Suez Re-Assessed—III “HISTORY WILL UPHOLD EDEN”

Press, Volume XCIX, Issue 29206, 17 May 1960, Page 14

Suez Re-Assessed—III “HISTORY WILL UPHOLD EDEN”

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R. G. MENZIES,

Prime

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It is difficult to write tively about a is even more diffict It When raw contemporary. to • valued personal friend. Statesmen suffer from at least two occupational i'sadvantag* One is that if, as in the case of Anthony Edeo, they go . QU J, J* office in circumstances controversy, there is • able tendency to forget their other achievements and to permanent assessments in a sort of temporary heat Those who criticise or attack Eden over Suez should bear In mind that they may be (al I think they are) wrong, and that to judge him by that alone may prove to be a rank injustice to a man whose services to his country and to the world deserve calm and balanced and historical consideration. “ The other disadvantage of a statesman is that he alone cannot enjoy the wisdom of “hindsight” Those who applaud him at the time are strangely certain, after the event has turned out either badly or contentiously, that they never did agree with him. Modern history is full of examples of this human frailty. Abeolaie Courage For myself, I am an unrepentant supporter of Anthony Eden. His whole record shows Sim to be a man of patriotism, Surage, high intelligence and integrity. My Australian Labour predecessor, John Curtin, once described him as “the greatest Foreign Secretary of the century.” His resignation from the Chamberlain - Government arose from a powerful conviction that the dark forces of the world must be resisted. For most people, and perhaps for all, he was a figure of relative youth and absolute courage. He served a long apprenticeship before he became, by common consent. Prime Minister. His health had suffered, and he lived under constant physical strain. When Nasser confiscated the Suez Canal, Eden was shocked and stirred. What was to be done about an act so hostile to international law, and so damaging to the vital interests not only of Great Britain but of Commonwealth countries like India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Australia and New Zealand? Here we reach the great paradox. The man who had been in previous years praised and thanked for rejecting soft policies against lawlessness and aggression found himself, in 1956, in some quarters, assailed for taking strong and clear action.

As an actor in a small part of the Canal drama, J should set down just a few facts as I saw and see them. The so-calied “nationalisation” of the Canal was an unlawful exercise of alleged power, accompanied by force and the threat of force. It amounted to the repudiation of an international coatrack My own conviction, publicly expressed' in London and in Australia, was that the whole action was a breach of international law. The subsequent proposals made by 18 nations (including the U.S.A.) and explained in Cairo by a committee of which 1 was chairman, were fair and reasonable, recognised Egyptian territorial sovereignty, but sought truly international management of what was a supremely important international waterway. They were rejected by. Nasser. When the matter first came before the House of Commons, Eden made his position clear. He first pointed out that “no arrangements for the future of this great international waterway could be acceptable to Her Majesty’s Govenunent which would leave it in the unfettered control of a. single Power which could . , . exploit it purely for purposes of national policy.” He then added tl.ese pregnant words: “Her Majesty’s Government have thought it necessary to take certain precautionary measures of a mllit , 'ry nature.”

Approval of Force Mr Gaitskell made a supporting speech. He stated clearly: “I do not myself object to the precautionary steps announced by the Prime Minister today: 1 think that any Government would have to do that” Mr Herbert Morrison concluded that “if our Government and France, and, if possible the United States, should come to the conclusion that in the circumstances the use of force would be justifier, then ... it might well be the duty of honourable Members, Including myself, to say that we would give them support” Were all these words, spoken from both Jdes, just a bluff, to be called without risk? Was mobilisation a pointless gesture? Surely, these things meant that Nasser was put on warning that persistence in illegality would expose him io real risk. True, Nasser was speedily reported as having said to his military assistants that the British military preparations were just a bluff. In a peroodal talk I had with him in Cairo on September 5, 1956, I explained to him the strength of opinion in both London and Paris, and added, in substance, “I am ndt making any threats. Such things are not within either my authority or intention. But frankness as between two Heads ofGovernment requires me to offer In personal opinion that you are facing not a bluff, but a stark rendition of fact which your counttf should not ignore.” Nasser thanked me, said* he appreciated the force of what I had said, acknowledged his feeling of national responsibility, and assured me that he did not treat the Brit’sh action as bluff!

