The Press THURSDAY, JANUARY 21, 1960. Cypriot Independence Delayed

Press, Volume XCIX, Issue 29108, 21 January 1960, Page 12

The Press THURSDAY, JANUARY 21, 1960. Cypriot Independence Delayed

The decision to postpone the granting of independence to Cyprus was hardly unexpected. After the London conference of February, 1959, one year was allowed for the Cypriots and Britain to prepare for the change. It was an optimistic estimate of the period needed to create a stable governmental system for a strife-ridden people, lacking even racial homogeneity. Until recent weeks progress towards creating this system had been remarkable; Archbishop Makarios had proved his statesmanship, and had been surprisingly accommodating; the traditional enmity between the Greeks and the Turkish Cypriot minority appeared to have been satisfactorily submerged. But after the draft constitution of the Cypriot Republic was almost complete, the most difficult questions remained unsolved: the size of the two military bases, at Akrotiri and Dhekelia, over which Britain will retain sovereignty; and the new republic’s relationship to the Commonwealth. Britain, Greece, Turkey, the Greek Cypriots, and the Turkish Cypriots are all participating in the current negotiations. Thus Britain has escaped from its unenviable role as mediator between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Greece and Turkey share Britain’s anxiety to maintain the Western defences of which the Cyprus bases are a part; and they may contribute usefully towards securing the retention of the bases on an efficient footing. In present circumstances, however, the bases may be less valuable strategically to N.A.T.O. than to the Central Treaty Organisation (formerly the Bagdad Pact) or to Britain’s own interests.

The Cypriots have offered 36 square miles for the bases, or about one-third of the area Britain seeks. In addition to the strictly military institutions,

the British estimate of requirements covers training facilities and adequate water supplies. Cypriot villages (which provide labour for the bases) are to be excluded; but the necessarily irregular boundaries may cause difficulties. A conceivable compromise would be to confine British sovereignty to the strictly military territory and to place the surrounding land under Cypriot administration. Blame for the present deadlock can be fairly imputed to General Grivas, the former terrorist leader who, from nis exile in Greece, has attempted to further his own political ambitions on the Greek mainland by continued interference in Cypriot affairs. He appears successfully to have inflamed Cypriot opinion by accusing Britain of trying to keep “the “ most fertile part of Cyprus ”. Cypriot membership of the Commonwealth, according to General Grivas, would be “ nationally inadmissible and “ economically detrimental ”,

Too many people may have been comforted by the apparent waning of General Grivas’s power in Cyprus. From time to time he has proved a stormy opponent for Archbishop Makarios, who may now feel compelled to take more heed of his views. The Archbishop had expected to be unopposed for the Presidency of the new republic; at the election, onethird of the Greek votes were cast for Mr John Clerides, the nominee of a group united solely by antipathy towards Archbishop Makarios. During the final stage of the constitutional negotiations, the Archbishop may be asserting his personal position by adopting a policy of intransigence in order to mollify General Grivas and his supporters. At this late hour, Cyprus should want no more wreckers—not even Grivas.