secret filqs show that this dilemma for mankind was forecast by atomic scientists almost two decades ago—even before they knew the'- terrible invention would work.

In essence, the first great moral debate of the atomic age was personified by two strong-minded men, one a refugee scientist, the other an Army general. Many others participated in the secret struggle, but these two became the symbols. Against the bomb: Leo Szilard, a brilliant Hungarian physicist who had studied at the University of Berlin, but fled to the United States after the rise of Hitler. As much as any other man. he was responsible for persuading Franklin D. Roosevelt to undertake atomic-weapons research in the first place. With Enrico Fermi, he supervised the first controlled chain reaction in a squash court under the football stands of Stagg Field at the University of Chicago.

For the bomb: Major General Leslie Richard Groves, a West Point-educ-ated Army engineer who built the Pentagon and then took over the prodigious “Manhattan Engineer District” to build the atomic bomb. A big man, handsome and fearless, he literally drove a vast army of scientists, factory workers and military officers to accomplish a feat that changed the world for ever.

Both men still live today, and the fervour of their differences continues unabated. Szilard, at 65, and Groves, at 66. still cling to the views that cleaved them 18 years ago. Groves Still believes the decision to use the bomb was right Szilard still believes it was - wrong.

Highlights Of Epic Dispute

Here are the highlights of the epic dispute, in which Szilard and Groves stood at opposite poles, as revealed in the Manhattan papers: A bundle of scientific petitions and statements, largely opposed to unrestricted use of the A-bomb on Japan, never reached President Truman—although they were addressed to him, and Colonel Kenneth D. Nichols, production chief of Manhattan, had urged Groves ‘‘that these papers be forwarded to the President of the United States with proper comments." America’s top military officer of World War 11, Goners] George C. Marshall, urged that the A-bomb should not be used against

Japan except after adequate warning. Said Marshall: “We must offset by such warning methods the opprobrium which might follow from an ill-considered employment of such force.” His advice was not followed. Apparently, only a few opposition statements ever reached Truman. One was a passionate letter from O. C. Brewatef of New York, who was involved in atomic production, and who wrote the President: "This thing must not be permitted to exist on earth.” Another was the official dissent of Ralph A. Bard, the Under Secretary of the Navy, who argued that the Japanese should be warned that atomic power might be used. As early as September 30, 1944, many months before the first atomic device was tested and before Manhattan officials were even sure it would work, two distinguished Americans, James G. Conant, President of Harvard University, and Vannevar Bush, President of the Carnegie Institution of Washington, warned Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson of future “super-super” bomba that could be delivered by guided missiles. They urged that America demonstrate its first bomb for the Japanese before actually using it against Japan. The Interim Committee, set up at Stimson's suggestion in the spring of 1045 to study all implications of the atomic bomb, started with the assumption that the bomb would be used and never really weighed the opinions of the opposing scientists. Almost all American leadens privy to the atomic secret—military, scientific and political—were concerned about possible Russian duplicity and were extremely wary about informing Russia, our World War II allay, of our atomic progress. This was one of the few areas of general agreement in the otherwise divisive dispute over use of the bomb on Japan. Nowhere in the Manhattan papers is there any indication that President Truman ever made an affirmative decision to drop the bomb. Rather, he seems to have proceeded on the assumption that the bomb would be dropped when ready. The papers tend to confirm a recent statement by Groves that Truman “was like a little boy on a toboggan.” who never had an opportunity to say yes. All he could have said, Groves argued, was no. That word the President never uttered. Moral Implications The moral implications of using the atomic bomb were first raised by Conant and Bush in a lengthy joint letter to Secretary Stimson on September 30, 1944, more than ten months before the bomb vaporised Hiroshima. This letter, remarkable for its prescience, urged that International control of the atom be established to prevent an arms race to terrifying proportions. One prophetic sentence read: "One must consider the possibility of delivering either the bombs at present contemplated or the super-super bomb on an enemy target by means of a rocket plane or guided missile.*’ Bush and Conant argued that the history of the bomb should be disclosed to the world as soon as the bomb was first demonstrated, and they urged that such a demonstration should precede direct military use. “This demonstration might be over enemy territory,” they wrote, “or in our own country, with subsequent notice to Japan that the materials would be used against the Japanese mainland unless surrender was forthcoming.”

The great debate within the secret atomic community began in the winter of 194445, when it became plain that Nazi Germany would collapse before the bomb was ready. Some scientists recoiled at the idea of using the bomb against Japan, which was already beginning to blaze under the great B-29 incendiary raids. Other scientists wanted the A-bomb used at once to quicken the war’s end. (To be continued).

Bluebird Sponsor. The British industrialist. Sir Alfred Owen, back from his visit to Australia, where he was involved in a controversy over the Bluebird land speed record attempt, said he had never ceased to have faith in the Bluebird which, he said, could “go up to 500 miles an hour.” London. August 14.