Shadow Over The United Nations

Press, Volume C, Issue 29623, 20 September 1961, Page 14

Shadow Over The United Nations

In the best of circumstances it will be difficult to think of the United Nations without Mr Hammarskjold. If the worst occurs, the United Nations will cease to exist as Mr Hammarskjold knew it Mr Hammarskjold’s term as Secre-tary-General would have ended on April 10, 1963 Because Russia and its satellites had withdrawn recognition from him, his powers of useful action were already cramped; but he clearly intended remaining in office virtually to keep the United Nations in being. Since the summit fiasco of May last year, Russian policy on the reorganisation of the United Nations Secretariat has crystallised in the proposal for replacing the SecretaryGeneral with a triumvirate consisting of representatives of the Western, Eastern, and “ neutralist ” blocs, each with a veto Because the work of the United Nations would be permanently stultified, Mr Hammarskjold rejected the Russian “troika”. To counter Russian allegations that nationals of the Communist countries were inadequately represented among his subordinates, the SecretaryGeneral recently reallocated positions on his staff, and substituted an Indian,

Mr C. V. Narasimhan, for his veteran Executive Assistant, Mr Andrew Cordier, of the United States. In spite of this the Soviet Union has continued vociferously to demand a radical overhaul of the United Nations. The United Nations’ embarrassments have been aggravated by the failure of the Communist countries to honour financial obligations, to endorse joint operations, and generally to co-operate with their fellow-members. Recently-awakened distrust of Russia among the “ unaligned ” countries will not deter Mr Khrushchev from reviving more determinedly than ever his plan for changing the structure of the Secretariat, and perhaps from other attempts to cripple the United Nations. Because the Security Council must ppprove of a new Secre-tary-General, Russia can use the veto to frustrate endeavours to replace Mr Hammarskjold. Without a chief executive the United Nations may be praetically powerless to take up effectively Mr Hammarskjold s work in the Congo, and to accept new tasks. What, then, will be the prospect of negotiating temperately on a nuclear test ban, on disarmament generally, or on the peaceful use of space?