N.Z. Policies In The Pacific War

Press, Volume CII, Issue 30128, 11 May 1963, Page 3

N.Z. Policies In The Pacific War

[Reviewed by A.R.I

Documents Relating to New Zealand’s Participation in the Second World War, 1939-45. Volume 111 War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs. 568 pp.

In 1949 and 1951, Volumes I and H of the War History Documents were published. Now, with the appearance of Volume 111, tihis series is complete. These three volumes reproduce some of the more important docu-

ments—-dispatches, messages, memoranda by chiefs of staff, exchanges between the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and between the Prime Minister and General Freyberg, and the like—-held in the Prime Minister’s Department and the service departments in Wellington. Only a selection has been published since, as the late General Kippenberger once explained, 20 volumes instead of two would have been required to present all the items treated in the departmental files. Presumably, another 10 volumes could have beep Ailed had all the documents on the subjects treated in this third volume been published. Certainly, Brigadier Fairbrother, the present editor-in-chief of New Zealand War Histories, wisely states that the bulk of source material is formidable and publication in full quite impracticable. Now while doubts may linger as to how adequate—to use Brigadier Fairbrother’s word— a coverage has been supplied by the latest selection, there can be no doubt as to the very real value of this third volume to all students of New Zealand’s war effort and of New Zealand’s Commonwealth and international relations during the years 1939-45. Some of the unit and campaign histories published by the War History Branch may be more immediately interesting but, long after the narrative accounts have been laid aside, serious students will be consulting this third volume of documents. Already it is a set text for honours history students in one of our universities and, almost certainly, it will be used in the other three centres. This is because it contains important documents which would not normally be available for consultation by even responsible researchers until at least 50 years after the events which they treat. This volume is primarily concerned with relations with Japan up to the outbreak of war with that country, the command and conduct of the war in the Pacific, the division of strategic responsibility between the United Kingdom and the United States, the defence both of New Zealand and the South Pacific together with some special reference to Fiji, Tonga and Fanning Island, the formation and employment of the 3rd New Zealand Division, and New Zealand's participation in the occupation of defeated Japan. In addition to giving us access to some of the basic material used by Professor F. L. W. Wood in his admirable book, “The New Zealand People at War—Political and External Affairs,” this volume provides some fascinating reading on the topics covered. As a war-time Prime Minister, Peter Fraser emerges from these papers as a bigger and more statesmanlike figure than any but his more devoted supporters might have expected. While one may enter a caveat to the effect that many of the statements which appear over Fraser's name may well have been influenced by his colleagues in the War Cabinet or by his professional advisers, it seems that Fraser was shrewd and tough when necessary and also deeply conscious of his respon - sibilitaes to and for the people of this Dominion. Soon after he had taken over from Savage, he registered his opinion that acceptance of certain Japanese demands would not "be morally right or even politically expedient.” He therefore consistently opposed any attempt to conciliate or appease both on principle and in the belief that the United States and China would be more likely to do the right thing by the

Commonweal th in the event of war with Japan. But, even in dealing with the war in North Africa (see p. 123), he would appear to have been more astute than the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff in weighing up likely German moves. In a dispatch of January 12. 1942, he reflected on the view of a high military authority that the fall of Singapore was “unthinkable” by claiming that “ the unthinkable is now in everybody’s mind.” Fraser took account of most factors and possibilities in pressing the New Zealand point of vi£w on the authorities in London. “The following which is of highest degree of secrecy” (p. 179) and “most secret and personal for General Puttick” (p. 251) are phrases which sound exciting. They apply to war-time appreciations of situations and likely enemy moves. Such documents still retain some of the impressive air of urgency and importance which necessarily attached to them at the time they arrived in Wellington. Other documents deal with more mundane but none the less important questions such as the manpower situation, with special reference to the freezing works, in New Zealand. General Freyberg’s views on the degree to which the New Zealand brigade in the occupation force in Japan should or should not be made up of volunteers are interesting as is the revelation of the extent to which party political presures were becoming evident. The lengthy appreciations which appear in the appendices together with General Barrowclough’s charter are also historically valuable. Brigader Fairbrother mentions the three members of his staff who did the research and 'the selection of these documents. Mr W. A. Glue prepared them for publication, but his editorial interventions are most unobtrusive being, for the most part, limited to references to other documents, whether published or not, to useful biographical entries of the type employed in the war histories generally, and to informative footnotes which explain changes in office, the nature of conferences and other events. Occasionally, these footnotes tend to be too short: for example, the claim that the enemy on Janurary 21, 1942 “launched a counteroffensive which . . . drove the Eighth Army back to the Alamein Line” would appear to summarise the events of January to June of the year too severely. The fact that paraphrasing of messages for reasons connected with security and the preservation of certain codes was no longer necessary removes one of the principal grounds for criticism and question raised about the earlier volumes. Well printed and indexed, this volume should make informative reading for all interested readers as well as being a valuble aid to the serious student.