Recent Judgments “HALF-DISTANCE” STOPPING RULE EXAMINED

Press, Volume CI, Issue 29718, 11 January 1962, Page 11

Recent Judgments “HALF-DISTANCE” STOPPING RULE EXAMINED

Campbell v. Conn (Before Mr Justice T. A. Gresson, at Hamilton.) (By a Legal Correspondent) In this case, “the half-distance rule’’ is considered in relation to the overtaking and passing of another vehicle immediately in front.

This was a claim for damages arising out of an accident which occurred about 6.45 p.m. on August 28, 1959, on a straight stretch of the main Rotorua-Ngongataha highway near the wellknown Fairy Springs. The plaintiff, Campbell, was riding north on a bicyqle without a light; and the defendant, Conn, was driving a truck with a trailer attached in the opposite direction toward Rotorua, with his lights on “dip.” The collision thus took place on the defendant motorist’s incorrect side of the road; but immediately before the collision, the defendant had moved to his right to overtake and pass another car going in the same direction. When the defendant first saw the cyclist he was about 20ft ahead. The accident occurred about 100 yards short of the limited speed zone. The evidence suggested the defendant was travelling about 35 to 40 miles an hour. The action was heard in Hamilton last February, and the jury exonerated the defendant motorist from any negligence by answering issue number one, by finding that the defendant was not inegligent in a manner causing or contributing to cause the plaintiff's accident in any respect. Judgment was accordingly entered for the defendant. New Trial Sought

The plaintiff moved for a new trial alleging misdirection on a material point of law, and in argument concentrated upon an alleged misdirection in regard to what is commonly referred to as “the half distance rule,” as comprised in Reg. 26 (2) of the Traffic Regulation 1956:“(2) No person shall on any road drive any motor vehicle at such a speed that he is unable to stop his vehicle within half the length of clear roadway that to the driver is visible immediately in front of the vehicle: “Provided that it shall be a defence to any proceedings for a breach of this subclause if the defendant proved that his motor vehicle was traveling behind another vehicle up to which the roadway was clear and that the defendant’s speed was such that he could stop short of the other vehicle in the event of a sudden stop by the latter. “(3) No driver of a vehicle on any road following immediately behind another vehicle shall, except for the purpose of overtaking and passing that other vehicle drive at such a speed that at any time he is unable to stop his vehicle within, the length of clear roadway visible to him between the two vehicles.” This was part of the issue submitted to the jury at the trial, and was dealt with by both counsel in their addresses. The trial judge told the jury that it must determine all questions of fact, and that the whole case was substantially a question of fact upon which the jurors were entitled to draw fully on their practical experience and their knowledge of conditions upon the roadway. He pointed out that the

plaintiff must prove causative negligence against the defendant, and that this involved a failure to exericse reasonable care in the circumstances as they existed Rules Of The Road With regard to the statutory rules of the road, his Honour observed: “A breach of a regulation, if you consider there has been a breach is simply evidence from which you may infer causative negligence, if you are so disposed. It does not finish the matter to say simply there has been a breach of the regulation. You have got then to consider whether in all circumstances that constituted negligence entering into the cause of the accident.” He then read Regulation 26 (2) to the jury, including the proviso, and told it that in general terms, the regulation says with regard to speed that a driver of a motorvehicle has to be able to stop within half the length of clear roadway. His Honour went on to state—and this is the passage to which the plaintiff’s cause took exception:

“Now there is some controversy, and, I think room for rival views as to whether that regulation applies to the facts of this case at all. It is easy to apply it to a stationary object, for example, a slip of stones or obstruction in tlje roadway. It becomes easy to say that with that in front of you you must be driving at such a speed that within half the available clear distance you can stop, but it is, I think, more difficult to apply the regulation to a vehicle which is, as it were, closing the gap as it comes toward you. However, in the present state of my information on the topic, I do not think that I can direct you that the regulation has no application; and it is for you to decide whether there has been any breach of it, and, again, if you decide that there has been, it is for you to say whether that constitutes causative negligence entering into the cause of this accident.” Rule On Overtaking His Honour then went on to discuss the rule as to overtaking in Regulation 9. and Regulation 6, which imposes the obligation to keep as near as practicable to the left of the road. He pointed out that it was for the jury to decide whether the regulations had been breached, and whether or not the breach constituted causative negligence. He observed that the regulations were in the. main rules of common sense, and that the jury might find, but that it was a matter for it that the case could really be determined on fairly simple, straightforward, commonsense lines, invloving no particular refinement with regard to the regulations, though what they prescribed must, of course, be taken into account.

Finally, his Honour expressed the view that the substantial allegation against the defendant motorist was that he went to overtake another car and did not lift his sights and become as alert as the occasion required, and in particular, take great

care to see that there was no traffic approaching. In his judgment his Honour said that Reg. 26 (2) is designed to control the speed at which a driver should travel in relation to what is immediately in front of him. That duty is governed by the length of clear roadway visible to the driver in the direction immediately in front of him.

If the regulation did apply in the circumstances, proof of a breach of it was not decisive on the question of responsibility. It merely provided evidence either that the following vehicle was travelling at an excessive speed or else that the driver was not keeping a proper look-out. His Honour observed that it was relatively easy to apply “the half-distance rule,” for example, to driv. ing in patches of fog. approaching bends or road works and the like, and also to the ordinary case where one vehicle was driving immediately behind another; but its suggested application when a driver temporarily pulls out of line astern to overtake and pass another vehicle involved practical difficulties.

For example, he asked, how was the half length of clear roadway to be calculated in relation to another vehicle approaching in the opposite direction? Moreover, the faster the passing manoeuvre was completed and the sooner the vehicle returned to its correct course, the less the danger to approaching traffic. His Honour inclined to the view that Reg. 26 (3) exempts the overtaking driver from the rule when he moves out to overtake and pass another vehicle vis-a-vis that vehicle and that at this point he becomes subject to the provisions of Reg. (9), which governs his situation in relation to approaching traffic by prescribing (where relevant) that no driver shall pass or attempt to pass any vehicle proceeding in the same direction unless, until the passing movement is completed, the driver has a clear view of the road and the traffic thereon for a distance of at least 300 ft in the direction in which he is travelling. His Honour said he had given the plaintiff the advantage of submitting an issue as to “the half-distance result the jury, and in the result the jury absolved the defendant from all negligence, taking the view, which was quite justifiable on the facts, that the plaintiff was the author of his own misfortune through riding an unligbted bicycle on a main highway at night. “No Injustice”

It was open to the jury to conclude that when the defendant motorist moved out to pass the other car, the plaintiff’s unlighted bicycle loomed up unexpectedly in the darkness at a time when the defendant could take no effective evasive action. His Honour concluded by saying that he had done the plaintiff no injustice by submitting an issue to the jury as to “the half-distance rule. Misdirection to be a ground of new trial must be substantial misdirection.” In his view the direction was adequate and there was no room left for misunderstanding or misapprehension. The plaintiff’s motion for a new trial was dismissed. The defendant was allowed 25 guineas costs; Counsel: For the plaintiff D. L. Thompkins: for the defendant, McMullin. Solicitors: For the plaintiff Thompkins. Wake and Paterson (Hamilton); and defenMcMuilin (Hamilton).