The Press TUESDAY, APRIL 4, 1961. Towards A Settlement In Laos

Press, Volume C, Issue 29479, 4 April 1961, Page 12

The Press TUESDAY, APRIL 4, 1961. Towards A Settlement In Laos

Russia has always been ready to negotiate about Laos—on Russia’s terms. The Soviet reply to the latest Western proposals for ending the Laotian war leaves in doubt the timing of a cease-fire. Because in the Western view everything depends on the enforcement of a truce in advance of political negotiations, Russian intransigence could still destroy the immediate prospect of a negotiated peace. Yet the ■Western allies (including New Zealand) may congratulate themselves on the closing of their ranks against the Communist menace in South-east Asia. The full consequences may not soon be apparent. The advent of the Kennedy Administration in Washington has resulted in much closer accord with Britain on ways to pacify Laos and to establish there an unequivocally neutral regime. Abandoning his predecessor’s preference for a pro-Western government in Vientiane, Mr Kennedy has adopted Britain’s solution for the Laotian problem. The new Western unity on the recall of the international control commission and on an international conference to draft a permanent settlement has implied endorsement of some Russian demands; but because this endorsement is still subject to the concurrence of East and West upon the time and inspection of a cease-fire, Russia has gained no bloodless victory.

With characteristic bluntness Mr Kennedy has told the Soviet Union that come what may he will not tolerate the absorption of Laos into the Communist empire. He has supported his words with renewed military aid to the Royal Laotian Government and with preparations against a crisis in which American forces would be involved. He has thus accepted the risks of “ escalation ” Washington jargon for outbidding the Communists with assistance to strategic areas. Together with the British Prime Minister (Mr Macmillan) he has concerted a vigorous plan of diplomatic attack, purposeful and urgent. Efforts to

pacify Laos and secure it for its own peace-loving people cannot fail to evoke sympathy throughout the uncommitted countries of Africa and Asia. Comments such as those of the Indian Prime Minister (Mr Nehru) are among the West’s most telling diplomatic weapons against Mr Khrushchev.

The hardening of the Western attitude was reflected during the recent meeting of the South-east Asia Treaty Organisation’s Ministerial Council, whose resolution on Laos indicted more strongly than any previous S.E.A.T.O. pronouncement the Communists’ activities in IndoChina. The council affirmed that the Laotian war came within the terms of the Manila Pact protocols, and that if necessary S.E.A.T.O. forces would fight for Laotian independence. Although the council was careful not to limit the period during which armed intervention might be contemplated, its resolution was admonitory rather than belligerent. The council not only strengthened the hand of the Western Powers; it undoubtedly enhanced respect for S.E.A.T.O. as a bulwark against Chinese and Russian aggression.

Although the outlook appears a little brighter, the basic danger in Laos is unchanged. While they temporise the Communists can continue their familiar tactics of infiltration and reinforcement. The West appears now to recognise Communist China as an essential. participant in peace talks; but will this compromise suffice? How can a truly neutral regime be guaranteed? Prince Souvanna Phouma’s failure last month to arrange a “ Laotian ” solution of his country’s difficulties led to intensified pressure, both within and outside Laos, for an internationallyimposed settlement. After the forthcoming discussions between President. Kennedy and Mr Macmillan the details of Western policy should be even clearer; but the final arbiter on whether Laos is to be engulfed in a major conflict will still be Mr Khrushchev—or perhaps Mr Mao. It is not a pleasant thought.