Threat To France

Press, Volume CI, Issue 29719, 12 January 1962, Page 8

Threat To France

France has begun 1962 inauspiciously. Tension over Algeria is perhaps greater than ever before; and the republic’s future relationship to the European Common Market is uncertain. Of these two problems, Algeria promises to be the more important for the

Gaullists; indeed, upon a successful Algerian settlement will depend the regime’s existence. It is widely believed that the present year will see the end of Algerian hostilities of the kind with which the world has grown familiar during the last eight years. Whether Metropolitan France is about to be debilitated again by civil war is an anxious question still unanswered. The satisfactory progress of negotiations between the FX.N, the Algerian Moslems’ rebel organisation, and President de Gaulle’s Government has been confirmed by recent

pronouncements in Paris. During an end-of-year broadcast. President de Gaulle announced that, irrespective of political developments, most of the 400,000 French troops in Algeria would be withdrawn in 1962 for “ regrouping in Europe”. Two divisions had left before the President spoke; two more, as well as several air units, are leaving this month. If trouble in Algeria could be ended as simply as by offering no more resistance to the Moslem rebels, the President’s decision might be regarded as a stroke of compelling logic. But it would be foolish to ignore the obvious difficulties with which President de Gaulle is increasingly beset.

Bomb outrages, industrial unrest, a revival of political demonstrations (by both extreme Right and the extreme Left), and the spread of nervousness among the public authorities of Metropolitan France all indicate the perils to which France, even more than Algeria, is being exposed primarily through the activities of the Secret Army Organisation (the 0.A.5.), led by General Salan. Time for a “ final ” revolt by Right-wing extremists against President de Gaulle is running out fast. A record exodus of holidaymakers to the winter sports resorts may have resulted, from the escapist urge that has characterised periods of profound change in French history. How real is support for General de Gaulle? Only a year ago. it was possible to guarantee the safety of high-ranking Gaullist spokesmen in the Algerian cities: now that is no longer true. Yet the

French crowds still cheer General de Gaulle—much in the same way (the cynics add) as Napoleon 111 was cheered until a day or so before Sedan.

An attempted coup by General Salan’s fascist supporters is accepted as practically inevitable; whether it will be in Metropolitan France, or be confined to Algeria, remains in doubt. The withdrawal of French troops from Algeria is part of General de Gaulle’s answer to this threat, rather than the complete betrayal of French interests that the European colonists represent it to be. As in the past, the key to French political stability and economic welfare is held by the armed forces. Regular officers such as General Salan are among the most reactionary opponents of the Gaullists’ Algerian policy of constitutional selfdetermination. A discouraging sign for the O.A.S. has been a decline in the number of its converts within the armed forces. Moreover, a rival loyalist organisation is known to be active among the troops in Algeria. By transferring large numbers of men from garrison duty in Algeria to a support role with N.A.T.O, President de Gaulle plans to dissociate Army malcontents from the European extremists of Algiers and Oran. In this way the reported aim of the O.A.S. to establish a “Franco-Moslem republic" in Algeria may be frustrated; and, through a show of military strength, the President may avert from Metropolitan France what now appears a real threat of armed civil conflict.