By our conference session the following afternoon his whole attitude J»a« stiffened. He had, like the rest of us, read in the morning Egyptain newspapers a statement of U.ffiA. policy which said, in headlines, that “there must be no use of force,” and that if the eighteen-nation pro-

posals were rejected othenj "must be considered.” From that time on, Nasser felt he was through the period o» danger.

Israel’s Choice Subsequent events are well known. There was a condition of great tension. Egypt was still

to support * Jhte charge. The plainest explanation is that Israel, lining somewhat precari. pusly, and having found the United rations a broken rera decided that if she had to acts of war against Israeli ship, ping by Egypt, the war might u well be fought on two sides. As Anthony Eden points out at page 524 of hto wtaorous book the British Cabinet ’ laranodj Egypt on the evening 2Sth and “durtiv hid reached a potatbaH-wuy beU? tian prisoners were being taken Cloudy no time was to be Brt if the Canal itself «ra ng* to become the battieground, with dieaetroue reanlta. Them potent facH naw clearly recorded, explain the muchwith the U3A and the Com. monweelth. Drue, two inesaagei were sent to President Eisenbower co the IMh. But th* American Administration wu at that very time, aa Ed* san

“urgently proposing to have Israel branded as an aggressor by the Security Council." In this state of emergency, not capable of being dealt with by debates and vetoes, Great Britain and France, on October 31, delivered an ultimatum to both countries requiring both sides to withdraw their fore* to a distance of 10 miles from the Suez Canal. Egypt rejected the ultimatum, and shortly thereafter the “invastae" occurred.

I have indicated my reuoni for believing that the action taken was correct To me, the only remaining question ii whether . the subsequent “cease fire” resolution of the United Nations was obeyed too promptly. An event which left Nasser, so far as his people knew or understood, undefeated wu fraught with future disaster. - , . Powerful Reasons . The 'reaatms are carefully ezplained io Anthony Eden’S bMk They were powerful reasons, u any fair-minded reader must allow. New circuratances had arisen, most of them hot created by Great Britain, but by others. But whatever the final judonent may be on this point, I maintain that the actions of the British Government had shown a realism and promptness and firmness not always to be found in modern times, and that history will uphold thesa. I would like to add a few words about John Footer Dulles, perhaps the moot controversial figure in Eden’s book. The work done and leadership shown by Dulles at the first Suos conference in London were alike admirable. The propoods ultimately adopted were baaed upon a draft largely made by Dulles. He subsequently gave me frost encouragement In the work of tile Sues Cmnnrittee, of which be bad, 1 understood, proposed that I should be chairman. • When the Cairo Mission failed, it wu Dulles who devised the plan for a Canal Users* Association. I am sure that he felt strongly that Nasser’s actions should be frustrated. Much later, he became a severe critic of the Franco-Brit-ish action, asserting that the whole matter should have gone to the United Nations. This view, which seemed to so many of us to be not practical at a time when a war was actually being fought in Egypt, can: ot be fairly understood unless it is realised that faith in the United Nations has a high place in American sentiment; and that "taking a matter to the United Nations” has been frequently treated in high American circles not as a matter of procedure but as the expression of policy in itself. Dulles had enormous responsibilities, in the discharge of which he was in many ways an individualist. Ha had fallen into the habit of “thinking aloud" at press conferences and freely debating with Congressional Committees alternative courses of action. Unde.- these circumstances he was variously reported, and frequently accused of inconsistency. Victory Conceded In the course of my.contacts with him, I found him a man of great parts and integrity. It >* a misfortune that in the crucial phases of the Canal episode his natural feeling for United Nations action should have, as I think, distracted him from the hard facts of a growing crisis and the disastrous implications of even appearing to concede a victory to an aggressive dictator. For (and we must face it) the action taken by the United Nations In “ordering out” Great Britain and France saved Nasser, strengthened his hand in the whole Middle East, and grievously weakened British prestige and power in one of the danger areas of the world.

TMe to tha thM of f e«r ariMec by •toffit-tato. natieani ■ SgwoL * closely aaaaaiatori wNlk th* events, who review the Sues epMeln the BgM jf Sir recently printed taTrertri form tai "TheProos*ithe Marquees of Salisbury,' then a member of the British Cabinet; Mr Hugh Gattskell, Leader of the Opposition; Mr R. G. Meades, Prime Minister of Australia; and Mr Robert Murphy, formerly United States Deputy Under-Secretary of State.