If Britain Joins... GIVE AND TAKE OF COMMON MARKET

Press, Volume C, Issue 29523, 26 May 1961, Page 12

If Britain Joins... GIVE AND TAKE OF COMMON MARKET

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WALTER FARR

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The most important immediate effect on Britain of membership of the European Common Market may be likened to the effect on a shopkeeper or factory-owner who finds that he is able to 'offer his goods on better terms to three or tour times more customers and that the long-term business prospects iare such that he can confidently begin rapid, large-scale i expansion. In return for this he loses, (to some extent, direct control over certain important sectors I of his business. i If carried through fully the (Common Market means that 'France, Germany. Italy,

Belgium, Holland. Luxem- 1 burg, and probably Norway, i ' Denmark and a number of « ' other countries, will, within 1 ’ this decade, be as wide open s ’•to us for trading purposes as 1 /Scotland is to England. It i /would form a single economic i . unit, taking in some 250 < ’.million people compared with I ; 50 million in Britain. ’ This is the end product of ' the discussions the British i ’ Government is now beginning i ’ aimed at linking up with ' Europe. Before we publicly . ; declare that we have finally . decided to sign the basic i document, the Treaty of ■ » Rome, we are determined to ' /be clear on what the Treaty : means and which parts can ' be tailored, through special ; j protocol, to suit Britain's /special position. .We are trying to give up . j the least possible amount of . sovereignty for the greatest s possible economic benefits. The Common Market Six fully understand this. Some of them did something of the (kind when the Treaty was 5 drafted and they have continued to do it in applying the Treaty. Assuming that the talks at official level between Britain and the Six are satisfactory and we sign the Treaty: what does it mean in terms of political and economic sovereignty? How far are we (committed? To what extent do we lose our national

laenmyf Sovereignty Issue The preamble seems harmless enough. We would be committed to establishing '“the foundations of an ever closer union among the iEuropean peoples ... to 'ensure economic and social progress ... by common action in eliminating barriers which divide Europe and to (direct efforts to the essential purpose of constantly improving the living and workling conditions of the peoples.”

There is no mention of giving up sovereignty here, no clear indication of how close the union should be. We accepted a more meaningful preamble when we signed the innocuous Western European Union Treaty. The first big sovereignty issue arises in the economic

clauses directly affecting our trade with Western Europe, the Commonwealth and the [rest of the world and our (right to decide our tariff .policies. I The British Cabinet and (Parliament, under the terms of the Treaty as it now stands iare required to hand over 'tariff policy to the institutions of the Common Market. i in some of which we could eventually be outvoted. The effect is that if we ■ went in now we should, by mext January, be cutting the ; duties protecting our industries from highly competitive (French, German, Italian and Benelux goods by 50 per cent. of the 1957 figure. Unless we lare allowed a longer time |to apply the rules (which is not impossible) we are bound to accept these cuts not because our Government and Parliament decide it is the I right time to do it but because the Common Market 'organisation says so A sizeable portion of sovereignty [roust therefore be given up Sweeping away the tariff ; barriers between us and the ! Six—the Common Market I time table savs they must be ; gone by 1970—would mean (letting such things as (Continental cars come into I Britain to compete on equal terms against our own. The alternative, if we do not go jin. is to compete, as we are 'beginning to do now, against them in Continental markets on terms which give them a clear advantage. Strain on Commonwealth Drastic though these implications of the Treaty of Rome appear to be to the anti-European, they are in ■fact not very different from (the system we have already accepted In the European (Free Trade Association. The essential difference in accepting them in the framework of the Common Market is that the effect on our industries. due to the extra competition of countries such as France and Germany, is greater. But so is the reward In E.F.T.A. we can only sell to a market of 90 million people, of whom we ourselves jeomprise 50 million. What is entirely new in the economic provisions of i the treaty is that we are also required to give up our right to fix tariffs between us and countries outside the Common

Market We have to accept what is called a common external tariff—in other words, a tariff wall thrown round the Common Market and therefore around us. the height of which is fixed not by us alone but again by the Common Market institutions. We therefore again lose a certain [amount of sovereignty. I This Is the rule which (strains our economic links with the Commonwealth. If ,we accept this part of the 'Treaty in full, we can no longer give preference to food and other goods coming to Britain from such countries as Australia and New Zea. land.

