Central Intelligence Agency Under Fire

Press, Volume C, Issue 29503, 3 May 1961, Page 21

Central Intelligence Agency Under Fire

[Specialty written for the N.Z.P.A. by FRANK OLIVER] WASHINGTON, April 30. Hie Cuban fiasco has served once again to focus attention on the Central Intelligence Agency, the secret service organisation which grew out of the famous World War II undercover agency, the O.S.S.

The Cuban exiles were quick to blame it after their invasion failed and while not much is being said about the CI A. publicly in Washington. there are those who wonder just what its role in the Cuban affair was and how much it is to blame for that failure which has proved so damaging to American prestige. Obsevers are recalling the L'-2 affair and they are recalling that strange affair when President Eisenhower was to make a personal appearance in Tokyo < presumably to the plaudits of the crowds) and then was un;.ble to land because of the popular resentment against the new Japanese-American security treaty. One American commentator. James Reston, of the •'New York Times.” says flatly that the President acted over Cuba on the basis of intelligence estimates by the CIA., “which was convinced that Cuba was ripe for revolt.”

He says that other intelligence estimates “by the Allies” challenged the C.I.A. analysis but the President “went along with the C.1.A.” "Not Blaming Dulles"

Later in his comment, he says that the President is not blaming either Mr Allen Dulles, the director of the C.1.A., nor his deputy who made the principal presentation of the intelligence estimate to Mr Kennedy “but he does want to know where they went wrong, and they are now very much on the spot."

Small wonder that the President, after the Cuban fiasco, spoke about “useful lessons” of “this sobering episode” That is doubtless why the whole system of intelligence analysis is now under review by General Maxwell Taylor and the At-torney-General, Mr Robert Kennedy. It is felt by many that some explanation is necessary as to how this vast organisation (which is reputed to have 10,000 employees in Washington alone and thousands more in the rest of the country and overseas) could have been so sure the Cubans would revolt against Castro and be so wrong in the event. It is felt that the C.1.A.. with access to Cuba and with friendly nations elsewhere in Latin America, ought to have been able to make a better judgment. Mr Reston says the President’s confidence in the

direction of the C.I.A. has clearly been shaken and that there will almost certainly be changes. Elsewhere, it is being said that it was an open secret among Cuban exiles in Florida and in some Central American States that the C.I.A. planned, co-ordinated and directed the operations that ended in defeat on the beachhead in Cuba. It seems certain that in the demoralisation of Cuban rebels within Cuba, the underground intelligence service in Cuba has been wrecked by the mass arrests which Castro’s forces carried out.

From Florida, it is reported that there is now a break in communication between these agents in Cuba and their exiled compatriots in Florida. Cuban sources in Florida are reported in the press as saying that the C.I.A. precipitated the attack on Cuba without adequate co-ordina-tion with the rebel underground in Cuba and in spite of urgent warnings by exiled Cubans against the attack at this time. These sources add that the entire operation was based on the assumption of a popular uprising against Castro as soon as the first landings were made. Exiled Cubans accuse the C.I.A. of being in far too much of a hurry in getting the attack under way. Breakaway Groups There can be no doubt that the various rebel groups in the United States were far from being a harmonious whole and that some small groups (containing experienced guerrillas who had fought with Dr. Castro when he was seeking to oust Batista) broke away from the main movement before the attack was launched. In spite of the breakaway from the main movement, these small groups still hoped for American aid in arms, sabotage material and transportation to Cuba. It is also reported that the various rebel groups contained not only Leftist elements which fought with Dr. Castro and left him only when he turned Communist but also some former supporters of the dictator, Batista. Not unnaturally, difficulties developed between groups so widely divided politically. But, it is being asked, in view of these things then known to intelligence services. how could a successful invasion be expected?

It is also believed that Dr. Castro had a very good idea of about when the invasion was to take place. The “New York Times” reports that known Castro intelligence agents in Florida knew with other Cubans there that an invasion was imminent and that although law enforcement agencies knew of these agents and in some cases had their photographs, no visible effort was made to remove them from the scene. Exiles’ Claim

Cuban exiles involved in the affair claim that they argued with the C.I.A. that the invasion should be preceded by a softening-up campaign of sabotage and that there be multiple landings instead of a single thrust Cubans here charge that last-minute preparations for the invasion were kept from a Cuban underground organisation not favoured by the C.LA. for political reasons. It is believed that it was this underground organisation which successfully carried, out sabotage operations immediately before the landings. Another criticism from Cubans has been that there was no C.1.A.-directed broadcast into Cuba urging the Cubans to rise and telling them who was leading the invasion. Instead, they said, a C.1.A.-operated propaganda station claimed victories and uprisings among Cubans that were not true. One rebel leader in Miami said: “People could not take chances on exposing themselves, not knowing what was happening.” Doubtless some of these charges are now being investigated by General Maxwell Taylor and his staff and it is being freely forecast by some observers here that although the investigation may take some while eventually there will be major changes in the organisation of the C.IA.. and probably in personnel near the summit of the organisation.