The Eden Memoirs KHRUSCHEV AND BULGANIN VISIT BRITAIN

Press, Volume XCIX, Issue 29112, 26 January 1960, Page 11

The Eden Memoirs KHRUSCHEV AND BULGANIN VISIT BRITAIN

Agenda Carries

Wide Range

[By the Rt. Hon. Sir Anthony Eden, K.G.]

At the summit conference in July, 1955, an invitation to visit Britain had been accepted by Marshal Bulganin and Mr Khrushchev. In December the Soviet leaders toured India and Burma, where their abuse of colonialism in general and Britain in Particular brought a reproof from the British Government.

Nevertheless, there was no cancellation of the visit to Britain which began on April 18, 1956. An agreed agenda for the talks included the Middle East situation as well as Europe, the Far East, disarmament and Anglo-Soviet relations.

Official talks took place in Downing Street and made a considerable call upon the endurance of our visitors. We considered topics concerning all parts of the world and our conversations went to the root of the matter. They were the longest international discussions between two powers in which I have ever taken part. As the Soviet representatives came into the Cabinet room at Downing Street to take their places opposite us at the third or fourth of our meetings, Mr Khrushchev remarked, “See how well trained we are, we file in like horses into their stalls." It was about colonial affairs that argument was the toughest and, at times, the roughest. The Russians thought that we had in mind their speeches in India and Burma and maintained that a question of principle was at stake. They would criticise any country which followed a policy of colonialism. We retorted that we were proud of what we had done and were doing in the Commonwealth and Empire to bring their peoples towards self-government. It was a continuous process; Malaya, the Gold Coast and Nigeria were present examples. We said that we had nothing to hide, but if our friendship was to grow, it must have a basis of understanding. The Russians conceded that the British must be given their due, but held tight to their principle. After much debate, I felt that even on this subject, where all Communists show the most stubbornly closed minds, we had at least paraded what were to our guests new arguments and they had listened to them.

Warm-Water Port Throughout their history the ippeal of the warm-water port has always been strong for the Russians. Istanbul, though frequently could never meet this need. It only admits to the Mediterranean, another enclosed sea, both ends of which were at one time controlled by Britain. The attraction of the Persian Gulf to the Russians has always lain as much in the outlet it would give to the wider oceans as in the oil itself, perhaps more. The leaders of the Revolution have emphasised the importance of making their gains in the East They understood that in Europe they would come up against a civilisation strongly based upon respect for individual man. There would be weaker barriers, if they turned towards the East As Zinoviev declared in 1925, “The road to world revolution lies through the East, rather than through the West.” When we discussed the Middle East in London, I told the Ruslians that the uninterrupted supply of oil was literally vital to our economy. They showed an understanding of our interest and appeared to be wiling to meet it I said I thought I must be absolutely blunt about the oil, because we would fight for it. Mr Khrushchev replied that I *ould hardly find sympathy with the Soviet Government if I said I was prepared to start a war. They, for their part, would only resort to war if an attack were made on them or on the Warsaw ract countries.

“Not Threatening Anybody”

. kter in the talks Mr Khrush®ev reverted to this topic and •? my statement, as he put it, I was prepared to fight a *ar in that part of the world. ° e raid that it was close to the Soviet frontiesr. If my state®®t was intended as a threat they must reject it I repeated what I had said was that »e could not live without oil and we had no intention of bestrangled to death. We were not threatening anybody. Later ' v «ts showed that the Russians this warning and underwood our position pretty well, troubles came, their openmoves were prudent. As to the Middle East arms “®itation, the Russians mainwith some justice, that the wmiem did not concern our J'o countries alone, nor did wish to take any initiative in matter themselves, though W were ready to hear any proothers might have to make. u ? «°th understood that the •“Mie East was. the area where of policy were likely to become acute. . ne * discussions did something Put that danger at a further remove. not shirk the topics on -z™ we disagreed. For inthe Soviet representatives m outspoken criticisms . Bagdad Pact I was left (J?. 016 conviction that if we uw make it plain and public u \ 00 further military bases established, by our«*vej or by the United States, countries of the Middle which were members of the Porta ♦ bring quite an imjfj!y measure of reassurance. ran»«?* r^y defined, such an arneed not interfere with purposes of the aJLI® ta our interest to give to economic activities

under the Bagdad Pact Russian infiltration was more to be feared than Russian invasion. To meet this, increasing prosperity in the area was the most effective weapon, though inevitably taking time to forge. The more emphasis we could put on it the more hope there was that gradually the Soviets would come to regard the pact for what it was, an expression of mutual help in an area of common interest and n °t a menace hovering over the oilfields of Baku. A short while ®Bo, threats had been uttered by •he Soviets at the consequences to Europe of building some alternative organisation to the European Defence Community. In fact, the Western European Union had come to be endured if not accepted, so in time might the Bagdad Pact. On disarmament, the Soviet leaders told us, in confidence and in advance, of action they proposed to take later in the reduction of conventional weapons. On the Far East, we both noted with relief that the tension in the Formosa Channel was less acute though not resolved. The Soviets had a warning to give of the danger of allowing the situation to drag on indefinitely.

