Another Korea?

Press, Volume C, Issue 29437, 13 February 1961, Page 10

Another Korea?

Since the Indo-China war Laos has been almost exclusively an American bailiwick—an artificiallyunited kingdom whose economy and defences have depended heavily upon enormous American grants. After weeks of inconclusive civil war and fantastic political confusion the Americans are being forced to recognise that six years of military aid, at 40 million dollars a year, have been largely wasted. It is an extraordinary war not so much for its battles as because the pro-Communist troops have missed obvious opportunities, for example to capture Luang Prabang, the Royal capital, before the Royal Army garrison was strengthened. More frequent comparisons in American newspapers between Laos and Korea indicate the increase of United States anxiety. Joseph Alsop, who is noted equally for the gloom and the accuracy of his forecasts, sees in the apparent failure of the Royal Laotian Army to stem Leftist gains a mounting threat to the security of all South-east Asia, and the first success in a great new campaign of Communist expansion. President Kennedy, to his credit, has lost no time in attacking the major problems of American diplomacy, none of which is graver or more perplexing than Laos. Mr Dulles’s concept of the South-east Asia Treaty Organisation included Laos as the key to regional strategy. The planning and equipment of the Royal Laotian Army were undertaken inevitably by the United States, the best-fitted of the S.E.A.T.O. partners for the task. Against the advice of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department insisted that the army should number 25,000 men. The

Joint Chiefs favoured a more flexible force of between 12.000 and 15.000. In the event, the lessons of the Indo-China war were forgotten; a massive, unwieldy infantry force, unsuitable for jungle fighting, was established at huge cost to the United States Treasury: and military burdens disproportionate to the country’s economic strength were thrust upon future Laotian governments. The lack of good roads is an initial obstacle to the successful deployment of this force; and the small Laotian airfields cannot accommodate big military planes. For guer-

rilla operations against the rebels the Laotian Army is . badly organised and inappropriately equipped. The

flow of American airborne supplies continues; so do the widespread fraud, profiteering, and corruption encouraged by this spate of foreign interest. The Russians and the Chinese carefully distinguish their own “ legal ” assistance to the Pathet Lao and to Captain Kong Lae from “ illegal ” American aid to the Royal Government in Luang Prabang. As long as fighting continues, there will be the frightening prospect of greater international participation and the development of international conflict from the civil war. The Boun Oum Government, which is loyal to King Savang Vatthana, has not enhanced its repute by false reports of foreign troop movements. The United States Government is probably readier now to accept a strictly neutral regime and to abandon hope of anything more definitely aligned with the West.

Since President Kennedy took office, Western unity about the possible recall of the international commission to Laos has been better assured’. However, difficulties have arisen through the Cambodian proposal, supported in Hanoi. Peking, and Moscow, for a preliminary conference of 13 Powers interested in the future of Laos. Such a conference, it ts suggested, would succeed to the responsibilities of the Geneva meetings held after the Indo-China war. The danger is that, while the return of the commission is delayed, conditions in Laos will worsen and the present arguments between East and West grow more complicated.