GERMAN VIEW OF N.A.T.O.

Press, Volume CII, Issue 30116, 27 April 1963, Page 3

GERMAN VIEW OF N.A.T.O.

[Reviewed by

A.P.

Defence or Retaliation. By Helmut Schmidt. Oliver

and Boyd.

This is an important book •nd a good one. Hundreds of books nave been written on the problems of the defence of the West (Mr Schmidt’s bibliography is of 20 pages), but few are both as technically competent, and as readable as this one. The author, a 44-year-old leading member of the German Socialist Party, calls his book “a German contribution to the considerations of N.A-T.O.’s strategic problems.” Though some of the chapters about the specifically German problems are not of great interest to us, most of it is a clear, well-reasoned, and terrifyingly interesting survey of the problems of N.A.T.O.

Mr Schmidt deals with ideas on strategy right from the days when the United States had the superior nuclear forces, to the present when the U.S.S.R. may hold the upper hand. In dealing historically with the situation, he brings us face to face with the moral and physical difficulties of the Western Powers as they seek to defend themselves against possible Soviet aggression.

In the early 1950 s, the United States felt that it would defend the West by its nuclear weapons carrier-air-craft. The Soviets, although well behind in the nuclear race, had large conventional forces. The N.A.T.O. Powers’ conception of their own conventional forces was, in the event ef war, to act as a shield, to cushion the blow of the Soviet ground forces, until the United States nuclear weapons decided the battle behind the lines. It was felt that the United States intention to use nuclear weapons was sufficient deterrent to the enemy. This was pushed home at a later date, when the N.A.T.O. ground forces were armed with nuclear warheads for artillery and close support operation. It was based on the Eisenhower regime’s appreciation that any future war would be a total nuclear war.

However justified this argument may have been in the earlier stages, it fell to the ground as a result of developments in the U.S.S.R. The Soviets probably have now nuclear superiority; they have the missiles to deliver their weapons; and the vastness of the Soviet territory means that their bases are now nowhere nearly as vulnerable as are those in Britain and the United States. The result is that while the nuclear forces are deterring each other, the conventionally armed forces re-established their importance, with the balance greatly favouring Russia. The world has again come to accept the possibility of a limited war fought by conventional forces between Powers whose balance in nuclear power is such that each is deterred from using the nuclear weapons. Mr Schmidt's argument is that in this situation the arming of N.A.T.O. tactical forces with nuclear artillery is a danger to world peace: to use nuclear weapons tactically would start the complete war with strategic weapons. Other dangers are equally obvious. Should, for instance, the U.S.S.R. start a nuclear war by sending missiles on their way, the result would be that much of the United States nuclear offensive force would be destroyed by that action: and that the second phase—United States retaliatory action against Soviet built-up areas—would be undertaken by the surviving missiles. The knowledge that the side which starts a war gains such an overwhelming advantage and produces the idea called the pre-emptive strike: so that if “A” decides that “B” is about to start a nuclear war, "A” gets in first

and sends his missiles away. If “A” has made a mistake, through faulty intelligence or misreading the radar, that is just too bad. Nor should we neglect the great possibility of human error. In the days of aircraft, if the nuclear bomber started out, he could be recalled. It has been done. With missiles there is no recall. An apology following nuclear missiles sent off by mistake is hardly likely to be acceptable. And the morality of ordering a pre-emptive strike, even on the most conclusive evidence of intended attack by the enemy, is very much open to discussion. All this adds up to the West’s dilemma. ’ Since N.A.T.O. assumes that in any future European war, Germany will be wiped out from the beginning, it is of vital interest to Mr Schmidt and his fellow countrymen! And his solution? Quite obviously, with the appalling power that men have now’ at their command, there is no final answer short of mankind’s conversion. But he does suggest several lines of thought. He discusses the idea of “disengagement” Although the idea of a neutral belt in Europe has often been suggested, it was not taken seriously until given concrete form by Eden in the mid--1950’s and then taken up by Gaitskell, and the German Socialists on one side, and by Rapacki on the other. It envisages an area consisting of Western Germany on one side, and East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia on the other, where no N.A.T.O. or Russian troops would be stationed; where some international force would keep the peace between the countries concerned; and where, should an attack by ground forces take place, the other side would have some w’aming. Mr Schmidt then advocates that the N.A.T.O. forces should not be armed with nuclear weapons that N.A.T.O. should not become a fourth nuclear power. By the same token, he feels that the West should build up their N.A.T.O. forces both in manpower and conventional weapons.

He advocates limiting the Nuclear Club to the United States and Russia, appreciating, as we all do, the increased dangers each time a smaller Power, perhaps less responsible, gains the bombs. And he goes into great detail about the defence requirements of N.A.T.O. He wants the West to build up its spiritual and moral forces. By this, he does not mean hurling Christianity into the »fight against communism. He means that the West should appreciate and find strength far more in the freedom and democratic institutions which it enjoys. There is much more to this book than this. Although the passing of the months has already dated parts of it (Mr Schmidt wrote it 20 months ago), and it has been translated into English for eight months), the analysis of the situation, and many of the suggested solutions to the problems, continue to be relevant. The decreasing value of nuclear missiles as a deterrent when both sides are more or less on nuclear parity; the great danger of too many nations with the bomb; the revival of the idea of a limited war, with the dreadful certainty that beyond a certain stage, one side or other is going to fire its missiles; the fact that so far no nation has taken disarmament seriously; the need for great sacrifices and a stiffening of the moral backbone —these remain facts we live with, targets to aim at. Do not take this book too lightly. Every page is packed with argument and fact. It takes considerable study—but it is worth it.