N.Z. WAR HISTORY THE N.Z. BATTALION THAT ‘MUTINIED’

Press, Volume C, Issue 29436, 11 February 1961, Page 3

N.Z. WAR HISTORY THE N.Z. BATTALION THAT ‘MUTINIED’

IRemeured bv OLM ] 23 Battalion. An official war history. By Lieuten-ant-General Sir Edward Putliek. 634 pp Illastrated and indexed.

Of the many incidents which marked the 2032 days of the 25th Battalion's existence, few are likely to be remembered longer than the •‘mutiny" on the Ormonde. Isolated insubordination, although not common, was not entirely unknown among the New Zealandeis in the Second World War, but the Ormonde incident—“incident" seems the appropriate word when the circumstances are recalled—was the only such occasion when an entire New Zealand Battalion exercised what in peace tune is considered to be a democratic right. The Ormonde affair really began on September 15. 1940. when the convoy carrying the Third Echelon reached Bombay. The 25tr» Battalion was then in the Mauretania, but because the big liners were urgently required elsewhere—their speed and carrying capacity made them too valuable to be exposed unnecessarily to the risk of attack in the narrow waters of the Red Sea—it was decided to transfer the troops

to smaller, older, slower and less valuable ships and the 25th Battalion was allotted to the Ormonde.

On the morning of September 17 the troops disembarked from the Mauretania and observed the Army custom of being left unsheltered in the hot sun for a Jong period before they were marched the two miles to the Ormonde. This operation took 84 hours—unecessarily long even in a temperate climate, but almost unbearable in the hot. humid, tropical Indian climate.

The troops were then given leave until midnight, but their troubles were by no means ended. During the leave period a tropical thunderstorm drenched them all and when they returned to the Ormonde they found she had no drying rooms, nor was a change of clothing available. “Altogether it had been a trying day". General Puttick records. “The men had much trouble changing their money Ceylon rupees placed on board for use at Colombo, the usual and expected port of call, could not be changed at the trading banks and the Indian shopkeepers refused to accept them. However, the Imperial Bank of India and the larger European stores converted the rupees but it was most frustrating and exasperating to run into this difficulty which wasted a good deal of precious leave". One feels some more serious attempt to help the troops solve their difficulties would have been made if General Puttick had been with them.

Next morning. September 18. the Ormonde moved into the stream and anchored, and it became evident the change of ships was very much for the worse. Sleeping quarters were overcrowded. messing arrangements were poor, the ship was dirty and insanitary and all of this was aggravated by the hot. humid climate General Puttick remarks: "The contrast between the Ormonde of 15.000 tons and the Mauretania of 35.739 tons was startling”. This seems an understatement.

| On the march to the Ormonde the troops saw meat being handled on the wharf. The natives were walking over the carcases which were exposed to the hot sun and to the millions of flies. This disgusted them and they speculated on the identity of . who would have to eat it. They knew that evening when they were given meat for dinner. This made “a verydeep impression"’ upon the men, and 21 years later those j who were on th? Ormonde still recall it in the strongest I of terms.

The officer commanding the troops. Lieutenant Colonel Weir (now Sir Stephen Weir) did his best to remedy the conditions, but by this time the strong reaction to the disgusting conditions was general throughout the Battalion and at 1.15 p.m. on September 19. when the convoy was due to sail, the troops took over the ■ ship.

General Puttick deals fairly fully with the circumstances leading up to the “mutiny” but he lapses into official Army style when he describes the incident.

“A large body of men. - allegedly encouraged by a ; disgruntled crew, occupied the ( ship's bridge and wheel house, j telling the captain they were . taking charge and the ship I would not sail until the ’ grievances were justified. A , deputation then waited on i Colonels Wilder and Weir and I all the grievances, other than the one of accommodation I were disposed of satisfacI tonly.” In the New Zealand way of | life, this was a dispute but | in any other it was “mutiny.” i But it still had its funny side. • One of the 25th Battalion ringleaders who now lives in Wellington recalls that “the captain of the Ormonde was :in tears when we took over 'his ship. A British gunboat i was ordered to come to the ’ rescue and it circled the ship ; with guns trained on us. The i troops thought this highly > amusing. When the skipper of t the gunboat called on us to surrender the boys gave him the accepted Army answer”. J An inquiry into the incident was later held on board and General Frey berg reported he I was satisfied the trouble had been due mainly to poor ’ transhipment arrangements at I Bombay, a contributing factor . being the inexperience of j officers and other ranks. But perhaps it was this dislike of being imposed on which made the 25th Battalion such an excellent fighting unit. And the troops were fortunate in the commanding officers who led the battalion’s in its campaigns in the Middle East and Italy. The battalion’s best known commanders were Lieutenant Colonels A. S. Wilder, G. J. McNaught, T. B Morten and E. K. Norman.

Colonel McNaught led the unit in the savage Sidi Kezegh battle in 1941. when the battalion lost 402 men from its rtfle companies—only 276 survived. According to General Puttick this was the heaviest casualty list in any New Zealand battalion in any action in the whole war. Colonel McNaught himself was wounded three times that day The battalion fought with distinction in the grim days of Alamein when the enemy advance was stayed only by sheer guts and hard fighting, and later, when the tide of war turned in the Allies

favour in North Africa, the troops had the satisfaction of settling old scores with the Africa Corps. In Italy it took part in the Sangro and Orsogna offensives and proved once again its reputation as a tough fighting unit. After Cassino where the batallion's casualty list was six officers and 217 other ranks, the troops were almost continuously in action with the rest of the New Zealand Division and while it was occupying a section of the Senio winter line on January 31. 1945. one platoon was involved in what is regarded as one of the most unwarranted tactical errors of the war.

No. 12 platoon, B company, was ordered to establish a position on the stopbank, then occupied by the Germans. The platoon, commanded by Lieutenant Guthrie Wilson (author of the b:st selling war novel “Brave Company”) had no flank support, but it achieved its objective. Then all hell broke loose and the platoon was subject to strong enemy counter attacks and heavy shelling, as well as harassing fire from the rear. The Germans had been able to get behind the platoon. Finally, with ammunition spent and out of communication with rest of the battalion, the platoon was overwhelmed and the survivors marched off to a prisoner-of-war camp.

General Puttick commenting on this unfortunate operation, says he cannot escape the conclusion that the operation had no prospects of success, an opinion no doubt held by the men on the spot. General Freyberg censored all reference to the incident in war correspondents’ reports, which seems to indicate that he too was not happy about the tactics used.

General Puttick’s history of the 25th Battalion is a faithful record. He shows a remarkable understanding of the strange reactions of civilians in the tortuous process of becoming tough, seasoned fighting troops.