Two Crises—1 KHRUSHCHEV’S ROLE IN CUBAN COLLAPSE

Press, Volume CI, Issue 29983, 19 November 1962, Page 10

Two Crises —1 KHRUSHCHEV’S ROLE IN CUBAN COLLAPSE

(By ISAAC DEUTSCHER] London, November 8. —The great inquest on Cuba is absorbing the attention of the entire Communist world. The Soviet withdrawal from the Caribbean is giving rise to as much dispute and division as did the Soviet intervention in Hungary six years ago; and Mr Khrushchev’s position is not less affected than it was then. He survived the Hungarian shock, but only after having come under dangerous attack from Mr Molotov and Mr Kaganovich, who were almost on the point of overthrowing him in June. 1957. He may survive the Cuban shock too; but for the moment he has to sustain a severe trial of strength with his opponents His role in the Cuban affair is hotly debated in Moscow, Peking and in all Communist capitals. Some may be wondering whether he did not needlessly play with fire in Cuba when he sought to establish a missile base there. But the main question discussed is whether he has proved himself a sober statesman and peacemaker and has averted nuclear catastrophe, or whether he has played the part of an “appeaser” and allowed himself to be “blackmailed by American imperialism into surrender.” Official Image

The official picture, exhibited in Moscow, shows him, of course, as the saviour of peace; and, according to all reports the Soviet man in the street is inclined to accept this image at its face value. Lord Russell has said that Mr Khrushchev’s presence of mind and magnanimity saved mankind; and undoubtedly this tribute has made its impression on Soviet opinion. However, this flattering view of Mr Khrushchev is not generally accepted by the politically - minded, especially by the Communist hierarchy and the military. It is against attacks from these quarters that the Soviet leader has to defend himself vigorously if he is to hold his position.

Significantly. in these quarters he is blamed for dismantling the missile base in Cuba rather than for trying to establish it. To many Communists he appears as the author of a "shameful Communist Munich,” as a • kind of “Comrade Chamberlain,” who deludes himself and others that by "selling out" Cuba he has obtained “peace for our generation”

The anti - Khrushchevites are a mixed lot. There is the Molotov - Kaganovich "antiparty group,” which, though long disgraced, has not yet been expelled from the party and still has its sympathisers. There are other large groups in the Presidium and the Central Committee (is General Suslov their leader?), who have been strong enough to protect all these years the ‘‘anti-party group” against

the threat of farther reprisals. More Opponents

In the background there is a formidable group of famous marshals and generals more or less at loggerheads with Mr Khrushchev. It is enough to name here Marshals Zhukov, Rokoacovsky, Sokolovsky, Koniev. Golikov, and Moskalenko. Finally, in the days of the Cuban crisis a political divergency seemed to develop even between Mr Khrushchev and his Ministry of Defence, for while he was holding out the olive branch tc President Kennedy. Marshal Malinovsky was mobilising and alerting the armed forces, especially the nuclear ones.

Outside the USS.R. the Maoists and their sympathisers are not at all willing to “let Mr Khrushchev get away with it.” even though the truce between Peking and Moscow, concluded last April, is nominally still in force. Once again the Albanians, who loudly denounce the Khrushch evite “betrayal of Cuba." express only what the Maoists and tiheir friends have been saying in private. The Albanians have not been alone to re-open fire. It is now known that at the session of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian party, whirft was held before the Congress, a large faction headed by Mr Anton Yugov, the Prime Minister, came out openly against the “Cuban surrender” and intended to carry the attack into the Congress. Mr Khrushchev was so alarmed that he struck back at once, and had his critics expelled from the Central Committee overnight. However. expulsion now does not mean what it did in the Stalin era: the expelled are not necessarily reduced to political impotence; and the pro-Chinese faction has its adherents in most other East European Communist Parties, especially in Czechoslovakia and East Germany. Dr. Castro’s Attitude

The latest recruit to the anti-Khrushchevite camp is Fidel Castro himself. He has been enraged to find himself used as a mere pawn, and to hear Moscow propose a United Nations inspection of Cuba without even consulting Havana about it.

Dr. Castro’s anger with Mr Khrushchev might not matter much, especially because of Cuba’s continued economic dependence on Soviet aid. But it is within Dr. Castro’s power to obstruct and render ineffective the KhrushchevKennedy agreement. Moreover, Soviet propaganda has over the last two years boosted Dr. Castro and assiduously built him up into the heroic figure of the LatinAmerican revolution. If he were now to join Enver Hoxha in open rebellion — and the popular mood in Cuba may push him that way —Mr Khrushchev would indeed be greatly embarrassed.

