The Press THURSDAY, AUGUST 2, 1962. The E.E.C. Timetable

Press, Volume CI, Issue 29890, 2 August 1962, Page 12

The Press THURSDAY, AUGUST 2, 1962. The E.E.C. Timetable

It is a sad commentary on the emotional atmosphere now surrounding the European Economic Community negotiations that Mr Heath should have to reaffirm Britain's pledge to take no final decision until after the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ conference next month. Why, in the first place, should the good faith of the British Government be questioned on no better evidence than an uninformed guess by Earl Attlee? In the second place, the British Government’s real anxiety is to get some broad outline of E.E.C. terms in time for the Prime Ministers’ conference. The strident clamour from Canberra and Wellington has plainly roused Conservative back-bench opinion against the E E C.; it may also have been unhelpful in the delicate Brussels negotiations. At any rate the negotiations have dragged painfully on. The sticking points are the price level for temperate foodstuffs in an enlarged E.E.C., and the arrangements for the admittance of these foodstuffs after 1970. The first point is the really important one: if prices are set too high uneconomic European production will be encouraged, leaving much less of the market for Commonwealth imports. Presumably Mr Heath will not conclude his talks until he feels either that reasonable terms are available for the Commonwealth or that the EEC. will go no further. It is at that point that he will have something to report to the Prime Ministers. After their views—which may be much more moderately expressed in a private meeting—have been heard, the British Government will be able to make up its own mind and face the House of Commons. The difficulty is not in the British Government’s time-table but in the completion of the Brussels talks.

The Commonwealth is not the only source of the emotional fog in London Any new international obligation is bound to raise in some quarters a fear of “ loss of sovereignty ” What might ultimately happen in a European political confederation (in which Britain would have

a leading part) cannot be foreseen. In the meantime, British sovereignty and the authority of the British Parliament would be no more affected by accession to the Treaty of Rome than they are already by other treaties on trade, defence, and currency. The new obligation would apply only to regulations to ensure the creation of a true common market. Membership of the E.E.C. would not interfere with Britain’s political relationships with the Commonwealth (such as they now are) or with traditional and cultural ties. What part is the New Zealand Government playing in all this? Overtly, at least, it is pursuing courses that make the British . Government’s task more difficult, and it has compromised New Zealand's interests. The New Zealand Government should certainly make its views plain: but should it do so in a way that might bring down the Macmillan Ministry or cause it to make decisions justified only by : expediency? The New Zealand Government has erred in making common j cause with Australia when i its interests are different. I New Zealand has always ’ been recognised as a special case. deserving special treatment; and this was promised it by Mr Sandys. Australia, as one Liberal Party Minister admitted before he was dismissed, has no such vital economic interest. The Australian Government’s interest is primarily the political one of preserving Country Party support. By organising a common front New Zealand may nave jeopardised its claim to any greater consideration than that given Australia. And what are these tactics intended to do? To preserve the comfortable market we have had for the last 20 years? We cannot do that whether Britain joins the E EC. or stays out. We have already been warned about butter and have had to accept a quota. The New Zealand Government is fighting the wrong battle in ' the wrong place. It should be concerting its energies to adapting the New Zealand economy to the new order that is inevitably coming.