Again this looks worse than it really is. Our experts have in mind a system under [which the Commonwealth (countries might well even-

tually benefit rather than lose. They would be able to do more trade witi) Continental countries. W» might continue to receive- cheap Commonwealth food through quota devices. Most of the Commonwealth raw materials coming here would ,not De affected because the Common Market external tariff bn such materials is negligible. The agriculture clauses tn the Rome Treaty, say the experts, what ever safeguards we obtain, must mean eventually a radical change in our system of protecting British agriculture. i The Continentals . have devised a plan fiir a European agriculture Wganisation. If we go in reasonably soon we shall be th|ire in time to have our say in some sort of compromise solution. But whatever the compromise it seems certain that the system which will eventually emerge will be nearer Continental systems than ours. The brighter side of this picture is that our highly mechanised farmeri feel more than a match fbr Continental farmers such as the French peasants. Here the Implications of the Treaty impinge directly on the British houie-hold. The Treaty allowa for special assistance to the marginal farmer, but the subsidy svstem must go. Grocery bills will go up, but Income tax bills will presumably go down. Obliged to Consrft Other clauses involve an undertaking to consult the Market institutions whenever we make a big change in our financial and economic policies. It is noteworthy, however, that West Germany managed to take most people by surprise when sie. revalued the mark. Some of our ministers are worried about the effect of , clauses in the Treaty [which mean that eventually we should have to channel all ' our commercial relations with ; countries outside through ‘ Common Market instiitions.

We could not negotiate a foodstuffs arrangement sav, with New Zealand directly from Whitehall. New asaland would have to negotiate it with the Common Mafket. A special arrangement I might be made preventing tips rule applying to us in all cases, in view of our Commonwealth links. The Common Market institutions we should haveito join look worrying until w< study closely how they wo|k out in practice. The Commission in Brussels is the wateh-dng of the Treaty: it makli proposals for implementing policies. They are approved

usually by a majority vote so that we could agßn be outvoted. Does this mejn that the Commission can. fcgainst our will, dictate to WMrtehall and dominate the British economy? The Treaty aid our own experts say it do s not. In fact the Commission is controlled by the Couicil of Ministers which cons its of member States’ Ministars of finance, transport or wlistever subject is being discussed We could at present avoid being voted down because t e big decisions must be carried unanimously. At a lateristage, however, voting will #e by

I majority. European Parliamett - A major worry of (many ' anti-Europeans concent the > European Parliament firmed ■ under the Treaty. At present ! this would be created by each > State sending some 30 afready • elected MPs. The Treaty, - however, allows for it Ito be * elected by universal European 5 suffrage. I Could such a Parliament t begin to interfere with le--1 cisions of our own Parliamsnt ! in Westminister? For this to t happen there would have 'o t be an addition to the Treaty, - which would have to be f approved unanimously by ill Governments. Britain coud ‘ therefore exercise a veto s A body which has certain t special and overridhg

powers is the High Authority of the Coal and Steel C<mmunity which It is generally assumed we should have to join. If so we must subnit to the Authority’s juristic, tion on vital aspects of »ur coal and steel industry sach as investment and rate of production. In return for this important loss of sovereignty, however, the expert* are certain that our industries would gain very substantilly. The progress of the Continental coal and steel indusfies since the creation of the Community proves this. So much for the m ijor losses of sovereignty. T ere are other provisions w uch look drastic but whiel in

practice do not mean i reat changes. The rule provi ting tor tree movement of la our is a good example, Chis certainly does not mean r.hat a million or so unempl yed Italians would pour into Britain. A safeguard ent ires that no worker moves intil he is offered a job We need have no great fear of losing our national ide rilty by taking the plunge or the Treaty of Rome, how iver much the federalists tr' to use it at a springboard for creating a European si perState. Whatever move they make in this direction v su'd under the unanimity ru! . be subject to our veto and t the vetos of others now In the Six who think as we d ; One of the most impo tant factors in the Cor non Market from the Bi tish point of view is that in the Commission and in the < [her institutions every pos [b!e effort ui made to meeti the ' special problems of I all members. The possibilities for <rmi promise and smoothing kver ; the harsh edges of this Tatity ; are endless. Much of k is . vaguely worded. Yet this I* still, for the people of Bgtain. ■ a revolutionary documaht. It i is capable of bringirf 1m- ■ mense benefit to Europe and i to the whole world—if we . play our full part