The Press TUESDAY, MAY 9, 1991. Hopes Fade At Geneva

Press, Volume C, Issue 29508, 9 May 1961, Page 14

The Press TUESDAY, MAY 9, 1991. Hopes Fade At Geneva

Behind closed doors in Geneva the tripartite conference on a nuclear test ban has reached its worst deadlock. Yet when the conference resumed on March 21 it was closer to agreement than any disarmament negotiations since long before the Second World War. Had the conference collapsed last year the blame might have been apportioned equally between the United Slates and Britain on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other; now the blame would all be Russia’s. This is because of the substantial concessions offered by the West and Russia's refusal not only to consider reasonable compromises but to honour earlier promises. There remains little evidence to support the sincerity of Russia’s professed desire for a treaty—at least in the meantime, while the United States and Britain maintain their voluntary moratorium on nuclear tests. The Geneva talks were the first major confrontation of negotiators from Moscow and from the new United States Administration. Success would enhance enormously the possibilities of easing coldwar tensions and of fostering peaceful co-operation between the capitalist and Communist worlds. Failure is likely to set back the cause of general disarmament, perhaps for years. Russia has agreed to resume comprehensive disarmament talks on August 1, but only if additional participants are invited to the conference. In any event the August conference may be meaningless if it follows the abandonment of the separate test negotiations. The fundamental issue between Russia and the West continues to be the evolution of an international system for inspecting and controlling nuclear tests. President Kennedy’s endorsement of the British view that in any such system risks will be inescapable appeared earlier this year to facilitate concessions to Russia’s sensitiveness about inspections on its own territory; but since then at least seven significant concessions by the West have failed to evoke a satisfactory Russian response. Moreover the Russians recently withdrew their approval of the agreed

plan for appointing a single neutral administrator to head the test ban commission. Instead of the agreed arrangement Moscow now

insists upon a triumvirate, similar to that with which Mr Khrushchev wants to replace Mr Hammarskjpld at the United Nations—one man each from the Communist bloc, from the Western Powers, and from the uncommitted countries. Each member would have a power of veto over the commission’s operations. This would make nonsense of the control machinery; and Russia has been told bluntly that the United States and Britain are resolved to sign only a treaty which stands a reasonable chance of proving effective.

Reports of the stalemate at Geneva have heightened interest in Walter Lippmann’s historic interview with Mr Khrushchev at Sochi on April 10. The Western Powers, Mr Khrushchev told Lippmann, were not ready to agree on a nuclear test ban. This was shown, he continued, by “ the demand for 21 or “ perhaps 19 inspections a “year”, which was “noth- “ ing but a demand for the “right to conduct complete “ reconnaissance of the “ Soviet Union ”. Mr Khrushchev’s second reason for pessimism was the French nuclear weapons programme, and his third the administration problem —his own refusal to countenance a single neutral administrator such as Mr Hammarskjold. On this last point Mr Khrushchev was most emphatic. Lippmann, commenting on Mr Khrushchev’s dogma that “ while there are “ neutral countries there “ are no neutral men ”, says: “ It means that there “can be international co- “ operation only if in the “administration as well as “in the policy-making the “ Soviet Union has a veto Mr Khrushchev is well aware of the embarrassments to which the Western Powers will be exposed as long as the world lacks controls over nuclear armaments. If Mr Kennedy is forced by domestic pressures in the United States to end the test moratorium, Mr Khrushchev may gain another propaganda victory with which to exacerbate the feelings already aroused by diplomatic reverses over Cuba. Ultimately, however, Russia itself must realise how nuclear weapons and their spread to other nations will menace equally its own welfare and that of the Western Powers. If hope could not still be pinned to human logic, then the prospect for humanity would be dark indeed.