Thus the Soviet leader has been on the defensive towards his Communist critics as well as towards President Kennedy The argument which he is advancing in selfjustification is as follows: He had decided to set up the missile base in Cuba at Dr. Castro’s reauest conveyed to him by ‘‘Che’’ Guevara, the Cuban Minister, who came to Moscow in September. The Cubans were then in a panic, and were convinced that the Pentagon was bent on invading their country. They asked for help. Cuban Insistence

Mr Khrushchev was prepared to come out with a statement that the U.S.S.R. would treat an American invasion of Cuba as a cause for war. But the Cubans were not satisfied with this, and said that he had so many times made that statement and so many times watered it down that if he merely repeated it. the American Administration would not take it seriously. Only a visible and conspicuous token of Soviet readiness to go to war over Cuba, the Cubans held, could still deter an American invasion. The missile base was to be that deterrent. It lay in the nature of his project that the base should not be camouflaged, but that it should, on the contrary, be made to catch the American eye. and to catch it as soon as possible.

Mr Khrushchev accepted the Cuban request and the underlying view of the situation. He did not, he claims, seek in Cuba to change the world balance of nuclear power, for he holds that the striking power of Soviet intercontinental missiles suffice* to lay waste the United States and that it does not matter “how many times over you are able to kill your enemy.” It may be that the chief* of the Soviet nuclear and missile forces did not quite share this view, and attached greater operational value to the Cuban base. Whatever differences there may have been .the military and the party Presidium agreed to meet the Cuban request (In the Presidium Mr Mikoyan alone seems to have had misgivings.)

’’Warning” To U.S. In taking the decision to install the base. Mr Khrushchev and his advisers assumed on “discovering” it Washington would react with an outburst of indignation, and that this would lead to a temporary aggravation of the cold war, but to nothing worse They hoped that in toe end Washington would bow to the accomplished fact and make peace with the presence of Soviet nuclear arms in Cuba; that this would free Castro from the threat of invasion, give the an enormous gain in prestige and propaganda, weaken Washington's influence. and so stimulate the anti-imperialist revolution" throughout Latin America The miscalculation. it appears, was as incredibly and monumentally simple as this. Neither Mir Khrushchev nor

Dr. Castro foresaw that the missile base, far from deterring an American invasion, would make the threat of the invasion real and imminent. This accounts for Mr Khrushchev's behaviour in the critical week.

In the first days of the crisis, even after President Kennedy had proclaimed the blockade of Cuba, Mr Khrushchev still played his poker game coolly, on the blissful assumption that his bluff would not be called. Only on October 26 did he realise suddenly that the United States was ready for the invasion, and that the U.S.S.R, might be confronted with the stark choice between a nuclear world war and acquiescence in the American occupation of Cuba.

Urgency Claimed

"Not days but hours were left to us to forestall this danger,” says Mr Khrushchev to prove that he had to make his changed front wi'h the speed that the situation required; and that he had to order the dismantling of the base and accept all of President Kennedy’s conditions at once, without consulting anyone, not even Dr. Castro. In these conditions, he had to content himself with President Kennedy's pledge that there would be no invasion of Cuba.

Drawing the balance of the crisis Mr Khrushchev and his supporters point to the Presidential pledge as Cuba's and Russia's “concrete gain.” The manoeuvre with the missile base, they argue, has after all achieved its minimum objective: it has lifted the threat of invasion from Cuba. A wider and more imponderable gain is supposed to consist in showing the world how resolutely Moscow stands for peace, even if this involves considerable concessions and sacrifices.

The anti-Khrushchevitea reply that President Kennedy's pledge to respect Cuba’s integrity is worth no more than were Hitler's assurances to respect the indedendence of Czechoslovakia. If anything, they say, Mr Khrushchev's surrender has encouraged the Pentagon to invade Cuba, even if for tactical reasons the invasion is slightly postponed. Critics’ View Mr Khrushchev has made the Soviet deterrent quite incredible in the eyes of the West, say his critics. He has strengthened, in effect, the hands of .those in N.A.T.O. who wish to deal with the Soviet bloc only from positions of strength, and who assume that Moscow may be forced to yield in other sectors too, perhaps even in Berlin. Mr Khrushchev's critics conclude, therefore, that his Cuban “Capitulation' far from saving peace, has only rendered the threat of war more acute. Both Khrushchevites and anti-Khrushchevites are now watching tensely the evolution of Washington's policy towards Cuba. This will be the test in the light of which the Communist world will judge Khrushchev's performance during the Cuban crisis. (World Copywright Reserved by Isaac Deutsche:) To Be Concluded).