Britain In Europe GERMANY NOT KEEN ON ENTRY OF RIVAL

Press, Volume XCIX, Issue 29363, 16 November 1960, Page 16

Britain In Europe GERMANY NOT KEEN ON ENTRY OF RIVAL

IBv

"LYNCEUS"

" of the “Economist")

■ From Che "Economist" inteilipence Unit)

London, November 7.—Two high civil servants representing the British Government have recently visited Bonn to pick up the threads of the discussions held last August between Mr Macmillan and Dr. Adenauer on relations between Britain and Europe. It is fortunate that the Foreign Office was represented at these latest talks because the MacmillanAdenauer conversations, which were interpreted in Britain in an essentially economic context, may. on closer inspection, be found to have been wholly concerned with political problems—at least on the Germap side. It was after these discussions in August that hopes suddenly waxed in Britain of an early entry into Europe. Some optimists suggested that Britain might find it possible to enter the Common Market. Others, more realistically, limited their expectations to the early negotiation of a treaty of association between the European Free Trade Association of seven countries and the European Economic Community of six. Even these hopes now appear to have evaporated. This may already have been discovered by the British experts who went to Bonn. Resentment Against France

The fact is that in Germany today there is no particular desire for a closer association between the Six and the Seven, or for the entry of Great Britain into Europe. There is, it is true, considerable resentment against France, especially since the Rambouillet meeting between Dr. Adenauer and President de Gaulle, and more especially since the subsequent visit of the French Prime Minister, Mr Debre, to Bonn. That resentment, however, is not due to the attempt on the part of France to dilute the political content of the Common Market or to block the entry of Britain into the European Economic Community. Rather it is due much more to the political problem created by France’s evident desire to go its ow. nuclear way and thus to undermine the unity and strength of N.A.T.O. Dr. Adenauer wishes to see N.A.T.O. reorganised and endowed with far greater power and responsibilities than it possesses at the moment. He is obsessed by the possibility of another Berlin crisis and by the need to maintain the unity of the Western world in the face of that threat. That was probably the whole intent of the cordiality and sympathy that marked the AdenauerMacmillan discussions. The words of conciliation which the German ■Chancellor addressed to the British Prime Minister—which most people interpreted as showing a readiness to ease Britain’s way into Europe—were probably intended to ensure that Britain was drawn more firmly into N.A.T.O. and that no desire for "summitry” would be allowed to undermine Britain’s adherence to the West. Dr. Adenauer has little interest in economic problems; he leaves these to his technicians and their considerations are in no way allowed to sway his political decisions.

The problem of the Six and the Seven is, therefore, left well in

the air and without prospect of an early solution. There are strains within the Common Market; and political difficulties in France may, in the not distant future, effect it profoundly. These, however, are additional reasons for strengthening the European Economic Community while the going is good. Germany is not planning to dominate that community, but the course of economic developments and the tremendous dynamic of German industrial expansion suggest that in due course Germany must economically. and then politically, occupy a position of priority. All the more reason, therefore, why Germany should not wish to hasten the entry of Britain into the club. As seen from the point of view of the Free Trade Association, the obstacles that handicap an early association with the Common Market also appear considerable. Three problems in particular will have to be resolved before any bridge can be secured. The first is the position of the Commonwealth, whose particular difficulties have loomed somewhat larger since the recent meeting of Commonwealth Finance Ministers in London. Sharing of Preferences

To the suggestion which has been made that this problem could readily be solved by allowing the rest of the Seven and the Six to share Britain’s preferences in the Commonwealth market, it must be answered that the quid pro quo for these preferences is free entry for Commonwealth goods into Britain. The countries of Continental Europe would have to offer something approaching this in order to share with Britain the advantages of Commonwealth preferences. The second obstacle is the protection of agriculture—a matter of hideous complication, and one which would loom large in any association that would allow Denmark, for example, to intrude into the Controlled market for agricultural products which is now being formed within th" Six. The third problem is the special one of the traditional neutrals, Switzerland, Sweden and Austria, within the Seven—no small obstacle given the political impulse behind the European Economic Community. It may yet be possible to weld the Six and the Seven into an all-European market, and plans to that effect are being considered. However, the prospects of securing this would seem now to lie in the second rather than in the first half of the 1960’5.