Controls Upon Trade

Next, the Russians marshalled their objections to strategic controls upon trade. They maintained that these had not, in fact, done serious injury to the Soviet Union. On the contrary, they said, they had compelled them to manufacture or build for themselves whfere they would otherwise have been content to import For example, after the export of tankers by Denmark had been forbidden, Russia had built her own tankers and she was now exporting them. This did not prevent the Soviet leaders from expressing their resentment at the controls. We had to explain that these were not matters for ourselves alone and that there was considerable scope for increased trade outside them.

“A Hardy Biennial” Some progress was made with the hardly biennial so grimly described as "cultural exchanges.” We made it plain to our guests that there could not be an improvement in this aspect of Anglo-Soviet relations, if they continued to use for this purpose organisations in our country which were controlled by Communists. The Soviet leaders took the point and some improvement followed their return to Moscow. The subjects on which we failed to agree were more numerous. We recorded bluntly in our official statement that we had not reached an understanding on the means to achieve peace and security in Europe. All the same, I was sure that the Soviet leaders now had a clearer understanding of the views and considerations - underlying our policies. Marshal Bulganin and Mr Khrushchev pressed me to make a return visit to the Soviet Union. I accepted this invitation, although I could not then fix a definite date.

Rumpus At Labour Party’s Dinner

One incident during their visit made a marked impression on the Soviet leaders. The Labour Party’s dinner to them in the House of Commons had ended in a rumpus. Mr Khrushchev was indignant at what he regarded as the discourteous treatment meted out to him, and next day expressed himself vigorously to those with whom he spoke. This included the Foreign Secretary and myself. I did not encourage Mr Khrushchev to elaborate his views to me. I had never attacked the Government of my own country when abroad, however sharply I disagreed with their policies. By the same token, when in the Government I was not eager to hear criticism of the Opposition by toreignera. Both these are habits to which politicians might with advantage revert, though they do not Senear likely to do so. The Americans nowadays observe these restraints better than we • In my own mind, I was pretty sure that one of the factors which had led to such an unhappy meeting was the Labour leaders underestimation of the and ability of their Soviet guests. The last thing that men of Mr Khrushchev’s and background can endure is anything in the nature of intellectual patronage.

Remarkable Fund Of

Knowledge

The truth was that these men had a remarkable fund of knowledge not only of the Soviet Unions special problems) but also * thp world s weak points, in proSed t.lks at Number 10 I found Marshal and Mr Khrushchev perfectly capable of upholding their end of the discussion on any sub?ect They did this without briefs guidance from any of aek advisers. whole life conducting. jnw national affairs, and X viewed this

performance with respect. It will be tragic for us, and it may be fatal, to underestimate these men and their knowledge. T,P ne , of topics which Mr Khrushchev and I discussed from time to time was the immense burden imposed upon our countries by the effect of the rapid progress of science on the production of armaments. No sooner is a weapon invented and put into mass production, than it is outdated by some later invention. I found Khrushchev more alive to this problem than I had expected, in view of the control over finance that a dictatorship exercises. New—And Then Museum Piece After a dinner at Number 10, he told Sir Winston Churchill, who was a guest, how we had all been spending money on increasing the speed of aircraft, but now the whole emphasis had switched to guided missiles and a great deal of the previous effort was wasted. He said that he and Marshal Bulganin had come to Britain in one of their newest cruisers, but already it was practically a museum piece. Probably its future role would be to act as a super-yacht for such ceremonial occasions, but he could not visualise surface ships engaging in duels at ranges of hundreds of miles. He added that this must be a matter of regret for Sir Winston Churchill as a former head of the Navy, but the march of time was inexorable.

I like to exchange ideas with intelligent men who can express the mind and thought of foreign countries, whether in politics or the arts. Now that politics are over for me, I look forward to the last most of all. As a result of ten days spent together in almost constant contact, I felt that I knew these Russians as no volumes of dispatches could have revealed them to me. I found their characters, especially Mr Khrushchev’s, deeply intriguing. I am sorry that, for diverse reasons, I am unlikely to meet either of them again.

Personal Contacts There is dispute about the place of personal contacts in modern diplomacy. Every prime minister or foreign secretary is apt to consider himself better qualified than most to make contacts with leading foreign statesmen. This failing has caused some people to hold firmly the contrary view, that there should be no contacts between foreign governments except through diplomatic channels. However natural in the leisured eighteenth century, this practice is not sufficient now. Castlereagh was wise to change it. An age that reaches for the moon can hardly refuse to make direct contact with its earthly neighbours Travel is accepted as educative and to have personal contact with foreign statesmen is to travel in the mind. I have found it an advantage to know the man to whom I was addressing a communication through ambassadors. When one has cantered many miles, it is good to take a jump from time to time. Direct international contacts are the fences of diplomatic life.

[After a week-end of informal talks at Chequers, the Russian visitors left on A pril 27.]

