Co-existence Or War COMMUNISTS APPROVE COMPROMISE POLICY

Press, Volume XCIX, Issue 29398, 28 December 1960, Page 8

Co-existence Or War COMMUNISTS APPROVE COMPROMISE POLICY

(By

UH

ISAAC DEUTSCHERI

London, December B.—The declaration of the 81 Communist parties, as it was finally adopted with many amendments and corrections, strikes a balance between the Russian and the Chinese points of view. In almost every passage, it aims at a synthesis between a Russian thesis and a Chinese antithesis. Only this balancing secured for the document a unanimous adoption. The unanimity was not achieved mechanically; nor was it only apparent. The disputants were anxious to present a common front to the outside world.

As I have pointed out in earlier articles, the Chinese have not been out to challenge the Soviet leadership of the Communist camp; but they have been determined to "put teeth” into Soviet policy. In this they succeeded to some extent even before the conference, as could be seen from Khrushchev’s behaviour at the United Nations, from his partial recognition of the Algerian “Government,” and from the changed tenor of various Russian pronouncements. Soviet Leadership The Moscow Declaration emphatically re-acknowledged the Soviet leadership, but even in doing so it bares quite a few Chinese teeth. Thus, it echoes Khrushchev in proclaiming that "peaceful co-existence ... or destructive war—this is the alternative today” and in rejecting “American,” and by implication Chinese, "brinkmanship” as “leading to thermonuclear catastrophe.” But against Khrushchev the declaration asserts that “the aggressive nature of imperialism has not changed” (i.e. that Lenin’s definition of it is still valid), and that “imperialism . . . persists in preparing a new world war.” The 81 parties accept the Russian thesis that the economic contest between the U.S.S.R. and the United States is “the main form of the class struggle” at present; but they insist on the need to intensify the class struggle proper, especially in the underdeveloped countries. For the first time, the “national bourgeoisie” of those countries is openly described as a vacillating and undependable ally, liable to seek accommodation with the West: and for the first time Khrushchev’s “friends." Nasser and Kassem, have been attacked for suppressing communism in their countries. For all its elaborate character and stylistic elan, the declaration is not likely to end controversy. It will rather serve as one of those sacred texts which each disputant can and undoubtedly will quote in support of his own views and policies.

What then will be the effect of the Moscow conference (a) on the international Communist movement, and (b) on Soviet diplomacy? Three Groupings The international Communist movement remains divided into three wings: left, right, and centre. These are in some respects the indirect descendants of the three Communist schools of thought, Trotskyist, Stalinist, and Bukharinist, which contended against each other in the 1920’5. But whereas in the 192»'s the contest ended in the establishment of the Stalinist monopoly and the suppression of all the other schools of thought, the present struggle can hardly lead to a similar outcome. Khrushchev, the leader of the centre, cannot afford to excommunicate the Maoist Left. Nor can Mao afford to pronounce anathema on Khrushchev. They and their supporters must therefore go on arguing and patching up their differences as best they can. They are, so to speak, condemned to do this in mutual tolerance, which does not come easy to either of them.

This relative tolerance is quite new to contemporary communism, which has been formed in the monolithic mould of Stalinism. It breaks up that mould; and it creates openings for viewpoints ot er than the Maoist and the Khrushchevite. One may doubt wh ther the conference would have been able to repeat, as it has done, the condemnation of Titoism, if Tito and his party had not chosen to remain outside the organisation. Within, the Poles, the Italians, and others form the Right wing. In Moscow, this Right preferred not to speak with its own voice: it was glad to see that Khrushchev took the initiative for the attack on the Chinese; and it lent its support to him. In the long run, however, a three-cornered contest may well develop; and the dispute which ostensibly is still between the Chinese and the. Russians only, is already cutting across various national parties. It is an innerparty as well as an inter-party affair. There are “revisionists” and “dogmatists" in Russia and even in China, and in quite a few other parties. Among the South-east Asians and Latin Americans the split between the Maoists and the Khrushchevites has already become more or less open.

Regional Effects The decisions of the Moscow conference foreshadow little or no change in the policies of the Communist parties of the West especially of those of Western Europe, where the relative stability of the existing regimes leaves little scope for revolutionary action in the near future. But the parties of the underdeveloped nations are likely to become more active and aggressive than hitherto.

This may be of particular importance for India, where the Communists of West Bengal have, in opposition to their national leadership, opted for the Maoist line. Expecting to score a great success at the next election, the Maoists of Calcutta hope to make of West Bengal a Communist stronghold, and declare that they will not surrender it to Nehru and Congress as meekly as their comrades in Kerala surrendered their stronghold. An intensification of revolutionary activity may also be expected in Latin America, where Maoism has been gaining ground.

The effect of the conference on Soviet diplomacy may be quite considerable. True, Khrushchev has been given a free hand to make an approach to the new American Administration; and another journey to the summit is about to begin. But the conference has also restricted Khrushchev’s freedom of movement and of bargaining. This is not to say mat the 81 Communist parties, big, small, and altogether tiny are, through a formal

dictating to the Soviet Premier what he has to do. It is rather that he can no longer pursue any policy in overt conflict with the Chinese and in defiance of the mood prevailing in the communist movement at large. Negotiations With U.S.

That mood allows Khrushchev to pick up with President' Kennedy the threads of negotiations where he and President Eisenhower left them; but it does not allow him to go back to the “Camp David spirit” with all the hail-fellow-well met panache so congenial to the Soviet leader. The conference has told him that in any negotiations w’ith the West he must be. and must be seen to be, a much tougher negotiator than he was in the past. It has allow’ed him to 'fly once again to the summit, but it has somewhat clipped his wings before the flight. Whether Khrushchev will act in the spirit of this instruction remains to be seen. If he does not, the Chinese, and not only they, will turn on him all their heavy guns; and the ideological barrage will be more fierce than ever.

A real change has thus occurred in the background against which the Soviet Government will confront the New American Administration. The relative ease and freedom of initiative which Soviet diplomacy enjoyed between 1954 and 1960 belongs to the past. In these years Khrushchev rid himself of his rivals Malenkov and Molotov, and seemingly became the sole master of Soviet diplmacy and policy. But now he has come under pressures from within the communist camp far more potent and severe than those to which he was ever exposed from his Russian rivals. The growing momentum of the communist "third of the world" has its impact even in Moscow. It shows itself in the fact that for all the renewed emphasis on the Soviet leadership of the Communist camp, the Russians can now lead only on condition that they also allow themselves to be led." Critical Period

The ideological truce between Peking and Moscow is designed to cover the critical period during which Moscow will be testing the intentions of the new American administration. The results of the testing will have a decisive influence on the further evolution of communist policy. Every move made by the new American President and the Soviet Premier, every phase in their negotiations (if there are anyi, every bit of progress made, and every failure to make any progress, will be scrutinised throughout the Communist world, and eagerly evaluated as evidence in support either of the Khrushchevite or of the Maoist line. The Khrushchevites will dwell on every event and incident which they may be able to interpret as evidence in favour of their policy of "active co-existence.” while the Maoists will pick up every straw in the wind to prove that no genuine compact between East and West is possible, and that nothing but uninhibited global class struggle can resolve the fundamental conflict by which the world is torn. In a sense, therefore. Mr Kennedy is going to be the unwitting arbiter of this inner Communist controversy.—(World Copyright Reserved.) (Concluded.)