The Press SATURDAY, DECEMBER 19, 1959. Western Disunity Imperils N.A.T.O.

Press, Volume XCVIII, Issue 29082, 19 December 1959, Page 12

The Press SATURDAY, DECEMBER 19, 1959. Western Disunity Imperils N.A.T.O.

Dissensions within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation probably endanger world peace more than any present threat from Russia. Ten years ago high hopes were raised by the establishment of N.A.T.0.; but tnuch has occurred, especially during the past year, to undermine the foundations of the alliance. The consequences of a summit meeting—if one eventuates—are unpredictable. Yet it is abundantly clear that the improved prospects of a European detente have served Russia’s ends well by aggravating N.A.T.O.’s plight. Why, the optimists ask, should military forces be built up if peace is already assured by Russia’s conciliatory mood? Why devote scarce resources to defence when industrial development is crying out for capital? The smaller N.A.T.O. Powers tend in this milder international climate to resent the assumption of independent diplomatic initiative by the Big Powers’ leaders. N.A.T.0., the smaller Countries feel, is being bypassed in any case; why should they concur retrospectively in decisions made for it? This is dangerous doctrine, which will please only the Communists. At the beginning of its second deCade, N.A.T.O. stands at the crossroads. It may march forward to wider usefulness; it could founder in disunity. The current sessions of the N.A.T.O. Ministerial Council are complementary to the Western presummit conference, also in Paris. (This is one reason why observers Reared that little constructive Work might be done by the N.A.T.O. Ministers, who might also be preoccupied with President Eisenhower’s meeting with General de Gaulle, upon which fests the hope of better relations with France. Reports of Cbntinued squabbling in the JjI.A.T.O. Council have not augured well for renewed Western solidarity. The Council’s decision to review the objectives and functioning of the alliance is therefore especially welcome. If the resolute spirit of the Ministerial communique can be translated into fact, 'Western defences may be assured against a premature assumption of superfluity; but the Ministers’ announcement that they will resume negotiations after the pre-summit conference indicates the difficulty of harmonising divergent policies. ; N.A.T.O. was envisaged originally as a military institution; £ut it has been dominated increasingly by political pressures. The present list of members’ grievances is formidable. . Coldwar manoeuvres have occupied the United States and Britain go fully that they have probably underrated the urgency of repairing N.A.T.O. Bickerings about the United States’ internal defences have been reflected in European uncertainties, indecision, and misgivings. The tenuous hope of general disarmament, kept no more than alive by occasional well-timed Russian gestures and more recently by the Geneva conference, has been*enough to make members of the alliance reluctant to supply their quotas of men and equipment io the N.A.T.O. forces. There Jias been a growing reliance on the “nuclear deterrent”, despite the doubts and arguments as to how the deterrent should 3be maintained and whether

manned bombers or guided missiles should receive priority. Western conventional forces — those equipped with nonnuclear weapons—have been neglected. Ten years ago the specific military threat that N.A.T.O. was intended to deter was assessed in terms of the known Communist forces available to overrun Europe. At that time atomic bombs had barely entered into tactical considerations. Today, if an atomic holocaust were to be avoided, conventional forces would still be necessary to resist aggression. Though the Communists have fewer men under arms than a decade ago they are better equipped and therefore stronger. By contrast, N.A.T.O. is militarily undernourished and debilitated by disputes about bases, weapons, and manpower. Every time the Americans report a rocket failure at Cape Canaveral, West European morale suffers through suspicion of the United States’ technical capabilities and fear of Soviet ascendancy. Gaullist France is the most intransigent of the allies, and the readiest tf> put petty nationalism before continental security. To bolster his philosophy of French grandeur, General de Gaulle wants his home-made atom bomb, regardless of the embarrassment to Western negotiators with Mr Khrushchev. In Western relations with France, only the Algerian war is comparable with “la bombe ” as a major cause of strain. The N.A.T.O. Council is discussing a defence report submitted to the recent Assembly of the Western European Union, also in Paris. This report, prepared by a committee of which Mr F. W. Mulley, a British Labour Parliamentarian, was rapporteur, suggested a joint European strategic nuclear force as a complement to the United States Strategic Air Command. Britain is the only existing source of nuclear weapons in Western Europe. The British Goverhment is believed to be considering a nuclear pool project in the context of its search for links with the European Economic Community. The project would need United States and Canadian sanction. The French may not like the scheme; but by now most statesmen, including Dr. Adenauer, seem to be weary of Gaullist tantrums.

On the economic front, a revitalised N.A.T.O. could serve new purposes. This has been emphasised by the organisation’s Secretary-General (Mr Paul-Henri Spaak). Citing the example of economic co-ordin-ation among the Soviet satellites, Mr Spaak last month called for similar efforts by Western Europe and for an easing of the United States European burdens. Mr Spaak’s plea was timely because of American restiveness about overseas commitments. Moreover, ‘the value of Europe as a front-line bastion of America has diminished; and, before any conclusive American withdrawal from the continent, the N.A.T.O. Powers should have their plans concerted. A prerequisite is unity within the alliance. Whether it is con trived through Mr Eisenhower s avuncular influence or through the N.A.T.O. Council itself is immaterial. By the death of N.A.T.O. the free world could lose its linch-pin, while Russia gained the victory.