Back at Number 10, I had to decide what our policy should now be. The present Soviet rulers had as much confidence as their predecessors in the ultimate triumph of communism. They were unshakeably determined. The methods they would employ might be different from those of Stalin and they might be harder to meet.

Many influences had served to bring about this change, including the power of the nuclear deterrent as a major influence against world war. We had to consider the adjustments needed in our policies to cope with a new situation, for a new situation it undoubtedly was. We were moving from a period of fixed positions to a period of some flexibility. In military terms, Khrushchev had stopped preparing for the last war and was modifying the plans for the war that might have been, if no nuclear deterrent had existed.

“Formidable Problems”

All this set formidable problems for us. We had entered the nuclear field, we were making the hydrogen bomb, yet neither in Europe nor in the Middle East could these entirely replace conventional forces, which were still insufficiently mobile. Our

overburdened economy had somehow to meet these various demands, at a time when every new weapofi cost twice as much as its predecessor.

In a month or two’s time, the Commonwealth Conference of Prime Ministers would present an opportunity to examine these consequences. Meanwhile we had to look again at our own plans. On April 30 I sent a minute to the Foreign Secretary [Mr Selwyn Lloydl and a number of my colleagues: “Now that the Russian visit is over, it is necessary to review our policy. There are a number of points to be looked at. Our main weapons of resistance to Soviet encroachment have hitherto been military. But do they meet the needs of the present time? I do not believe that the Russians have any plans at present for military aggression in the West. On the other hand, are we prepared with other weapons to meet the new challenge? This seems to me to be the major issue of foreign policy. It will not be dealt with merely by Dulles’s new thoughts for N.A.T.0., whatever they may be. But it is bound up with a review of our defence policy and it may be better to handle it in that connexion. We must discuss this before you leave for N.A.T.0.” Urgent Questions I further told the Foreign Secretary that we would meet our senior colleagues the next day to discuss this and Anglo-Soviet relations, including trade, the Middle East and disarmament I considered that these questions were all urgent and that we must not lose the impetus.

There was one factor in the situation which had certainly influenced the new Soviet leaders. Western solidarity had been created by Stalin’s policies. It was the military threat to the West, expressed in immensely superior Soviet military power and in the attempt to blockade Berlin, which brought N.A.T.O. into being. As the menace of major war receded, the existing basis of Western cohesion against Soviet encroachment might be weakened. We should need to adjust bur policy with more speed if we were to maintain the solidarity of the free world to meet the new challenge from the Soviet Union. In foreign policy it looked as though we should lay more emphasis in future an economic propaganda weapons and less on military strength. These considerations I discussed with the Foreign Secretary and with the Minister of Defence [Sir Walter Moncktonl before their departure for N.A.T.O. They agreed to place them in the forefront of the forthcoming discussions. It was evidence to us all that adjustments would have to be made with N.A.T.O. to meet the new situation, but it was important to avoid any premature dismantling of the military foundations of the alliance. We wished to justify the necessary changes for technical military reasons as much as for political ones. Both were real.

“Sharp Backward Step”

At this moment a trade proposal came from the United States Government which could only be regarded as a sharp step backwards. At our meeting in Washington in January, the United States Government had undertaken, at the instance of the President, to examine relaxations of the existing restrictions on trade with China “now.” In the months that followed we had done everything we could to get some fulfilment of this undertaking. The position was not made any easier by the fact that our agreement to such action had been publicly announced in Washington, with the result that Parliament clamoured week by week for some results.

A few days after the Russians had left, the long-awaited American reply arrived. This suggested that, in return for small relaxations in the existing restrictions on trade with China, we should agree to reinstate the prohibition on the export of copper wire to the Soviet Union. There were no strong strategic arguments in favour of this action, nor could we accept that copper wire was of direct military importance. It would be most embarrassing foi us to reinstate the prohibition, for our increased exports of coppei wire were a principal ingredient of the recent expansion in AngloSoviet trade. Politically, we could hardly be expected to agree to the imposition of this further restriction on trade with the Soviet bloc so soon after we had agreed, in the talks with the Soviet leaders, to work for an expansion of trade.

* For all these reasons, my colleagues and I agreed that the

American suggestion must be rejected. It had first reached me in a message from the President. I was disturbed, not only because of the new restriction proposed on Russian trade, but because we were still making no progress to help the industries of Malaya and Hong Kong, who depended so much on Far Eastern markets. The existing restrictions were creating very serious difficulties for them. In particular, Malaya must be freed of all conditions governing her trade in rubber.

After consultations with one or two of my colleagues, we agreed that I should reply to the President, warning him of our concern and that the Foreign Secretary should take up these matters with the American Secretary of State at N.A.T.O. within the next few days. Progress in reducing restrictions on China trade continued wretchedly slow, until the seizure of the Suez Canal engulfed this and much else besides. Copyright. The Times Publishing Company, Ltd.. London, 1960 All rights reserved Distributed ay Opera Mundi, Parts Reproduction in whole or in part strictly prohibited <To Be Continued Tomorrow)