The Press FRIDAY, DECEMBER 14, 1962. Missiles And Britain’s Defences

Press, Volume CI, Issue 30005, 14 December 1962, Page 12

The Press FRIDAY, DECEMBER 14, 1962. Missiles And Britain’s Defences

Since the Second World War vast sums have been spent on both sides of the Atlantic upon the development of weapons that have never been brought into service. These costly ventures have reflected uncertainties created by the swift obsolescence of modern weapon techniques, and by the constant shifts of administrative policy on defence. Inter-service rivalries have been accentuated; and serious strains have been put upon the Atlantic Alliance. Whereas formerly the European armaments industries (including the British) could count on at least some foreign orders to reduce the developmental costs of new weapons, now among Western countries the United States enjoys primacy as a supplier of arms. Partly this derives from the frequently-urged desirability of integration among the N.A.T.O. forces; partly it is dictated by economic stringency, heightened as a result of continual choppings and changings of defence policy. Over the years Britain has been forced increasingly to accept dependence on the United States for its newest tactical weapons, notably rocket missiles.

Because of this acceptance of the inevitable, doubts of the actual availability of key weapons to which Britain’s long-term strategy has been geared are particularly annoying. The American Skybolt air-to-surface missile has been regarded as a means of prolonging the useful life of Britain’s aging V-bombers, in which the missiles are intended to replace bombs. Reports of American hesitancy about proceeding with the Skybolt programme suggest that the British Government may again have to face criticism of its defence arrangements with Washington. For years the entire structure of N.A.T.O. has been weakened through arguments about the kind and strength of the forces, nuclear and conventional, with which the alliance

should be equipped. The Skybolt controversy appears certain to aggravate anxiety, both in Britain and in Europe, about N.A.T.O.’s deterrent capacity. Britain’s experiences in missile development have been especially unfortunate. Since Mr Thorneycroft became Minister of Defence, he has tried to economise heavily on unpromising projects; and there has been renewed emphasis on equipping British conventional forces better, at the expense of nuclear missile research. More than two years ago Britain abandoned the Blue Streak rocket as a defence proposition—but only after an expenditure exceeding £ 100 million. More recently Blue Water, another guided nuclear missile, was abandoned after costing upwards of £25 million. Blue Steel, the first air-to-surface missile to replace bombs in the V-bombers, is apparently still in favour, but only as a short-term device before the planned introduction of American Skybolts in 1964 or 1965. There seems, however, no real assurance that Skybolts will be produced in quantity; and months-old arguments about British duplication of American missile efforts may prove, after all, to have been academic. This will not settle a more basic question: whether Britain is wise to continue to rely on bombers (which are vulnerable on the ground even if they can launch missiles far from the hazards of their targets), or whether it should concentrate on submarinelaunched nuclear missiles such as the American Polaris—an alternative that the British Government feels it cannot afford. And behind the scenes in Whitehall there remain unsettled problems of how defence responsibilities should be allocated among the three services. Probably fiever before have British defence administrators been confronted with such perplexing or such critical decisions as those they must reach in the immediate future.